Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation

Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.     

A note on price futures versus revenue futures contracts

Here we consider the hedging roles of a price futures contract versus a revenue futures contract. In the absence of idiosyncratic output risk, the revenue contract almost always dominates the price contract. Idiosyncratic output risk provides conditions under which the price contract should dominate. When production risk is largely idiosyncratic, a producer with an anticipated long actuals position might combine a long revenue futures position with a short price futures position. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:503–512, 2004     

SUPPLY CHAIN INFORMATION SHARING IN A VENDOR MANAGED INVENTORY PARTNERSHIP

Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) involves the vendor making the replenishment decision for products supplied to a customer based on various inventory and supply chain policies. Information sharing between supply chain members is required in VMI. Sometimes VMI decisions are delayed and/or the information shared is inaccurate. This research examines the effects of information delay and accuracy, and the sharing of sales and forecast information in a VMI environment facing stationary and nonstationary demand. The simulation experiments show the impact of information delay, information inaccuracy, and information sharing on a variety of performance measures, including inventory levels and fill rates.     

The structure of marketing channel relationships

Distribution channel research has been advanced in recent years by contributions based on the political economy paradigm, transaction cost analysis, and relationship marketing. Drawing on these bodies of thought, we propose a new conceptualization of the structure of marketing channel relationships. Relationship structure is defined in terms of decision-making structure and operational integration. The proposed model of channel structure antecedents and consequences is consistent with the major research paradigms but extends beyond simple categorical assemblages of constructs to provide an ordered set of relationships based on theory and empirical research. This conceptualization reconciles some apparent contradictions in the literature and provides a clear focus for structure, process, and performance research in channels. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from Louisiana State University. He has published in the areas of marketing channels, retailing, and logistics. His work has appeared in theJournal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Marketing Channels, International Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management, Journal of Marketing Education, and others. He served as the managing director of public relations with the Federal Express Corporation before entering the Ph.D. program at Alabama. He holds a B.B.A. in accountancy from the University of Mississippi and an M.A. in marketing from the University of Alabama.     

Uniform Commercial Policy, Illegal Trade, and the Real Exchange Rate: A Theoretical Analysis

Countries on fixed exchange rates sometimes use uniform tariffcum subsidy (UTCS) schemes as a way of achieving a real depreciationwithout disturbing the nominal exchange rate. A potential drawbackof this policy in relation to an across-the-board devaluationis that a UTCS scheme provides incentives for illegal trade.Using an optimizing model with currency convertibility and illegaltrade. I find that welfare is lower under a UTCS scheme thanunder a corresponding across-the-board devaluation and thatin some cases the real exchange rate actually appreciates inresponse to an increase in the UTCS rate.