A DYNAMIC ENTRY AND PRICE GAME WITH CAPACITY INDIVISIBILITY

Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two‐stage game in which potential entrants choose capacities and next active firms compete in prices. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid and there are economies of scale. In the simplest version of the model with a single production technique, the equilibrium turns out to depend on the ratio between the level of total output at the long‐run competitive equilibrium and the firm's minimum efficient scale: if that ratio is sufficiently large (the market is sufficiently ‘large’), then the competitive price emerges at a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of the capacity and price game; if not, then the firms randomize in prices on the equilibrium path. The role of the market size for the competitive outcome is shown to be even more important if there are several available production techniques.     

Market Organization and Propagation of Shocks: The Furniture Industry in Germany and Italy

In this paper we study the furniture industry in two European countries, Germany and Italy. Although the two industries are characterized by very similar output and technology, they differ widely in terms of market organization, most notably the distribution of firms by size, and the organization of retail. We find some evidences that these differences have an influence on the dynamic behavior of industry output, prices and exports in the two countries.     

High equity premia and crash fears - Rational foundations

Summary. We show that in a Lucas endowment economy in which the process for dividends is described by a lattice tree subject to infrequent but observable structural breaks, in equilibrium recursive rational learning may inflate the equity risk premium and reduce the risk-free interest rate for low levels of risk aversion. The key condition for these results to obtain is the presence of sufficient initial pessimism. The relevance of these findings is magnified by the fact that under full information our artificial economy cannot generate asset returns matching the empirical evidence for any positive relative risk aversion.Received: 20 September 2003, Revised: 27 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D83, E44, G12.I am indebted to Mordecai Kurz (the co-Editor), one anonymous Referee, Gabriele Camera, Sadayuki Ono, Olesia Verchenko, and Allan Timmermann for many useful comments. I also think seminar paticipants at the European Economic Association meetings in Stockholm (August 2003) and the Midwest Economics Association in St. Louis (March 2003).     

Monotone continuous multiple priors

Summary. In a multiple priors model á la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we provide necessary and sufficient behavioral conditions ensuring the countable additivity and non-atomicity of all priors.Received: 25 November 2002, Revised: 24 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D81.We thank Roko Aliprantis, Maristella Botticini, Erio Castagnoli, Larry Epstein, Paolo Ghirardato, Itzhak Gilboa, Luigi Montrucchio, David Schmeidler, Marciano Siniscalchi, an Associate Editor, and an anonymous referee for helpful discussions. Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci gratefully acknowledge the financial support of MIUR and NOMOS Sistema (Milano).     

APPLICATION OF PANEL DATA MODELS IN BENCHMARKING ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SECTOR*

ABSTRACT ** : This paper explores the application of several panel data models in measuring productive efficiency of the electricity distribution sector. Stochastic Frontier Analysis has been used to estimate the cost‐efficiency of 59 distribution utilities operating over a nine‐year period in Switzerland. The estimated coefficients and inefficiency scores are compared across three different panel data models. The results indicate that individual efficiency estimates are sensitive to the econometric specification of unobserved firm‐specific heterogeneity. This paper shows that alternative panel models such as the ‘true’ random effects model proposed by Greene (2005) could be used to explore the possible impacts of unobserved firm‐specific factors on efficiency estimates. When these factors are specified as a separate stochastic term, the efficiency estimates are substantially higher suggesting that conventional models could confound efficiency differences with other unobserved variations among companies. On the other hand, refined specification of unobserved heterogeneity might lead to an underestimation of inefficiencies by mistaking potential persistent inefficiencies as external factors. Given that specification of inefficiency and heterogeneity relies on non‐testable assumptions, there is no conclusive evidence in favour of one or the other specification. However, this paper argues that alternative panel data models along with conventional estimators can be used to obtain approximate lower and upper bounds for companies' efficiency scores.     

A functional perspective on financial networks

The financial sector is a critical component of any economic system, as it delivers key qualitative asset transformation services in terms of liquidity, maturity and volume. Although these functions could in principle be carried out separately by specialized actors, in the end it is their systemic co-evolution that determines how the aggregate economy performs and withstands disruptions. In this paper we argue that a functional perspective on financial intermediation can be usefully employed to investigate the functioning of financial networks. We do this in two steps. First, we use previously unreleased data to show that focusing on the economic functions performed over time by the different institutions exchanging funds in an interbank market can be informative, even if the underlying topological structure of their relations remains constant. Second, a set of alternative artificial histories are generated and stress-tested by using real data as a calibration base, with the aim of performing counterfactual welfare comparisons among different topological structures.     

Efficiency Measurement in Network Industries: Application to the Swiss Railway Companies

The persistence of increasingly high government subsidies in Switzerland’s railroads has led the federal and cantonal authorities to discussing the possibility of high-powered incentive contracts such as those based on cost efficiency benchmarking. Railways are however, characterized by a high degree of unobserved heterogeneity that could bias the efficiency estimates. This paper examines the performance of several panel data models to measure cost efficiency in network industries. The unobserved firm-specific effects and the resulting biases are studied through a comparative study of several stochastic frontier models, applied to a panel of 50 railway companies operating over a 13-year period.* The authors wish to thank Michael Crew and two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. Aurelio Fetz provided an excellent assistance, which is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.This revised version was published in June 2005 with corrections in the author affiliations.     

Eastern European Economic Integration and Foreign Direct Investment

Economic transition in Eastern Europe should generate market growth. In addition, current discussions on economic integration and the development of a free-trade area in Eastern Europe will improve market accessibility. These two forces will significantly affect the strategies by which external firms will choose to supply markets in Eastern Europe. This paper examines the ways in which supply strategy is likely to change. We show that both market growth and improved market accessibility will lead the external firms to switch from exporting to foreign direct investment. However, market growth is likely to lead to dispersed investment in the growing economies, whereas increased market accessibility, by establishing an integrated regional bloc in Eastern Europe, is more likely to lead to concentrated investment plus infra-regional exports to the remainder of the regional bloc. The switch from exporting to local production through foreign direct investment will favor consumers through lowered prices but will harm national producers by depressing profit margins.     

Pricing and Informational Efficiency of the MIB30 Index Options Market. An Analysis with High‐frequency Data

We analyse the pricing and informational efficiency of the Italian market for options written on the most important stock index, the MIB30. We report that a striking percentage of the data consists of option prices violating basic no‐arbitrage conditions. This percentage declines when we relax the no‐arbitrage restrictions to accommodate the presence of bid/ask spreads and other frictions but never becomes negligible. We also investigate the informational efficiency of the MIBO and conclude that option prices are poor predictors of the volatility of MIB30 returns. This conclusion is robust to a number of statistical and sampling methods.
(J.E.L.: G13, G14).     

What are the Trade Spill-Overs from Fiscal Shocks in Europe? An Empirical Analysis***

We use a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis to explore the (trade spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in Europe. To enhance comparability with the existing literature, we first analyse the effects of these shocks at the national level. Here, we employ identification based on Choleski decomposition and a structural VAR, both of which lead to the same results. Then, we turn to study the cross-border spill-overs of fiscal shocks via the trade channel. Fiscal expansions in Germany, France and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from a number of European countries. In order to mimic the case of monetary union, we also shut off the effects via the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and find a slight strengthening on average of the cross-country spill-overs from a fiscal expansion. These results suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the possibility of enhanced fiscal coordination.*** This research is part of the RTN project ‘Macroeconomic Policy Design for Monetary Unions’, funded by the European Commission (contract number HPRN-CT-2002-00237). We thank two anonymous referees, a referee for the ECB Working Paper series, Peter Claeys, David-Jan Jansen, Franc Klaassen, Roberto Perotti and audiences at the Dutch Central Bank and the CEPR/CREI Conference ‘Designing a Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Europe’ (Barcelona, 2004) for many helpful comments. A large part of this paper was written while Beetsma was visiting the Directorate-General for Research of the ECB. He thanks the ECB for the stimulating research environment. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit any of.cial institution. The usual disclaimer applies.