Beyond Sharpe ratio: Optimal asset allocation using different performance ratios

As the assumption of normality in return distributions is relaxed, classic Sharpe ratio and its descendants become questionable tools for constructing optimal portfolios. In order to overcome the problem, asymmetrical parameter-dependent performance ratios have been recently proposed in the literature. The aim of this note is to develop an integrated decision aid system for asset allocation based on a toolkit of eleven performance ratios. A multi-period portfolio optimization up covering a fixed horizon is set up: at first, bootstrapping of asset return distributions is assessed to recover all ratios calculations; at second, optimal rebalanced-weights are achieved; at third, optimal final wealth is simulated for each ratios. Eventually, we make a robustness test on the best performance ratios. Empirical simulations confirm the weakness in forecasting of Sharpe ratio, whereas asymmetrical parameter-dependent ratios, such as the Generalized Rachev, Sortino–Satchell and Farinelli–Tibiletti ratios show satisfactorily robustness.     

Feasible momentum strategies: Evidence from the Swiss stock market

While there is little controversy on the profitability of momentum strategies, their implementation is afflicted with many difficulties. Most important, chasing momentum can generate high turnover. Though there are already several attempts to make momentum strategies less expensive with respect to transaction costs, we go a step further in the simplification of momentum strategies. By restricting our sample to Switzerland’s largest blue-chip stocks and choosing only one winner and one loser stock, we find average returns to our momentum arbitrage portfolios of up to 44% p.a. depending on the formation and holding periods. While unconditional risk models are at odds with momentum profits, stock market predictability and time-varying expected returns explain a large part of the momentum payoffs, including the post-holding period behavior of the winner and loser stocks (overreaction and subsequent price correction).

Experimentelle Forschung in der Budgetierung – Lügen, nichts als Lügen?

Budgeting is one of the most important instruments for planning, control and coordination in decentralized firms. Participative budgeting allows a firm’s headquarters to make use of the divisional managers’ superior information when formulating budgets, but, simultaneously, gives the managers the opportunity to benefit from their superior information and to build slack into their budgets. This paper presents experiments analyzing the behavior in participative budgeting processes and explores the question how the actors’ behavior is influenced by pure self-interest on the one hand and non-standard preferences e.g. for the well-being of others or for honesty on the other hand.     

Designing a public procurement strategy: lessons from local governments

Public sector procurement faces competing priorities, such as cost-efficiency, legal conformity, the advancement of environmental protection and the promotion of innovation. In addition, procurement departments are moving away from being mere organizational servants to having a strategic function. This paper looks at current public procurement strategy research, revealing neglected aspects. The authors propose a new analytical framework and suggest avenues for future research.     

The Effect of Environmental Risk on the Efficiency of Negotiated Transfer Prices

This study investigates whether environmental risk affects the efficiency of negotiated transfer prices. We analyze a setting where the buyer faces environmental risk but the seller does not. From the risk‐neutral firm's perspective, the transfer should be made in our setting because the expected value of the buyer's profit is greater than the certain opportunity cost of the seller from the transfer. We develop hypotheses to predict that, as environmental risk increases, it becomes more difficult for buyers and sellers to reach agreement. Such difficulty reduces efficiency in terms of both firm profit and negotiation time. We test our hypotheses via an experiment in which buyer and seller dyads negotiate over the transfer of a resource at six levels of environmental risk. Results show that, as predicted, environmental risk decreases efficiency. Specifically, as environmental risk increases, the frequency of agreement decreases, thereby reducing expected firm profit. Further, environmental risk increases negotiation time for those dyads that are able to reach an agreement. Data suggest that the cause of the decreased efficiency is that buyers and sellers use different reference points for determining a fair transfer price and environmental risk exacerbates the effects of such differences.     

Cost Benefit Analysis of European Air Quality Targets for Sulphur Dioxide, Nitrogen Dioxide and Fine and Suspended Particulate Matter in Cities

The European Commission has proposed air quality standards for NO₂, SO₂ and PM₁₀ to be in force by 2010. The present paper presents a study that gauged their costs and benefits. An analysis of the expected emissions for 2010 (reference emission scenario), using simplified air quality models, showed that non-compliance with these standards will occur in cities only, not in rural areas. Most compliance problems are expected for PM₁₀, least for SO₂. Central estimates of the costs to meet standards range from 21 MECU (SO₂), to 79 MECU (NO₂) to 87--225 MECU (PM₁₀). The estimated benefits are 83--3783 MECU (SO₂), 408--5900 MECU (NO₂), and 5007--51247 MECU (PM₁₀). Uncertainties are high, due to errors and incertitude in various steps of the methodology, mainly the estimation of the human health effects, in particular effects on mortality, and in the valuation of a statistical life. In the case of PM₁₀, additional uncertainty results from the small size of the air quality database. Notwithstanding the uncertainties, the indications are that the benefits exceed the costs.     

Pflegen und gesund bleiben

Beziehungsgestaltung durch empathisches Handeln - Empathie beinhaltet, in jedem Augenblick ein Gespür für die sich ?ndernden, gefühlten Anzeichen des Patienten zu haben. Keine leichte Aufgabe im allt?glichen Stress auf der Station.     

Employment protection, firm selection, and growth

How do firing costs affect aggregate productivity growth? To address this question, a model of endogenous growth through selection and imitation is developed. It is consistent with recent evidence on firm dynamics and on the importance of reallocation for productivity growth. In the model, growth is driven by selection among heterogeneous incumbent firms and is sustained as entrants imitate the best incumbents. In this framework, firing costs not only induce misallocation of labor, but also affect growth by affecting firms’ exit decisions. Importantly, charging firing costs only to continuing firms raises growth by promoting selection. Also charging them to exiting firms is akin to an exit tax, hampers selection, and reduces growth—by 0.1 percentage points in a calibrated version of the model. With job turnover very similar in the two settings, this implies that the treatment of exiting firms matters for growth. In addition, the impact on growth rates is larger in sectors where firms face larger idiosyncratic shocks, as in services. This fits evidence that recent EU-U.S. growth rate differences are largest in these sectors and implies that firing costs can play a role here.     

The hidden costs of outsourcing: evidence from patent data

Drawing on patent data for approximately 500 firms over 20 years, we advance recent theory on firm boundaries and test these propositions for the first time. We first provide evidence for the existence of knowledge complementarities between vertically related activities in a firm's value chain by showing that firms face increasing (decreasing) performance in conducting downstream activities (i.e., patent litigation) the less (more) they outsource related upstream activities (i.e., patent filing). We then propose and empirically demonstrate that vertical integration benefits through learning differ from vertical outsourcing costs through forgetting. We show that firms can partly offset these hidden outsourcing costs by sourcing similar upstream products from internal and external suppliers. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.