The impact of taxation and signposting on diet: an online field study with breakfast cereals and soft drinks

Experimental Economics - We present a large scale study where a nationally representative sample of 1000 participants were asked to make real purchases within an online supermarket platform. The...     

Questions about the equivalence of market rents and user costs for owner occupied housing

For modern nations, it is recognized as important that temporal and spatial variations in costs for comparable dwelling services are carefully measured. The costs of owner occupied as well as rental housing have important roles to play in both the consumer price index (CPI) and the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA93) specifies that a rental value of the housing stock should be included as part of the aggregates for personal consumption, personal income, income of proprietors and value added for the real estate industry. Yet, little attention has been devoted to an underlying commonality of practice: the implicit assumption that housing cost information for either renters or owner occupiers can be used for assessing movements over time and spatial differences in the cost of housing for both renters and owners, after allowing for differences regarding payment for taxes and certain ongoing expenses such as insurance and utilities. But in the real world, are the services that renters and owner occupiers get from their dwellings comparable? Also, for both renters and owner occupiers, are there place-related differences in the services they derive from their dwellings? And if so, what are the implications for official statistics making? These are the questions raised by the empirical results presented in this paper.     

Why does scholastic achievement differ across prefectures in Japan?

Using prefecture-level data on scholastic achievement tests in Japan, we found that parental income and education level positively affect student achievement. The effect of income on achievement is stronger for the high-scoring prefectures than for the low-scoring prefectures. The presence of grandparents also has a strong positive effect on student achievement. While the cross term between the percentage of absentees and the quantity of teachers is important in identifying the positive effects of teacher quantity, the effects of this quantity on elementary school achievement is nonlinear. We confirm the importance of teacher quality in determining junior high school achievement.     

Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts

We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Endogenous Alleviation of Overreaction Problem by Aggregate Information Announcement

It is well‐known that agents overreact to public information in markets characterized by strategic complementarities. We propose a simple and implementable method of alleviating the overreaction problem. Extending the beauty‐contest game of Morris and Shin to a multi‐region economy, we show that, under an aggregate information announcement, each agent converts purely public information into imperfect public information endogenously. This makes the agents’ beliefs dispersed and alleviates the overreaction problem. Moreover, we compare the welfare effect of the aggregate information announcement with that of a separate announcement. We find that there exist plausible situations where the aggregate information announcement is better than the separate information announcement despite reduced quality.     

A Non-homothetic Globally Concave Flexible Cost Function and its Application to Panel Data

A new non-homothetic globally concave flexible cost function is introduced and applied to a panel of firms in the Japanese paper and pulp industry. This cost function is a mixture of the generalized McFadden form and the generalized Ozaki form due to Nakamura (1990). A generalized index of technical change is used in place of the standard quadratic form of time-trend. The estimated cost function satisfied global concavity, and the symmetry condition of the Slutsky matrix was not rejected. Homotheticity was strongly rejected.
JEL Classification Numbers: C33, D24.