The Effects of Performance Measurement and Compensation on Motivation: An Empirical Study

Summary This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance measurement and compensation system affect the motivation of employees. Our survey results demonstrate a positive relationship between the perceived characteristics of the complete compensation system and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is not affected by the design of monetary compensation, but by promotion opportunities. The compensation system also significantly affects work satisfaction and turnover intent. Our results have both managerial as well as policy implications. We would like to thank the organization and the participants of the 2002 conference of the Performance Measurement Association in Boston for helpful discussions and also seminar participants of the Dutch Labor Market Conference. We are grateful for the comments provided by Bruno S. Frey. The paper has also significantly benefited from the suggestions and comments of two anonymous referees.     

From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules

Under numerical fiscal rules, such as those underpinning EMU,governments have strong temptations to use accounting tricksto meet the fiscal constraints. Given these political incentives,fiscal variables that in the past were regarded as a mere residualacquire a strategic role. This is the case of the so-calledstock-flow adjustment (SFA) which reconciles deficit and debtdevelopments. We develop a simple theoretical model where deficitsand two distinct SFA components (one that could be used to reducethe deficit figures and the other to impact debt figures instead)are determined as a result of a constrained optimisation byfiscal authorities. Econometric evidence provides results consistentwith the model findings. The SFA component related to the purposeto hide deficits rises with the recorded deficit, while thesales of financial assets designed to keep the debt under controlrise with both debt and deficit. When deficits are in excessof the 3 percent limit, accounting gimmicks become more sensitiveto the size of deficits. The SGP per se does not appear to increasethe extent to which higher deficits trigger more accountinggimmicks. However, the SGP seems associated with a more intenseuse of accounting gimmicks irrespective of the level of deficit.Such accounting practices have greatly contributed to the lossof credibility of Economic and Monetary Union's fiscal rules.If properly implemented, the reformed Pact, which stresses durableadjustment and long-run sustainability, should help curb suchperverse incentives. (JEL codes: E61, H62, H87)     

Earnings Instability and Tenure

We study the effect of tenure on earnings instability in Italy using the reforms of temporary employment contracts, which affected the average tenure of workers differentially across cohorts. We develop a model of earnings dynamics, and we exploit the variation of tenure and instability over time and across birth cohorts to estimate policy‐relevant parameters. Our results indicate that each year of tenure on the job reduces earnings instability by 11 percent; the drop is faster in the first three years of the match. Workers on a temporary contract have an earnings instability up to 100 percent higher than workers on a permanent contract.     

Firms' financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition

Thin capitalization rules have become an important element in the corporate tax systems of developed countries. This paper sets up a model where national and multinational firms choose tax-efficient financial structures and countries compete for multinational firms through statutory tax rates and thin capitalization rules that limit the tax-deductibility of internal debt flows. In a symmetric tax competition equilibrium, each country chooses inefficiently low tax rates and inefficiently lax thin capitalization rules. We show that a coordinated tightening of thin capitalization rules benefits both countries, even though it intensifies competition via tax rates. When countries differ in size, the smaller country not only chooses the lower tax rate but also the more lenient thin capitalization rule.     

Spillovers from agglomerations and inward FDI: a multilevel analysis on sub-Saharan African firms

This paper adopts multilevel analysis to study the agglomeration-performance nexus for domestic firms in sub-Saharan Africa. We show that contextual factors can explain up to 30 % of the variance in firms’ productivity, more than half of which depends on the geographic location. Our results show also that African firms’ productivity is positively correlated to the size of the agglomeration when they locate in larger cities specialized in different sectors, while the relation turns negative when they face direct competition from firms in the same industry. These effects are similar in the services and the manufacturing industries, even if in the latter positive spillovers are found to be conditional to the presence of backward and forward linkages with nearby firms. Finally, we are able to show that these effects are also confirmed when domestic firms locate close to foreign multinationals, especially those coming from the South.     

Does Gibrat's Law hold among young,small firms?

According to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. Aimed at extending this line of investigation, the present paper uses quantile regression techniques to test whether Gibrat's Law holds for new entrants in a given industry: that is for new small firms in the early stage of their life cycle. The main finding is that for some selected industries in Italian manufacturing Gibrat's Law fails to hold in the years immediately following start-up, when smaller firms have to rush in order to achieve a size large enough to enhance their likelihood of survival. Conversely, in subsequent years the patterns of growth of new smaller firms do not differ significantly from those of larger entrants, and the Law therefore cannot be rejected.JEL Classification: L11, L60Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual EARIE Conference (Lausanne, 7-10 September 2000) and at seminars held between 2000 and 2003 at the Economics Department of Harvard University, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Ferrara, the University of Bologna, the Bank of Italy, and Athens University of Economics & Business. We would like to thank Carlo Bianchi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Giovanni Dosi, Steven Klepper (Editor), Stephen Martin, Ariel Pakes, Aman Ullah and, in particular, Helen Louri and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from MIUR (Year 2000; protocol #MM13038538_001; project leader: E. Santarelli) is gratefully acknowledged.Correspondence to: E. Santarelly     

What is the role of legal systems in financial intermediation? Theory and evidence

We develop a theory’ and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach of comparing two sets of fixed-effect regressions, we also find that the investor’s legal system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.