Odd Prices at Retail Gasoline Stations: Focal Point Pricing and Tacit Collusion

This study empirically investigates the theory that odd‐numbered pricing points can be used as focal points to facilitate tacit collusion. Like other retailers, gasoline stations in the United States disproportionately sell at prices ending in odd digits. I show that station prices are higher and change less frequently in locations using more odd prices (particularly those ending in 5 or 9), even after controlling for other market characteristics. The evidence suggests that the use of pricing points can be an effective mechanism for tacitly coordinating prices, providing an alternative explanation for the widespread use of odd prices in retail markets.     

Market Orientation, Innovativeness, Product Innovation, and Performance in Small Firms

Most research on market orientation, innovation and performance is related to big enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In this study a model is developed to investigate the combined effect of market orientation and innovativeness on product innovation and company performance, for small firms. A specific feature of our research is that we use an objective measure for product innovation in contrast to the self-reported measures commonly used in research on innovation. To test our model data from 152 rose growers were used. This study's results show that the owner's innovativeness permeates all variables in the model and has a positive influence on market orientation, innovation, and performance. An interesting research result is also that customer market intelligence influences product innovation positively or negatively, depending on whether the innovativeness of the owner in the new product domain is weak or strong.     

The Decomposition of the Corporate Body: What Kant Cannot Contribute to Business Ethics

Kant is gaining popularity in business ethics because the categorical imperative rules out actions such as deceptive advertising and exploitative working conditions, both of which treat people merely as means to an end. However, those who apply Kant in this way often hold businesses themselves morally accountable, and this conception of collective responsibility contradicts the kind of moral agency that underlies Kant’s ethics. A business has neither inclinations nor the capacity to reason, so it lacks the conditions necessary for constraint by the moral law. Instead, corporate policies ought to be understood as analogous to legal constraints. They may encourage or discourage certain actions, but they cannot determine a person’s maxim – which for Kant is the focus of moral judgment. Because there is no collective intention apart from any intentions of the individual agents who act as members of the corporation, an organization itself has no moral obligations. This poses a dilemma: either apply the categorical imperative to the actions of particular businesspeople and surrender the notion of collective responsibility, or apply a different moral theory to the actions of businesses themselves. Given the diffusion of responsibility in a bureaucracy, the explanatory usefulness of collective responsibility may force business ethicists to abandon Kant’s moral philosophy.     

Sales and Firm Entry: The Case of Wal‐Mart

Temporary price reductions or “sales” have become increasingly important in the evolution of the price level. We present a model of repeated price competition to illustrate how entry causes incumbents to alternate between high and low prices. Using a six‐year panel of weekly observations from a grocery chain, we find that individual stores employ more sales as the distance to Wal‐Mart falls. Moreover, the increase in the frequency of sales was concentrated on the most popular products, suggesting the use of a loss‐leader strategy.     

The Perceptions of Ethical and Sustainable Leadership

Sustainable and ethical leadership in the financial industry expand in importance since the financial crisis of 2007–2009. This research examined the level of sustainable and ethical leadership of leaders in mortgage loan originator (MLO) organizations, as perceived by loan originators. The Perceived Leadership Survey (PLIS) developed by Craig and Gustafson (Leadersh Q 9(2):127–145, 1998) and the Sustainable Leadership Questionnaire (SLQ) developed by McCann and Holt (Int J Sustain Strat Manage 2(2):204–210, 2011) were utilized for this research. The survey results yielded high levels of both ethical and sustainable leadership. Employees also felt their leadership was encouraging ethical and sustainable behavior. However, correlations between the PLIS and SLQ did not prove to be dependent or closely correlated.     

Corporate cash holdings and political connections

We examine the relation between corporate liquidity and political connections measured via lobbying expenditures. This is an interesting question as many of the motives for holding cash should be diminished by political connections. Results indicate a significant and inverse relation between cash levels and lobby expenses and that the marginal value of cash decreases with lobbying. Taken together, these findings suggest firms react optimally to the reduced benefits of cash linked to political connections and that the market recognizes the weakened benefits of cash. Overall, our research shows another way political connections can shape corporate policy.     

The effect of rankings on honesty in budget reporting

We conduct an experiment to investigate the effect of rankings, which are pervasive in practice, on the honesty of managers’ budget reports, which is important for sound decision making in organizations. Participants in our experiment are ranked in one of four ways: (1) firm profit, (2) own compensation, (3) both firm profit and own compensation, and (4) randomly, which serves as our baseline condition. None of the rankings affect participants’ remuneration. Compared to our baseline (random rankings) setting, where participants indeed exhibit honesty concerns, we find that rankings based on firm profit significantly increase honesty and that rankings based on own compensation significantly decrease honesty. Participants who received both rankings were significantly more honest than participants in the own compensation rankings condition. We did not, however, find significant differences in honesty between the both rankings and firm profit rankings conditions. As such, participants in the both rankings condition seemed to focus more on the firm profit metric than on the financially congruent own compensation metric. We also find that our results are stable across periods, suggesting that the effects of rankings neither increased nor dissipated over time. We discuss the contributions of our study and concomitant findings to accounting research and practice.     

Did the Unconventional Monetary Policy of the U.S. Hurt Emerging Markets?

Open Economies Review - Policymakers in emerging markets complained that the unconventional US monetary policy response to the Great Recession hurt their economies. US policymakers responded that...     

Last dance or second chance? Firm performance,CEO career horizon,and the separation of board leadership roles

In recent years, many firms have chosen to separate their CEO and board chair positions. Prior research has demonstrated that there are three forms that a CEO–board chair separation can take: apprentice, departure, and demotion. In this paper, we examine the antecedents of these three types. Our results show that the three types of separation each have different profiles in terms of the prior performance of the firm, the independence of the board, and the career horizon of the incumbent CEO. The findings in this paper provide unique insights into the factors that drive boards' structural choices. As questions about board leadership structure become more nuanced and more relevant in both scholarship and practice, a full understanding of these factors will only become more important. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Institutionalized pollution havens

A multiple-principal, multiple-agent lobby group model suggests that the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policies is conditional on the structure of host countries' political institutions such as the number of legislative units (veto players). The model also yields the novel concept of “aggregate honesty” which combines veto players and corruption. FDI raises environmental policy stringency where the number of legislative units are many (aggregate honesty is high), but reduces it where the legislative units are few (aggregate honesty is low). Our panel data evidence is fully consistent with these predictions. An additional contribution is to show the empirical importance of endogenizing environmental policy in Pollution Haven Hypothesis studies. Only when treated as endogenous does environmental policy have a significant negative effect on FDI.