Rational expectations for large CGE models: A practical algorithm and a policy application

We describe a simple iterative method for solving large dynamic CGE models under rational expectations. Details are given for Australia's MONASH model but the approach applies to a wide range of CGE models. The method is automated in the RunMONASH Windows software, putting CGE modelling under rational expectations within the reach of non-specialist modellers. We provide an illustrative application in which MONASH results under rational expectations are compared with results under static expectations. The application and supporting software can be downloaded. Results from the application are interpreted in terms of elementary economic mechanisms.     

The contracting value of tainted reports in cost reduction settings

While cost accounting is a well-developed discipline with a rich institutional past, it is criticized for being manipulable. This criticism is due, in part, to the existence of multiple, yet equally accepted cost allocation procedures or cost estimation techniques. Employing a principal-agent model, cost accounting is modeled as a menu of alternative methods which, conditional on agent effort, produce noisy, unbiased and independently distributed (i.e., equally defensible) measures from which a single realization is selected ex post as the report used to contract with the agent. Assuming that the report does not indicate which method produced it, the report modeled is “tainted” in that the lowest (most favorable to the agent) outcome is reported, where the “amount” of tainting corresponds to the menu's size. The paper identifies bright-line conditions where the principal's expected net payoff is independent of the amount of tainting, demonstrating that tainting does not necessarily affect the report's incentive value.     

Does housework lower wages? Evidence for Britain

This paper uses the British Household Panel Survey to present the first estimates of the housework-wage relationship in Britain. Controlling for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, we find that housework has a negative impact on the wages of men and women, both married and single, who work full-time. Among women working part-time, only single women suffer a housework penalty. The housework penalty is uniform across occupations within full-time jobs but some part-time jobs appear to be more compatible with housework than others. We find tentative evidence that the housework penalty is larger when there are children present.     

The employment environment for youth in rural South Africa: A mixed-methods study

South Africa has high youth unemployment. This article examines the predictors of youth employment in rural Agincourt, Mpumalanga Province. A survey of 187 out-of-school 18 to 24 year olds found that only 12% of women and 38% of men were currently employed. Men with skills/training were significantly more likely to report employment, mostly physical labour (adjusted odds ratio: 4.5; confidence interval: 1.3, 15.3). In-depth interviews with 14 of the youth revealed that women are perceived more suitable for formal employment, which is scarce, informing why women were more likely to pursue further education and yet less likely to be employed. Ten key informants from local organisations highlighted numerous local youth employment resources while, in contrast, all youth in the sample said no resources were available, highlighting a need for the organisations to extend their services into rural areas. Because these services are focused on entrepreneurship, programmes to increase financial literacy and formal employment opportunities are also needed.     

Political and Economic Inequities and the Shaping of Institutions and Redistribution

This article studies the joint effect of political and economic inequalities on redistributive taxation and institutional quality. The theoretical model suggests that income inequality, coupled with political bias in favor of the rich, decreases redistribution and lowers institutional quality. The effect of the former is to increase productive investment, and the effect of the latter is to decrease it—with resulting ambiguous implications for economic growth. Testing these predictions empirically in a panel of countries, we find that inequality has a negative effect on both institutional quality and redistribution.