全文获取类型
收费全文 | 17315篇 |
免费 | 44篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 2742篇 |
工业经济 | 800篇 |
计划管理 | 2699篇 |
经济学 | 4001篇 |
综合类 | 483篇 |
运输经济 | 3篇 |
旅游经济 | 8篇 |
贸易经济 | 4597篇 |
农业经济 | 15篇 |
经济概况 | 1380篇 |
信息产业经济 | 44篇 |
邮电经济 | 587篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 2篇 |
2023年 | 9篇 |
2022年 | 5篇 |
2021年 | 13篇 |
2020年 | 17篇 |
2019年 | 29篇 |
2018年 | 2321篇 |
2017年 | 2082篇 |
2016年 | 1234篇 |
2015年 | 114篇 |
2014年 | 125篇 |
2013年 | 132篇 |
2012年 | 476篇 |
2011年 | 1969篇 |
2010年 | 1855篇 |
2009年 | 1547篇 |
2008年 | 1531篇 |
2007年 | 1881篇 |
2006年 | 82篇 |
2005年 | 409篇 |
2004年 | 478篇 |
2003年 | 564篇 |
2002年 | 263篇 |
2001年 | 75篇 |
2000年 | 63篇 |
1999年 | 12篇 |
1998年 | 20篇 |
1997年 | 3篇 |
1996年 | 19篇 |
1995年 | 3篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 4篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 13篇 |
1982年 | 2篇 |
1979年 | 1篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1977年 | 1篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
1968年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
111.
112.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
113.
Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk. 相似文献
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
Matthias Wrede 《The German Economic Review》2003,4(2):203-216
Abstract. This paper analyzes how deviating from individual taxation affects married couples. The focus is on time allocation, on investment in family‐specific human capital and on distribution of income within the family. Two insights are discussed in detail. First, the distribution of tax‐reduction gains due to the income splitting system depends on whether the family has been started or not. After marriage, joint taxation increases redistribution among family members. Second, although joint taxation reduces the tax burden of the family, it might harm the marriage partner that is more productive in household production provided that potential marriage partners foresee the effects of joint filing on the time allocation within the family. 相似文献
120.
Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract. On 11 May 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector mode: each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM1,000 pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM100, 200, …, 900 (s)he would accept or reject. In addition, participants were asked to predict the most frequent type of behavior. Three randomly selected proposer–responder pairs were rewarded according to the rules of ultimatum bargaining and three randomly chosen participants of those who predicted the most frequent type of behavior received a prize of DM500. Decisions could be submitted by mail, fax or via the internet. Behavior is described, statistically analyzed and compared to the usual laboratory ultimatum bargaining results. 相似文献