Multinationals without Advantages

We question the widespread argument that firms embarking on foreign direct investments must possess some specific advantages to offset the penalties of operating across national and cultural boundaries. A simple model shows that firms might invest abroad to capture local advantages through geographical proximity of plant location, rather than to exploit existing ones. Because of spatially bounded spillovers, laggard firms might use foreign investments to acquire location-specific knowledge, whereas leading firms might prefer costly exports to avoid the dissipation of their advantages.
JEL classification: F 23; O 32; L 22     

Do technology externalities justify restrictions on emission permit trading?

International emission trading is an important flexibility mechanism, but its use has been often restricted on the ground that access to international carbon credits can undermine the domestic abatement effort reducing the incentive to innovate and, eventually, lowering the pace of climate policy-induced technological change. This paper examines the economics that is behind these concerns by studying how a cap to the trade of carbon offsets influences innovation, technological change, and welfare. By using a standard game of abatement and R&D, we investigate the main mechanisms that shape these relationships. We also use a numerical integrated assessment model that features environmental and technology externalities to quantify how limits to the volume, the timing, and the regional allocation of carbon offsets affect climate policy costs and the incentive to invest in innovation and low-carbon technologies.Results indicate that, for moderate caps on the amount tradable emissions permits and sufficiently high technology spillovers, global innovation and technical change would increase and that this additional innovative effort could lead to economic efficiency gains. The numerical analysis confirms that when constraints are close to 15% of domestic abatement, efficiency losses are small because they are partly compensated by more technological spillovers and lower energy prices. Under a broad range of parameters, restrictions are costly for the constrained countries, but always beneficial for unconstrained ones.     

Accumulation and distribution of human capital: the interaction between individual and aggregate variables

The paper analyses the joint evolution of accumulation and distribution of human capital in an OLG framework. Dynamics arises from the interplay between human capital distribution and individual variables—inherited human capital and inborn ability. Such interaction drives individual investment in human capital and accumulation in the economy. According to initial distribution the model provides different dynamical behaviours linking growth and inequality; in general economies with a more equal initial distribution grow faster but other cases are possible. Moreover, since the model provides an endogenous threshold for investing in human capital, the distribution is characterised by multi-modality.     

Non-market Value of Winter Outdoor Recreation in the Swiss Alps: The Case of Val Bedretto

A longstanding interest from environmental economists on winter outdoor recreation has overlooked activities practiced outside the boundaries of winter resorts—e.g. ski mountaineering. This paper implements the Travel Cost Method to estimate consumer surplus per season derived from ski mountaineering and snowshoeing in Val Bedretto—a valley located in the Swiss Alps. In addition, the Contingent Behavior Method is used to estimate the changes in welfare associated with the construction of an alpine center that would provide services aiming to reduce the risk of injury and death associated with winter outdoor recreation. The data is analyzed by means of latent class panel on-site count models. The latent class approach allows us to identify subpopulations that benefit from the alpine center. The results show that 33% of visitors would experience an increase in their consumer surplus per season equivalent to €31 per visitor.     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

Concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry: the future of television

New technologies are deeply transforming the broadcasting industry. What we have seen so far is only the beginning of a long story. Inevitably, industry regulations must adapt, which means that a wide-ranging rethink of current practices is required. In order to assess the likely evolution of the industry, this article decomposes it into a number of components, from conception of programmes to their broadcasting, including distribution, storage and licensing. Contrary to popular expectations, the analysis suggests that the current high degree of concentration will, if anything, increase. The policy implication is that regulation, so far driven by now obsolete technological constraints, should increasingly emphasize promoting competition.     

Nominal shocks and the current account: A structural VAR analysis of 14 OECD countries

This paper provides some empirical evidence on one of the most controversial theoretical implications of the new open economy literature, which refers to the role of the current account in the international monetary transmission mechanism. In order to throw some light on this issue, two structural VAR models are estimated separately for 14 industrialized countries. The main empirical results highlight the importance of the role of nominal disturbances for current account fluctuations. Additionally, it is found that expansionary nominal shocks generate temporary current account surpluses, whose size is positively correlated with the openness of the individual countries. JEL no. C32, E40, F41, F42     

Cosmetic mergers: The effect of style investing on the market for corporate control

We study the impact of “style investing” on the market for corporate control. We argue that the choice of the bidder is influenced by the fact that the merge with a firm that belongs to an investment style more popular with the market may boost the bidder's value. By using data on the flows in mutual funds, we construct a measure of popularity, which relies directly on the identification of sentiment-induced investor demand, rather than being a direct transformation of stock market data. We show that differences in popularity between bidder and target help to explain their pairing. The merger with a more popular target generates a halo effect from the target to the bidder that induces the market to evaluate the assets of the less popular bidder at the (inflated) market value of the more popular target. Both bidder and target premiums are positively related to the difference in popularity between the target and the bidder. However, the target's ability to appropriate the gain is reduced by the fact that its bargaining position is weaker when the bidder's potential for asset appreciation is higher. We document a better short- and medium-term performance of less popular firms taking over more popular firms. The bidder managers engaging in these cosmetic mergers take advantage of the window of opportunity induced by the deal to reduce their stake in the firm under convenient conditions.