The housing bubble and a new approach to accounting for housing in a CPI

Over the course of the recent house price bubble in the United States, the price of homes rose rapidly from 1999 Q4 to 2005 Q4 (11.3% annually as measured by the Case-Shiller index, and 8.4% annually as measured by the Federal Housing Financing Agency) but slowly as measured by owner equivalent rents (3.4%), so measured core inflation remained relatively docile during this period, since only rents are used to measure inflation for housing services in the United States. Over the last several decades, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has experimented with both rental equivalence and user cost approaches for accounting for owner occupied housing (OOH) services in the CPI. We explain the basics of these approaches, and outline the BLS experiences with using them. This assessment leads us to conclude that the time has come to try a new approach: the opportunity cost approach. We argue this approach has advantages over both the conventional rental equivalence and user cost approaches, though it embeds components of the measures for both those approaches and builds solidly on the research of Verbrugge and others at the BLS. Also, we take up empirical issues that must be faced regardless of which of the approaches discussed is adopted. We explain how the repeat-sales and various hedonic regression methods can be placed in a common framework, thereby facilitating understanding of the properties of and the tradeoffs between the methods. We also consider measurement complications that arise because the land and structure components of properties depreciate at different rates.     

Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

This paper examines endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three firms—two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm—are allowed to merge with each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms.      

The price of education and inequality

Constructing a simple model that includes the price of education, this paper shows that the educational expenditure of rich households could prevent poor households from escaping poverty. The paper offers an explanation for persistent inequality.     

Competition and Privatisation Policies in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly: The Pay‐off‐interdependence Approach

I revisit the relationship between competition and privatisation policies in a mixed oligopoly with differentiated goods, following the pay‐off‐interdependence approach in the fashion of Matsumura and Okamura. We find that although the intensity of market competition increases with the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance, the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease in a differentiated goods mixed oligopoly in both the increasing marginal costs case and the constant marginal costs case. Further, given the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance and the number of private firms, we find that the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease as the degree of product differentiation declines. Finally, by considering an alternative‐pay‐off model in both cases, we compare the optimal degree of privatisation of the public firm.     

Modeling the performance of US direct investment in Japan: Some empirical estimates

Foreign firms' direct investments in Japan increased from about $930 million in 1984 to $2.2 billion in 1987, and are still increasing at a rapid rate. Most of these investments come from the United States and Europe. In this paper a short-run model for the performance of a foreign parent firm's subsidiary in Japan is presented. The model is based on theories presented by Hymer, Caves, Buckley and Casson, among others, and consists of two equations: one for profitability and the other for growth. Duality is used to relate a parent firm's activities to its subsidiary firm's profitability. The model is estimated using data for US firms' subsidiaries in the Japanese chemical industry. We find that for jointly owned subsidiaries (joint ventures), imports from US parent firms and the R&D spending by both US and Japanese parent firms are major determinants of profitability and growth. US firms' fully owned subsidiaries, however, exhibit considerably different profit and growth behavior than their jointly owned counterparts. Because of the small sample sizes used, it is not possible to ascertain the sources of the observed differences.     

Foreign Investment, Technology Transfer, and the Technology Gap: A Note

The paper analyzes a simple differential game model of international technology transfer via foreign direct investment, in which a subsidiary of a multinational corporation and a host-country firm are engaged in a technology accumulation race. In contrast to previous works, it is shown that an elasticity of the foreign firm's marginal quasi-rent plays a key role in determining the effects of technology spillover and of efficiency of learning activities on the technology transfer: those are positive if it is larger than unity in absolute value, and vice versa. Other comparative static results are reported.     

Patient Admission Patterns and Acquisitions of "Feeder" Hospitals

Acquiring outlying community hospitals is one approach commonly used by large tertiary care hospitals to increase referrals. Sophisticated acquirers may also seek to selectively increase referrals of more profitable patients. To explore these issues, we study vertical hospital acquisitions. Using a treatment and control framework, we find that roughly 30% of vertical acquisitions lead to a significant increase in referrals. Very few result in decreases. We find that increases are concentrated among patients undergoing more profitable procedures and with more generous insurance. However, we find no evidence that hospitals shun patients with higher expected costs of care.     

Aggressiveness of Managers in the Market with Network Effects: The Case of Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment

This paper analyzes a model wherein firms' owners hire biased managers in a differentiated goods duopoly with network effects. We show that whether firms hire an aggressive manager or not depends on both the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects in price competition whereas it does not depend on the degree of product differentiation or the strength of network effects in quantity competition. Thus, the attitudes of firms' managers depend on the type of competition and the relative magnitude of the strength of network effects to the degree of product differentiation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts

This study examines the endogenous choice of each firm’s strategic contract, that is, a price contract or a quantity contract, in a duopoly in which their demand functions are asymmetric when the content of their managerial contracts is determined through bargaining between the owner and the manager. The degree of asymmetry between their demand functions corresponds to the relation between the goods they produce. In contrast to the case wherein each firm’s delegation parameter is determined through profit maximization, we show that the quantity competition cannot become the equilibrium market structure when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner is sufficiently low. In particular, when the relation between the two goods is complementary, two asymmetric market structures can be observed in equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider the situation in which the relative bargaining power of the manager to that of the owner within each firm is different between the two firms.     

Can Small Class Policy Close the Gap? An Empirical Analysis of Class Size Effects in Japan

Can smaller classes lead to better educational outcomes and greater equality in achievement? We estimate the causal effects of class size on achievement tests by using discontinuous changes in class size under the Japanese public compulsory education system. We employ a value‐added model that uses achievement tests conducted at two different times during the same school year. Our results show that a reduction in class size has significantly positive effects on Japanese language test scores in the sixth grade, especially at schools in wealthy areas. However, we find no evidence that a universal small class policy closes the achievement gap among schools.