Yield curve responses to market sentiments and monetary policy

Central banks recently started to target longer term interest rates. The empirical failure of the rational expectations theory of the yield curve, however, limits its applicability to monetary policy analysis. The success of agent-based behavioral asset pricing models and behavioral macroeconomic models in replicating statistical regularities of empirical data series motivates to apply them to yield curve modeling. This paper analyses how the interaction of monetary policy and market sentiments shape the yield curve in a behavioral model with heterogeneous and bounded-rational agents. One result is that the behavioral model replicates empirical facts of term structure data. Moreover, it overcomes one major deficiency of rational expectations models of the yield curve in explaining the empirically observed uncertain responses of longer term yields to changes in the central bank rate. These are explained by the behavioral model’s ability to generate different responses of market sentiments to shocks at different times which lead to a variety of interest rate responses. Further results of this paper can be used as policy advice on how central banks can target the level, slope and curvature of the yield curve by targeting market sentiments about inflation and the business cycle.     

Assessing the employment effects of the German welfare reform – an integrated CGE-microsimulation approach

The purpose of this article is to quantify the employment effects of the recent German welfare reform. The key element of this reform was to merge the coexisting transfer systems Social Assistance (SA) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) into one unified benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II – ALG II). We also consider a second reform scenario that is intended to further improve the labour supply incentives of low-skilled workers. Our methodological contribution is to use an integrated CGE-microsimulation model. In adopting such an approach, we are able to combine the advantages of microsimulation studies by accounting for the large amount of heterogeneity in terms of households’ preferences and budget constraints with the advantages of an applied general equilibrium model. The latter permits us to identify potential general equilibrium repercussions through changes in wages and unemployment. The simulations indicate that the introduction of ALG II results in a negligible increase in employment of only 45?000 individuals. In contrast, a cut in benefit levels combined with a decrease in transfer withdrawal is shown to produce somewhat larger employment effects of about 190?000 individuals.     

PanelWhiz and the Australian Longitudinal Data Infrastructure in Economics

PanelWhiz is a graphical user interface that was written for the statistical software, Stata SE/MP Version 11 (Win/Mac/Linux) or later, which allows users to extract data from complicated multi‐level longitudinal datasets in an easy and efficient manner. Specifically, Australian datasets, such as Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life, Growing Up in Australia: The Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, Footprints in Time—The Longitudinal Study of Indigenous Children and Consumer Attitudes, Sentiments & Expectations in Australia, have already been integrated into the common platform of the PanelWhiz system.     

Buying a Home with a Resale Value: Location,Location, Location*

We develop a dynamic multiregion model, where a household's choice of housing location depends on its current wealth and its current type, and involves both consumption and investment considerations. The relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive determines the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting. A strong investment (consumption) motive implies sorting according to household type (wealth). The model predicts that large house‐price fluctuations are associated with a low degree of sorting by type. This prediction is consistent with evidence from US metropolitan areas when income, education, and age are used as proxies for household type.     

Quinn,Sarah L: American bonds: how credit markets shaped a nation

Journal of Economics -     

Doing Away with the Sovereign: Neoliberalism and the Promotion of Market Discipline in European Economic Governance

ABSTRACT

This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can rely on an authority to bail them out. It, therefore, precludes the kinds of intervention by Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s (ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the Eurozone.     

The cost effect in third-degree price discrimination

In the presence of a non-constant marginal cost and demand uncertainty, we show that an output increase is no longer a necessary condition for welfare to increase following the introduction of third-degree price discrimination. We thus highlight the existence of an effect that might offset the well known output and misallocation effects of price discrimination. We propose a specific example where this is indeed the case.     

Balancing Power Markets in Germany: Timing Matters

This paper analyzes timing issues on the German balancing power market. We focus the analysis on the length of the bidding period, i.e. the length of the time period a supplier has to provide balancing power capacities, and the question of how far before the beginning of a bidding period the auction should be carried out. We show that different load levels require different plants for the optimal provision of balancing power. In a longer bidding period, the power plants that have the lowest average cost in the bidding period are unlikely to be efficient in all hours of the bidding period. Hence, shortening bidding periods can increase efficiency. Furthermore, we show that an early commitment on a power plant’s mode of operation (when uncertainty about resulting spot prices is still relatively high) also reduces efficiency. This suggests that the auction should be held relatively close to the beginning of the bidding period. Furthermore, we discuss some advantages of a liquid real time market.     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.     

UNDERSTANDING MEMBER CHARACTERISTICS AND COOPERATIVE PRICE EFFECTS: THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINEAN DAIRY SECTOR

Since the 1990s, Argentinean dairy‐processing cooperatives have lost considerable amounts of members and market share. We analyse their current role by investigating the characteristics of farmers who continue delivering to them and price differentials between cooperatives and investor‐oriented firms (IOFs). A probit regression model applied to 917 farmers suggests that cooperative farmers are more disadvantaged than farmers delivering to IOFs in terms of education, farm size and productive technology. Moreover, t‐tests applied to data representing 70 per cent of national volume indicate that farmers delivering to cooperatives are between 11 per cent and 29 per cent smaller than those delivering to IOFs, depending on province. A hierarchical multilevel regression model applied to 9,720 transactions among farmers and processors shows that, after controlling for quantity and quality, cooperatives pay lower (3.5%) but more stable prices than IOFs. In a context of rapid structural change, we observe a market in which larger farmers deliver to IOFs and smaller farmers deliver to cooperatives and conclude that, at the expense of paying lower prices, cooperatives may act as buyers of last resort for otherwise disadvantaged farmers.