Quality of Governance and the Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements

This paper investigates economic and political factors which explain the presence or absence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). A model of three countries with imperfect competition markets is employed for theoretical analysis of political economy. The validity of theoretical results is tested by econometric analysis with a logit model. It is shown that countries with similar incomes are more likely to form PTAs, and that governments with low quality of governance have little incentive to form PTAs.     

A turnpike theorem for rolling plans

This paper analyzes the asymptotic properties of rolling plans in a multi-sector growth model with time-independent preferences and technology. Assuming that the model under consideration has a unique turnpike towards which all the finite optimal programs bend, the paper shows that, if plans are constantly revised with a fixed but sufficiently long planninghorizon, the resulting growth path converges to a neighborhood of the turnpike.     

On labor incentives and work norm in Japanese firms

In this paper, we argue that social/corporate norms play an important role in achieving higher productivity and better economic welfare. We define “social norm” to be a standard of behavior suggested by a social custom, i.e., a customary choice of actions in each social situation. We reinterpret the well-known Nash equilibrium as a “norm equilibrium.” A norm equilibrium is a stable social norm, stable in the sense that there is no incentive to deviate from the behavior suggested by the prevailing social norm. This interpretation requires less information than the traditional interpretation. Moreover, we need not be concerned with the problem of refinement because it is the social norm itself which refines the equilibria. We apply this concept to the labor market. The key assumption is that the level of an individual worker's effort is private information known to workers as a whole; i.e., all workers' efforts are known to their fellow workers as well as to the workers themselves. We show that different work norms may emerge in different corporations at an equilibrium. In “prestigious” firms cooperation is the prevailing work norm, while in “nonprestigious” firms noncooperation is the norm. Thus, the efficiency wage hypothesis holds without the existence of unemployment. Some implications of this interpretation for the Japanese labor markets are discussed.     

On stationary overlapping generations models

Consider a stationary consumption–loan economy with fixed amount of fiat money. We show that although the economy is stationary if the number of goods and the number of ‘types’ of consumers are larger than one, there might be no Pareto optimal stationary competitive equilibrium.     

External Shocks and High Volatility in Consumption in Low‐Income Countries

According to the well‐known concept of consumption smoothing, the volatility of consumption is low even when income is volatile; this is confirmed by data from G7 countries. Surprisingly, however, consumption volatility in many low‐income countries is nontrivially higher than income volatility. Here I examine what causes high consumption volatility in low‐income countries. In general, volatile consumption makes consumers worse off. Therefore, understanding the causes of high consumption volatility can contribute to improving welfare in low‐income countries by suggesting measures to assist in the stabilization of consumption. Unlike much previous research, I focus on international factors when explaining high consumption volatility. The results suggest that external shocks, which are far more volatile in low‐income countries than in industrialized countries, strongly swing consumption. By capturing these mechanisms, the model I use successfully accounts for consumption volatility's differences between the sample low‐income country and sample industrialized country.     

DO DEPOSITORS RESPOND RATIONALLY TO BANK RISKS? EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESE BANKS DURING CRISES

This paper empirically examines depositors' ability to distinguish healthy banks from problematic banks, a necessary condition for depositors to impose discipline on banking institutions. We analyzed a large panel of 784 deposit‐taking institutions in Japan during the period from the 1992 financial year to the 2002 financial year. Our estimates indicate that depositors rightly appreciated the difference between healthy banks and risky banks, and that depositors of larger institutions are more sensitive to the bank risks than those of smaller institutions. We further argue that the estimated risk sensitivities of depositors are large enough to discipline the deposit‐taking institutions.     

Agency Contracts,Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options

Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)‐quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first‐best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden‐action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.     

Intergenerational Transfers and Asset Inequality in Japan: Empirical Evidence from New Survey Data

This paper quantitatively examines the impact of intergenerational transfers on asset inequality among Japanese households. We estimate an intergenerational asset transfer function with various control variables, using a unique micro dataset taken from a survey conducted by the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office. Employing three different models, a Tobit model, an interval regression model and an ordered probit model, to ensure that our results are independent of the specific econometric approach used, we investigate whether asset transfers received are correlated with households’ financial strength. We find that higher income households are likely to receive larger asset transfers. However, the contribution of intergenerational transfers to asset inequality appears to be small.     

The cultural significance of accounting in Japan

We have had a spate of works on “Japanese Management” in the world, but very few on “Japanese Accounting”. In this article it is made clear that the functioning of accounting is contingent on the culture in which the accounting systems are incorporated, and that in order to discuss this intermingling of accounting and culture a perspective elaborated in Scandinavia can be relevant despite the uniqueness of Japanese culture. For only non-rationalistic or “naturalistic” perspectives can provide a basis for understanding the cultural dynamics of Japanese organizations and Japanese society. Thus the roles of accounting in Japan go far beyond what has been discussed in accounting textbooks.     

Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Market

This paper considers a sequential entry game of homogeneous firms in a vertically differentiated market. A firm can choose any variety of products, with a fixed cost per product. Each product can be withdrawn afterwards without exit costs. Then each firm chooses one product at most in equilibrium because of a commitment problem. The first firm chooses the highest quality if the fixed cost is so large that subsequent entry is blockaded. It chooses middle quality to deter entry of a low–quality firm if the fixed cost decreases. Hence everyone becomes worse off as the entrant becomes more dangerous. JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13.