Banking competition and welfare

We develop a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, higher social welfare, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium, they are empirically relevant, and carry significant implications for policy guidance.     

Time series approaches to Italian regional convergence

This article investigates the evolution of the gap between Italian regions and Italy as a whole during the period of 1980 to 2007. We tested for the presence of the stochastic and β-convergence hypotheses using different time series approaches. The former was studied, first, for the entire sample period and then, with an exogenous instantaneous break in the series. The presence of β-convergence, instead, was estimated considering a known and an unknown trend break date model. Our results show that most of the regions do not converge in an ‘actual’ way, since they do not present a stochastic and β-convergence simultaneously.     

Vertical Innovation and Catching-Up: Implications of EU Integration for CEECs-5

We analyze the role of vertical innovation in trade patterns for developing economies trading with technologically advanced countries. A model is presented where the international diffusion of knowledge, promoted by economic integration, is the source of a technological catching up and leads to a convergence in the quality of traded goods, with a positive effect on exports. We then turn our attention on the evolution of trade between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs-5) and their European Union partner countries, assessing whether economic integration has increase the quality of the goods produced. For the period 1995–2005, we find evidence of the increasing role of intra-industry trade and vertical differentiation and a process of specialization in higher quality products, especially in the medium- and high-skill sectors.

COMPETITION AND THE STRATEGIC CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CASE

We investigate how market competition affects the incentive to adopt a non‐profit‐maximizing behaviour. The analysis is developed in a strategic delegation framework in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in firm's relative performance. We study how the optimal delegation scheme is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We prove that the distortion from a profit‐maximizing rule decreases as market becomes less concentrated, while it increases as demand becomes more elastic. Finally, we discuss the impact of market competitiveness on the welfare‐enhancing ability of delegation contracts.     

Information Acquisition in Financial Markets

Previous work on information and financial markets has focused on a special set of assumptions: agents have exponential utility, and random variables are normally distributed. These assumptions are often necessary to obtain closed-form solutions. We present an example with alternative assumptions, and demonstrate that some of the conclusions from previous literature fail to hold. In particular, we show that in our example, as more agents acquire information, prices do not necessarily become more informative, and agents may have greater incentive to acquire information. Learning can therefore be a strategic complement, allowing for the possibility of multiple equilibria.     

Explaining Russia's Currency and Financial Crisis

The paper attempts to sketch a framework for understanding Russia's August 1998 financial and currency crises with reference to the main theories put forward so far. Our thesis is that, while not fitting easily into any pre-existing framework, the Russian crises shares many features of first-generation models inasmuch as it was largely due to inconsistencies among an overvalued peg, tight money, and an evident inability to address the fiscal deficit. In other terms, it derived from the incompatibility between standard IMF stabilisation policies and the difficulties that Russia was facing as a transition economy. On the other hand, by touching both currency markets and the banking sector, the Russian Episode shares also important features of the twin crises framework.The analysis considers the role of exchange rate movements and capital flows on Russia's rising vulnerability, fiscal problems and the building up of the public debt. It assesses the state of the Russian Banking sector and discusses the contagion effects of the Asian crisis and policy response. It shows how the core of the Russian crises lies in an unsound, IMF-backed, defence of the rouble, which in 1998 had become increasingly unsustainable.     

Income Distribution in Network Markets

We enquiry about the effects of first and second order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, within the standard model of a market with network externalities and hump-shaped demand curve. This issue is analyzed in the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. We find that, while under perfect competition both types of distributional changes result in higher output, provided marginal costs are low enough, in the monopoly case the final outcome depends on the way income distribution and the network externality interact in determining market demand elasticity.     

Labor Income and Predictable Stock Returns

We propose a novel economic mechanism that generates stock returnpredictability in both the time series and the cross-section.Investors’ income has two sources, wages and dividendsthat grow stochastically over time. As a consequence the fractionof total income produced by wages fluctuates depending on economicconditions. We show that the risk premium that investors requireto hold stocks varies with these fluctuations. A regressionof stock returns on lagged values of the labor income to consumptionratio produces statistically significant coefficients and largeadjusted R²s. Tests of the model’s cross-sectional predictionson the set of 25 Fama–French portfolios sorted on sizeand book-to-market are also met with considerable support.     

Organizational Structure and the Choice of Price versus Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly

We consider the choice of price/quantity of a public and a private firm in a mixed differentiated duopoly. First, we study the way in which the strategic choice of the market variable is affected by different given organizational structures (managerial or entrepreneurial) of the public and the private firm. Second, we investigate how the price/quantity choice interacts with the endogenous choice of the organizational structure, thus determining a subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms choose to behave as price‐setters and to adopt a managerial structure.     

The macrodynamics of financial fragility within a hard peg arrangement

The paper presents an open-economy macrodynamical growth model with the aim of giving an endogenous characterisation to the process that leads a small country with a currency-board arrangement to accumulate dangerously high levels of external debt and become vulnerable to macroeconomic instability. The macrodynamics of the model results from the combination of the commitment to maintain the peg - that makes liquidity closely dependent on the dynamics of foreign reserves - and the non-linear real and financial interactions that drives the pro-cyclical behaviour of the economy. Within this context, the external financing ease during an economic upswing leads to debt-supported growth and financial fragility; the consequent deterioration of profitability expectations brings about a capital reversal that, in the absence of monetary stabilisation tools, makes the currency arrangement unsustainable. A financial crisis may thus turn into a currency crisis.We run a continuous-time estimation of a non-linear differential equations system for Argentina during the years of the currency-board arrangement. We find that two steady-state solutions exist. The local stability and sensitivity analysis show that both equilibria are unstable and that the qualitative nature of the equilibria depends in particular on lenders' responsiveness to the degree of leverage. We also show that relaxing the assumption on the currency arrangement and allowing for an autonomous monetary policy makes both equilibria stable.