Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

A burgeoning literature in experimental studies of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism focuses on the ability of institutions that allow the monitoring, sanctioning, and/or rewarding of others to facilitate cooperation. In this paper rewards and sanctions are examined in a one-shot VCM setting that so far has been unexplored in the literature. The study finds that while some subjects are willing to reward and sanction others at a personal cost, the opportunity to reward or sanction is ineffective in facilitating cooperation relative to previous experiments in which a repeated game environment is employed. The study also compares behavior in an environment in which the imposition of rewards and sanctions is certain to an environment in which imposition is uncertain. The expected value of the reward or sanction is kept constant across environments to focus simply on the effect of uncertainty about imposition. Uncertainty does not change behavior in a significant way, either in the level of cooperation or the willingness of individuals to impose rewards or sanctions.     

Strongly stable networks

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a “top convexity” condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous—depending on player labels.     

Corruption and Technological Progress: A Takeoff Theory of Good Governance

Corruption is known to be a function of its return relative to productive activity. But the idea that corruption might itself respond to technological progress has not been emphasized. This paper presents an approach for thinking about institutional features that lower corruption by lowering its relative return. Policies that promote productivity growth in market exchange may cause the relative reward to rent-seeking to decline. The evolutionary development of anti-corruption efforts may be a normal part of modernization, much as changes in income distribution and urbanization.     

Managing micropolitical risk: A cross‐sector examination

This article stresses the need for today's multinational firms to adopt their own political risk‐assessment and risk‐mitigation strategies. A comparative study of the energy, financial, and automobile sectors illustrates the need for all companies in these sectors to undertake comprehensive risk‐assessment strategies. Risk‐assessment models established by leading multinationals like British Petroleum, Bank of America, and General Motors are examined as examples that other companies in these sectors can build upon. The consistent micropolitical risk variables then lead to a proposed practical framework for examining sector‐specific micropolitical risk. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

当代生产管理领域之学术成果回顾——由精敏到延迟战略

自从工业革命以来，生产典范历经一连串的移转过程，由大量生产逐步发展出大量客制化、精实生产、敏捷及最新的精敏等概念。这些概念中，又以20世纪末才出现的敏捷与精敏较少为人所知。本研究试图将敏捷与精敏的学术成果作较完整的回顾，以找出关于这两个概念的问题中，什么论点已经被回答，以及还有什么论点有待进一步的探索。此外，由于许多学者都指出，企业如果要达到敏捷与精敏，须通过延迟战略才能实现。因此本研究也试图回顾有关评估延迟战略之效益的研究，以对未来的研究发展提供方向。     

Marketed tax avoidance: an economic analysis∗

Recent years have witnessed the growth of mass-marketed tax avoidance schemes aimed at the middle (not top) of the income distribution, with significant implications for tax revenue. We examine the consequences for the structure of income tax, and for tax authority anti-avoidance efforts, of tax avoidance of this type. In a model that allows for both demand- and supply-side considerations, we find that: there is an endogenous threshold income below which taxpayers do not avoid, and above which they avoid maximally; the per-dollar price of tax avoidance is decreasing in income under progressive taxation; endogenous adjustments in the price of avoidance make supply less responsive to anti-avoidance activity than thought previously; and avoidance may drive a non-monotone relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. These findings suggest that new approaches to anti-avoidance, beyond legal enforcement, might be needed.     

Serial Nonparticipation in Repeated Discrete Choice Models

We consider alternative econometric strategies for addressing serial nonparticipation, that is, repeated choice of the same alternative or same type of alternative across a series of choice occasions, in data typically analyzed within the repeated discrete choice framework. Single and double hurdle variants of the repeated discrete choice model are developed and applied to choice experiment and multisite seasonal recreation demand data. Our results suggest that hurdle models can generate significant improvements in statistical fit and qualitatively different policy implications, particularly in choice experiment applications where the proper treatment of serial nonparticipation is relatively more ambiguous.