An Empirical Validation of Perceived Importance and Behavior Intention in IT Ethics

Robin et al. (1996) suggested a new construct when studying ethical behavioral intention which they entitled PIE (perceived importance). They empirically tested the PIE construct and found it to significantly impact both ethical judgment and behavioral intention. The present study extends and validates Robin et al.s work on PIE using a different context, different scenarios and a different sample. The findings indicate strong support for the validity of Robin et al.s PIE instrument and show PIE to significantly influence ethical judgment (attitude) and behavioral intention. This study also indicates the sex of the individual affects the individuals perception of importance and is a significant influence of ethical judgment and behavioral intention. Future ethical models and studies should include PIE as a possible influence on behavioral intention.Timothy Paul Cronan is Professor of Information Systems and M.D. Matthews Lecturer in Business at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. Dr. Cronan received his D.B.A. from Louisiana Tech University and is an active member of the Decision Sciences Institute and The Association for Computing Machinery. He has served as Regional Vice President and on the Board of Directors of the Decision Sciences Institute and as President of the Southwest Region of the Institute. In addition, he has served as Associate Editor MIS Quarterly. His research interests include ethics in computing, local area networks, downsizing, expert systems, performance analysis and effectiveness, and end-user computing. His publications have appeared in Decision Sciences, MIS Quarterly, OMEGA The International Journal of Management Science, The Journal of Management Information Systems, Communications of the ACM, Journal of End User Computing, Database, Journal of Research on Computing in Education, Journal of Financial Research, as well as in other journals, and Proceedings of various Conferences. Lori N. K. Leonard is an Assistant Professor of Management Information Systems at the University of Tulsa. Dr. Leonard received her Ph.D. from the University of Arkansas and is an active member of the Decision Sciences Institute. Her research interests include electronic commerce, electronic data interchange, ethics in computing, simulation, and data warehousing. Her publications have appeared in Journal of Computer Information Systems, Information & Management, Journal of the Association for Information Systems, Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, Journal of End User Computing, as well as in other journals, and Proceedings of various Conferences. Jennifer Kreie is Associate Professor in Business Computer Systems at New Mexico State University. Dr. Kreie received the Ph.D. from the University of Arkansas. Her research interests include ethics in computing, end-user computing, systems development, and computer-aided instruction. She is an active member of the Decision Sciences Institute, the Association of Computing Machinery and the Association of Information Technology Professionals. Her publications have appeared in Communications of the ACM, Decision Support Systems, Journal of End User Computing, Journal of Accountancy, and the National Accountant as well as Proceedings of several Conferences.     

Can Ethical Organizational Character Be Stimulated and Enabled?: “Upbuilding” Dialog As Crisis Management Method

Crisis management can be simultaneously a content specific problem solving process and an opportunity for stimulating and enabling an organizations ethical tradition. Crisis can be an opportunity for ethical organizational development. Kierkegaardian upbuilding dialog method builds from within the internal ethical tradition of an organization to respond to crises while simultaneously adapting and protecting the organizations tradition. The crisis itself may not be a directly ethical crisis, but the method of responding to the crisis is built upon the ethical foundations of an organizations tradition. A limitation of this method is that it may be less applicable to organizations with questionably ethical traditions. The concept of upbuilding dialog is derived from Kierkegaard, but here is applied to organizational crisis management. The method is illustrated and discussed in the context of a wrongful death crisis of the Dana- Farber Cancer Institute, a nonprofit organization, and an economic survival crisis at Ben and Jerrys, a business organization.     

A Preliminary Investigation into the Role of Positive Psychology in Consumer Sensitivity to Corporate Social Performance

Research on positive psychology demonstrates that specific individual dispositions are associated with more desirable outcomes. The relationship of positive psychological constructs, however, has not been applied to the areas of business ethics and social responsibility. Using four constructs in two independent studies (hope and gratitude in Study 1, spirituality and generativity in Study 2), the relationship of these constructs to sensitivity to corporate social performance (CSCSP) were assessed. Results indicate that all four constructs significantly predicted CSCSP, though only hope and gratitude interacted to impact CSCSP. Discussion focuses upon these findings, limitations of the study, and future avenues for research.     

Reason as a Nexus of Natural Law and Rhetoric

Although the pages of Journal of Business Ethics have hosted an ongoing dialogue on the ethics of rhetoric and persuasion, the debates have been unable to account for the underlying morality of the human propensity to engage in rhetorical discourse as a part of living in society. In this paper, I offer natural-law ethical theory as a moral paradigm in which to examine rhetoric. In this context, I assert that rhetoric services reason, which in turn services our dispositions or inclinations that are one ideological foundation of natural-law theory. As rhetoric affects the apprehension of these dispositions it subsumes a related morality in which rhetorical endeavors can be seen as “natural”. So endowed, I believe that this conception of rhetoric offers a number of philosophical and practical implications, one of which is a new way to assess the morality of commercial manifestations of rhetoric such as spin and the use of puffery in advertising.     

Agency Theory,Reasoning and Culture at Enron: In Search of a Solution

Applying evidence from recently available public information on Enron, I defined Enron’s culture as one rooted in agency theory by asserting that Enron’s members were predominantly agency-reasoning individuals. I then identified conditions present at Enron’s collapse: a strong agency culture with collectively non-compliant norms, a munificent rare-failure environment, and new hires with little business ethics training. Turning to four possible antidotes (selection, objectivist integrity, integrity capacity, and stewardship reasoning) to an agency culture under these conditions, I argued that the currently available ethics literature would have made little difference toward averting Enron’s collapse if any of the recommendations from the relevant ethics literature had been implemented. I conclude by identifying new directions for business ethics literature in order to make it more implementable under the conditions identified at Enron. Essentially, we need a way to clearly determine (1) the difference between connivance and commitment, (2) what is meant by balance with regard to the multiple dimensions of ethics and legal theories, and (3) the proper balance between agency and stewardship reasoning. Brian E. Kulik is a Ph.D. candidate in Management at Washington State University’s School of Business. His work focuses on the prevention of corporate corruption, corporate governance and ethics, teamwork and diversity, and research methods. His research to date has appeared in the Western and National Academy of Management conference proceedings and the journal Organizational Analysis. He earned M.S. degrees from Washington State University and The University of Cincinnati, and M.B.A. from The University of Denver.     

On the microstructure of price determination and information aggregation with sequential and asymmetric information arrival in an experimental asset market

Summary. Experiments were conducted on an asset with the structure of an option. The information of any individual is limited, as if only the direction of movement of the option value known for a single period without information of the value from when movement was initiated. However, if all information of all insiders were pooled, the value of the option would be known with certainty. The results are the following: (1) Information becomes aggregated in the prices as if fully informative rational expectations operated; and (2) The mechanism through which information gets into the market is captured by a path dependent process that we term The Fundamental Coordination Principle of Information Transfer in Competitive Markets. The early contracts tend to be initiated by insiders who tender limit orders. The emergence of bubbles and mirages in the markets are coincident with failures and circumstances that prevent the operation of the Fundamental Principle.The financial support of the national science foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science are gratefully acknowledged. The authors have benefited from helpful comments of David Grether, Kerry Back, Ivana Komunjer and Pete Kyle.     

A risk assessment model for banks

Summary. This paper proposes a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction among banks, where the actual risk an individual bank bears also depends on its interaction with other banks and investors. We develop a two-period general equilibrium model with three active heterogeneous banks, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. The model is calibrated against UK banking data and therefore can be implemented as a risk assessment tool for regulators and central banks. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors.We are grateful to Lea Zicchino, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the Bank of England, and the third Conference in Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Syros, for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England.This revised version was published online in January 2005 with corrections to the Cover date.     

The bias in Black-Scholes/Black implied volatility: An analysis of equity and energy markets

In this paper we examine the extent of the bias between Black and Scholes (1973)/Black (1976) implied volatility and realized term volatility in the equity and energy markets. Explicitly modeling a market price of volatility risk, we extend previous work by demonstrating that Black-Scholes is an upward-biased predictor of future realized volatility in S&P 500/S&P 100 stock-market indices. Turning to the Black options-on-futures formula, we apply our methodology to options on energy contracts, a market in which crises are characterized by a positive correlation between price-returns and volatilities: After controlling for both term-structure and seasonality effects, our theoretical and empirical findings suggest a similar upward bias in the volatility implied in energy options contracts. We show the bias in both Black-Scholes/Black implied volatilities to be related to a negative market price of volatility risk. JEL Classification G12 · G13     

Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms

Recent research in accounting explores how firms use “individual” or “non-financial” measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a firm that conditions bonus payments to executives on information that is not available to those outside the firm. This raises two issues. First, market participants may use the magnitude of such payments to infer the non-public information. Second, because information that is non-public is, by extension, non-verifiable, the firm cannot write explicit contracts based on it. Combining the relational incentive contracts and financial signaling literatures, we examine equilibria of a signaling game in which bonus payments from a firm to a manager convey non-public information regarding the firm’s future cash flows. Our main result is that increases in corporate myopia can, under some conditions, lead to increased profits. This finding is contrary to that typically found in financial signaling models.