Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

Exchange rate volatility and its impact on the transaction costs of covered interest rate parity

This paper provides empirical evidence on the linkage between foreign exchange market volatility and daily 90-day covered interest rate parity (CIP) conditions of the three major exchange rates against the US dollar (US$). Markov regime shifting models were utilized to generate time series of volatility regime probabilities and these were used to explain the first and second moments of the daily deviations from and the transaction cost bands around the covered parity conditions. We find a significant positive relationship between the deviations and the regime probabilities, indicating an increasing probability of higher volatility state being associated with rising deviations (both first and second moments) from the parity condition. Similar positive relationship is found for the transaction bands. Rising (falling) probabilities of high (low) volatility regimes increased the first and second moments of the bands. Furthermore, we find a higher volatility state combined with a US$ depreciation is associated with significantly higher volatility in the daily deviations than an appreciation. Also, US$ depreciation is associated with widening transaction bands. This suggests that the level of market uncertainty was higher when the US$ was depreciating.     

Foreign debt and economic growth

This paper empirically examines the relationship between government foreign debt and the growth rate of per capita GDP based on a total sample of 77 countries, as well as sub‐samples of various regions. Cross‐sectional estimates of the coefficient of foreign debt based on the total sample have a negative sign, but are not always statistically significant. Available data from African countries indicate that foreign debt and the growth rate of per capita GDP were negatively related at a high level of significance. For industrialized and Latin American sub‐samples, this relationship is negative but statistically insignificant. The sub‐sample Asian and other developing countries show a positive but insignificant relationship. JEL classification: F34, H6, O23.     

Multilateral and Bilateral Loans versus Grants: Issues and Evidence

This paper examines a wide range of issues relating to the mix between loans and grants as well as the degree of concessionality of loans. A number of empirical tests are carried out based on annual panel data over 1970 to 1999 for 22 donor countries and 72 recipient countries. Based on the tests, we observe that for bilateral donors, past grant‐loan mix (and, hence, reflows from past transfers) do not influence the volume of current resource transfers. Our tests also show that the rate of official borrowing by the recipients (and, by deduction, the extent of their past debt burden) is positively influenced by the extent of the concessionality of such loans – irrespective of whether it is in the form of subsidised interest rates or longer grace periods. The paper concludes with a review of the circumstances in which grants, soft loans and non‐concessional loans might have their respective comparative advantage, as well as a discussion of the need, so as to overcome the negative incentive problems of soft loans, for a typical concessional loan package to be separated into two constituent parts. This would enable the recipient to be given the grant component and the option to take from the non‐concessional loan component as much as desired.     

SUPPLY CHAIN INFORMATION SHARING IN A VENDOR MANAGED INVENTORY PARTNERSHIP

Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) involves the vendor making the replenishment decision for products supplied to a customer based on various inventory and supply chain policies. Information sharing between supply chain members is required in VMI. Sometimes VMI decisions are delayed and/or the information shared is inaccurate. This research examines the effects of information delay and accuracy, and the sharing of sales and forecast information in a VMI environment facing stationary and nonstationary demand. The simulation experiments show the impact of information delay, information inaccuracy, and information sharing on a variety of performance measures, including inventory levels and fill rates.     

Central bank transparency and market efficiency: An econometric analysis

Blinder (1998) argues that more open public disclosure of central bank policies may enhance the efficiency of markets. We examine this claim by studying whether the Federal Reserve System's 1994 policy shift toward more open disclosure improved or worsened the predictability of financial markets. Employing methods analogous to Campbell and Shiller (1991), we find that since 1994, the forecasting error has decreased for interest rates on U.S. bonds of most maturity lengths, and that the expectations hypothesis has performed better at the low end of the yield curve. These findings are inconsistent with the view that increased central bank transparency will decrease the efficiency of financial markets. The authors would like to thank participants of the 2001 Midwest Macroeconomics Conference and 2001 Missouri Economics Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are, of course, the author's.     

Productivity Trends in Europe: Implications for Real Exchange Rates, Real Interest Rates, and Inflation

The paper examines a long–run (neoclassical) framework in which differences in productivity growth across sectors and countries lead to inflation differentials. In a currency union, these inflation differentials imply cross–country differentials in real interest rates. The authors estimate the likely size of these differentials for European Union countries, discuss the potential costs of persistent inflation differentials, and comment on the conflicts they may cause within Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The analytical framework is a variant of the Balassa–Samuelson "productivity hypotheisis," which relates sectoral productivity trends to trends in the relative price of home goods.     

Wealth Effects of International Investments and Agency Problems for Korean Multinational Firms

This paper recognizes the recent surge in cross‐border investments by MNCs from newly industrialized countries and investigates the wealth effects of FDI announcements by Korean firms, which are the leading FDI providers in Asia. The empirical results indicate that for Korean MNCs: 1) cross‐border investments increase shareholder wealth; and 2) they do not obtain the firm‐specific technological advantages over international competitors. The paper also presents evidence that cross‐border investments do not increase shareholder wealth for the 30 largest chaebol‐affiliates, and that shareholder wealth losses are greater when corporate ownership is concentrated, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) .     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.