Financing Transit Systems Through Value Capture

A bstract .   Much of the literature on value capture reports empirical findings on the incidence of rising land values related to distance from a transit stop following the installation of rail transit improvements. This annotated bibliography shows that the elevated value effects of transit access are well documented. The authors maintain that it is now time for transit/land-use research to move from hypothesis testing to practical applications of value capture . Longitudinal models can help predict land-value increments over a period of time, yielding estimates of the total capturable revenues that would support the debt financing of transit improvement projects.     

The Effects of local Fair Housing Ordinances on Housing Segregation: Their Impact Is Small, But It's an Important Positive Change Toward Integration

Abstract . State and local fair housing ordinances, patterned after federal legislation, are promoted by federal policy. This study investigates whether these local laws have had any effect on levels of residential segregation between Whites and Blacks, 1970-1980, by comparing changes in segregation for 111 cities characterized by different types of fair housing coverage. Results show average declines of 9 points in the index of dissimilarity, with cities covered by both state and local laws declining slightly more than cities with no fair housing coverage. Declines are not greater in cities with laws that are “substantially equivalent” to Title VIII vs. cities with non-equivalent laws. When changes in segregation were examined by a variety of population, economic and housing variables that may affect segregation change, it was found that local ordinances continue to have a small, but statistically significant effect. This effect varies according to the pattern of segregation change under study; deconcentration of ghetto areas and integration of White areas are not affected by type of local fair housing coverage.     

Government wage differentials

This paper shows that public sector wages usually exceed private but the size and composition of the differentials depend on sex and level of government. Using a technique derived from the literature on sex discrimination, these differentials are decomposed into a portion attributable to differences in productivity between the two types of workers and a portion ascribed to economic rent. This rent results from public workers' relatively greater political influence in the government wage-setting process and a systematic upward bias in public wages imparted by present government pay policy.     

Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality

The methodological ideal of experimentalists, E, is easily stated: derive a testable hypothesis, H, from a well-specified theory, T; implement experiments with a design; implicitly in the latter are auxiliary hypotheses, A, that surface in the review/discussion of completed research reports (payoffs are 'adequate,' Ss are 'relevant,' instructions, context are 'clear,' etc.). We want to be able to conclude, if statistical test outcomes support not-H, that T is 'falsified.' But this is not what we do; rather we ask if there is a flaw in the test, i.e. not-A is supported, and we do more experiments. This is good practice—much better than the statistical rhetoric of falsificationism. Undesigned social processes allow E to accumulate technical and instrumental knowledge that drive the reduction of experimental error and constitute a more coherent methodology than falsificationism.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

Recovering Hicksian Consumer Surplus within a Collective Model: Hausman's Method for the Household

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. After demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished, the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover Hicksian consumer surplus. An algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources.     

A theory of natural addiction

Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an in-depth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their effects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unconventional behavioral assumptions employed by theories of rational addiction, including adjacent complementarity and the importance of cues, attention, and self-control in determining the behavior of addicts. We offer evidence for the special case of the opiates that “harmful” addiction is the manifestation of a mismatch between behavioral algorithms encoded in the human genome and the expanded menu of choices faced by consumers in the modern world.     

OPPORTUNISTIC MATCHING IN THE HOUSING MARKET*

We construct a model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow values while searching. Agents enter the market relaxed (with high flow values) but move to a desperate state (low flow values) at a Poisson rate if they have not already transacted. We characterize the equilibrium steady‐state matching pattern and the joint distribution of price and time to sale (for sellers). The expected price conditional on time to sale falls with time spent on the market, whereas the conditional variance of price first rises and then falls with time on the market.     

Editorial

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Editorial