Dynamic Seemingly Unrelated Cointegrating Regressions

We propose the parametric Dynamic Seemingly Unrelated Regression (DSUR) estimator for simultaneous estimation of multiple cointegrating regressions. DSUR is efficient when the equilibrium errors are correlated across equations and is applicable for panel cointegration estimation in environments where the cross section is small relative to the available time series. We study the asymptotic and small sample properties of the DSUR estimator for both heterogeneous and homogeneous cointegrating vectors. We then apply the method to analyse two long-standing problems in international economics. Our first application revisits the estimation of long-run correlations between national investment and national saving. Our second application revisits the question of whether the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate.     

Business Groups and the Big Push: Meiji Japan's Mass Privatization and Subsequent Growth

Paul Rosenstein-Rodan argues that economic development requirescoordinated investment in many interdependent industries, andprescribes a flood of state-controlled investment across allsectors—a so-called big push. Widespread government failuredefeated twentieth-century ‘big push’ schemes. Butspillovers across firms and industries, and from public goods,hold-up problems, and capital market limitations are real, andjustify coordinated growth across sectors if it can be donewithout government failures. Large, extensively diversifiedpyramidal business groups of listed firms dominate the historiesof developed economies and the economies of developing economies.Arguing that such groups provided this coordination in prewarJapan after a state-run big push failed, we propose that pyramidalbusiness groups are private-sector mechanisms for coordinatingbig push growth, and that competition between rival groups inducesefficiency unattainable in a state-run big push. We postulatethat a successful business-group led big push requires economicopenness, basic public goods, rule of law, separation of thestate from business, and a timely demise of business groupswhen the big push phase is complete. Where these criteria arenot met, growth stalls and oligarchic families become too powerfulto dislodge.     

Dynamic Investment Strategies to Reaction–Diffusion Systems Based upon Stochastic Differential Utilities

We study the dynamic investment strategies in continuous-time settings based upon stochastic differential utilities of Duffie and Epstein (Econometrica 60:353–394, 1992). We assume that the asset prices follow interacting Itô-Poisson processes, which are known to be the so-called reaction–diffusion systems. Stochastic maximum principle for stochastic control problems described by some backward-stochastic differential equations that are driven by Poisson jump processes allows us to derive the optimal investment strategies as well as optimal consumption. We shall furthermore propose a numerical procedure for solving the associated nested quasi-linear partial differential equations.     

On the Hoggard–Whalley–Wilmott Equation for the Pricing of Options with Transaction Costs

The Hoggard–Whalley–Wilmott equation is introduced to model portfolios of European type options incorporating transaction costs. The model gives rise to a nonlinear parabolic partial differential equation (PDE), whose nonlinearity reflects the presence of transaction costs. We show analytically the existence of solutions which are not necessarily convex nor concave. Numerical treatments are also given, which are devised to effectively handle an infinite domain and unbounded solutions.      

Dynamic models of the labor force behavior of married women which can be estimated using limited amounts of past information

This paper examines the extent of the inadequacy of standard cross-sectional models of US labor force behavior and considers the abilities of alternative models to capture the observed continuity in the hours of work and earnings of individuals as well as in their employment histories. Both of the alternatives to the standard cross-sectional model considered in this study incorporate limited amounts of information about past work behavior that could easily be collected as part of a national population census. Using a population of 21 to 64 year old married working women taken from a 1969 through 1978 Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the variables included in the Z vector age: 1) age of the wife; 2) education of the wife; 3) state average hourly wage in manufacturing measured in 1967 dollars; and 4) unemployment rate for the state in which the wife lives. Results show that by using information about a women's hours of work and wage rate in the previous year, it may be feasible to improve on forecasts of a woman's employment and earnings behavior. For each model a separate estimate is made for wives aged 21 through 46, and for those aged 47 through 64. The dummy and difference models perform much better than the standard model, with the dummy model having the higher pseudo-chi-square statistic. These models show that systematic errors made in determining which individuals work, what they earn per hour, or how many hours they work, should result in prediction errors of the same sort year after year in the computation of annual earnings. These findings with respect to years of work and nonwork, years of part time versus full time work, and cumulative earnings over a 10 year period, confirm and extend Heckman's findings; thus, forecasting models of the work behavior of individuals should not be estimated using pure cross-sectional data. It would be important if researchers could identify what observable factors, if any, increase the likelihood that wives will alter their work behavior from what it has been in the immediate past, even if they are not able to fully understand or explain this previous work behavior.     

Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer

When a manufacturer and its retailers and consumers are spatially separated, the retailers’ market size may be limited by the manufacturer who provides consumers with an option to purchase goods directly from them. The manufacturer uses this tactic to increase profit when a few retailers dominate the market. The mill price of a manufacturer, that is, the price of the good at delivery from a manufacturer’s factory, is critical under these circumstances.If the manufacturer charges a franchise fee, thus absorbing the retailer’s profit, this fee is a function of the mill price. Mill price policy can be used to maximize profit on the sale of goods and collection of the franchise fee. The resulting retail market structure becomes preferable for the manufacturer and consumers since the manufacturer’s profit is larger, as is the quantity purchased, compared with a competitive equilibrium in which every firm entering the market area is assumed to move its location instantly without cost.     

A Continuous-Time Analysis of Optimal Restructuring of Contracts with Costly Information Disclosure

This paper studies the role of restructuring, as compared to the one of liquidation, in valuation of long-term debt contracts in a continuous-time model with costly information disclosure. In asset-pricing literature, Merton??s (J Finance 29:449?C470, 1974) contingent-claim models have been long used for valuation of corporate securities and loans. However, since they basically assume sufficiently complete security structures in markets, the literature is not necessarily suitable for examining costly-information problems. On the other hand, in corporate-finance literature, it has been well known that agency costs (i.e., conflicts of interest among agents) distort corporate capital structure under costly-information problems. However, the effect of the distortion on valuation of securities and loans has not been explicitly studied either in theory or in practice. This paper bridges such a gap between the two literatures. This paper shows that, under a costly-information problem, corporate leverage ratios are higher when restructuring is expected to be accepted in default than otherwise. The risk of a jump to liquidation increases the default probability in short term, and decreases the probability of restructuring over time.     

A Continuous-Time Optimal Insurance Design with Costly Monitoring

We provide a theoretical and numerical framework to study optimal insurance design under asymmetric information. We consider a continuous-time model where neither the efforts nor the outcome of an insured firm are observable to an insurer. The insured may then cause two interconnected information problems: moral hazard and fraudulent claims. We show that, when costly monitoring is available, an optimal insurance contract distinguishes the one problem from the other. Furthermore, if the insured’s downward-risk aversion is weak and if the participation constraint is not too tight, then a higher level of the monitoring technology can mitigate both problems.