Electricity saving behavior of households by making efforts,replacing appliances,and renovations: empirical analysis using a multivariate ordered probit model

This study empirically explores the determinants of household electricity saving behavior based on a sample of Japanese households. Our study makes four contributions. First, we examine the short‐term saving action of making efforts, the medium‐term saving action of replacing appliances, and the long‐term saving action of undertaking renovations. Second, we consider not only the physical characteristics of households but also behavioral characteristics, such as their understanding of the importance of energy saving and willingness to save energy. Third, in our analysis, we assume that appliances and housing facilities have the electricity‐saving capability and service‐providing capability. While previous studies focus on the former, consumers in reality consider both capabilities. Fourth, we consider the optimization by households and include broad types of appliances and renovations. Using a multivariate ordered probit model with data on 518 Japanese households in 2012, we obtain the following results. First, in addition to the demand response, the effort level is determined by behavioral, rather than by physical characteristics. Second, the motivation behind appliance replacement is durability, rather than electricity‐saving and service‐providing capabilities. Third, appliance replacement is enhanced by an understanding of the importance of energy saving, rather than by the willingness to save energy. Households can replace appliances because of social pressure, even if they are not so concerned about saving energy. Fourth, households are willing to renovate housing facilities even though they pay a higher cost for the greater saving capability rather than for the service‐providing capability. However, such renovation is not influenced by internal incentives, but by physical aspects of the house, such as size, age, and type.     

Technology and labor contract: Two systems of rice harvesting in the Philippines

Major changes in agrarian institutions in the Philippines, such as landtenure and labor-contract arrangements, are analyzed in terms of theories of contractual choice and social interactions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that introduction of a certain technology (e.g., machine threshing of rice) reduces transaction costs involved in specific contractual arrangements (e.g., sharecropping), thereby making specific forms of economic organization (e.g., the rice hacienda) viable. Land reform (and also the green revolution) in the rice-growing areas of the Philippines again causes a change in harvesting technology. Through complex social interaction this gives rise to changes in labor contracts.     

On the impact of the tests for serial correlation upon the test of significance for the regression coefficient

Monte Carlo methods are used to investigate the relationship between the power of different pretests for autocorrelation, and the Type I error and power of the significance test for a resulting two-stage estimate of the slope parameter in a simple regression. Our results suggest it may be preferable to always transform without pretesting. Moreover we find little room for improvement in the Type I errors and power of two-stage estimators using existing pretests for autocorrelation, compared with the results obtained given perfect knowledge about when to transform (i.e., given a perfect pretest). Rather, researchers should seek better estimators of the transformation parameter itself.     

Transactions Accounts and Loan Monitoring

We show that transactions accounts, by providing ongoing dataon borrowers’ activities, help financial intermediariesmonitor borrowers. This information is most readily availableto commercial banks, which offer these accounts and lendingtogether. We find that (1) monthly changes in accounts receivableare reflected in transactions accounts; (2) borrowings in excessof collateral predict credit downgrades and loan write-downs;and (3) the lender intensifies monitoring in response. Thisis evidence on a key issue in financial intermediation—thereis an advantage to providing deposit-taking and lending jointly.But this advantage may have fallen as the cost of communicationhas declined. (JEL G10, G20, G21)