Long term risk sharing contracts as an approach to establish public–private partnerships for investment into next generation access networks

This paper develops an investment/pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks which, along with other applications, is applicable to public–private partnership projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used for finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of next generation access (NGA) infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk sharing concept” has several notable benefits compared with the traditional regulatory approach. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thus the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, including in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur.     

Product Market Competition,Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation

This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyse the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand‐collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002–2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.     

Transaction taxes, greed and risk aversion in an agent-based financial market model

Recent agent-based financial market models came to the result that taxing financial transactions does not per se increase financial stability and that the response of volatility and misalignments to rising tax rates seem to be u-shaped. Moreover, greed and the risk appetite of traders are often blamed for financial instability and there is no evidence how greed and risk aversion affect the effectiveness of regulations in financial markets. We aim to add to this gap in the literature by analyzing how the effectiveness of transaction taxes depend on different behavioral patterns within an agent-based framework. Our simulations indicate that a tax rate of 0.1% demarcates the stabilizing tax regime from the destabilizing one. We figure out that transaction taxes are less effective, either when chartists trade more aggressively, fundamentalists trade less aggressively, agents switch more frequently between trading strategies or only have short memory in their fitness measures. Lower risk aversion of agents, however, makes higher tax rates more effective as indicated by a flatter volatility response curve. We conclude that additional regulations should concentrate on the traders’ responsibilities for their risk-exposure.     

What do Russians think about transition?1

We use data from the 2006 round of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to describe perceptions of the Russian population about the transition process and the role of the state compared with that of free markets. We find that about one‐half of the Russian population is disappointed with transition and a large majority is in favour of high state regulation and state provision of goods and services. High demand for government regulation and increased state intervention coexists with a low level of trust in government institutions and recognition of high and rising levels of corruption. The findings are consistent with the theory developed by Aghion et al. (2009) . In an environment with poor social capital, private business imposes negative externalities on the society and society chooses to demand more state regulation and tolerate corruption to reduce these externalities. We also find that individual perceptions of social capital and corruption co‐vary with the demand for regulation, as predicted by the theory.     

Mind the channel! An affordance perspective on how digital voice channels encourage or discourage employee voice

We apply an affordance lens on qualitative data from three case organisations using a digital voice channel providing employees with the opportunity to speak up via answering periodic mini‐surveys and making comments in an anonymous mini‐forum. We find that imbrications of material and social agencies (i.e., the voice channel's features and managerial reactions to voice) in the respective organisational contexts culminate in employees perceiving the channel as either affording or constraining voice, leading to perceived voice outcomes that eventually encourage or discourage them to speak up. Whether voice is encouraged or discouraged partly results from the mere interaction between employees and the digital voice channel independent of managerial reactions. Our findings thus challenge the emphasis on managerial behaviour and reactions to voice in explaining voice behaviour and outcomes in extant literature.     

The Illiquidity Discount of Life Insurance Investments

We incorporate an illiquid life insurance investment in the multi-period investment strategy of an investor with constant relative risk aversion and independent and identically distributed returns. In our setup, the liquid and the illiquid assets are risky and correlated and the illiquid investment cannot be rebalanced. We calculate the illiquidity discount as the difference in certainty equivalent rates of return between the optimal strategy with all assets being rebalanced in each period and the strategy with the illiquid investment. Calibrating our model to data of the German market we find a negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and the illiquidity discount when the investor does not rebalance at all. However, when the investor rebalances his liquid assets in each period to hedge against the illiquid investment the illiquidity discount becomes economically negligible.     

The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises

This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5–2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.     

An interest rate peg might be better than you think

Active interest rate policy is frequently recommended based on its merits in reducing macroeconomic volatility and being a simple device. Yet, it might be outperformed by an even simpler policy. A peg can be welfare-enhancing and can uniquely be implemented.     

Coming attraction

Francesca Cornelli, Richard D'Aveni, Andrew Kakabadse, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Markus Reitzig, Fons Trompenaars and Kim Warren share their latest research.