Central bank transparency and financial market expectations: The case of emerging markets

In this paper, we study how central bank transparency influences the formation of money market expectations in emerging markets. The sample covers 25 countries for the period from January 1998 to December 2009. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias (the difference between the money market rate and the weighted expected target rate over the contract period) in money market expectations. The effect is larger for countries with no exchange rate peg and countries with low income. Second, an intermediate level of transparency is found to have the most favorable influence on money market expectations: neither complete secrecy nor complete transparency is optimal. Finally, all subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index lead to a smaller bias in expectations, with political transparency having the largest effect.     

Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

We analyze the optimal choice of risk in a two-stage tournament game between two players that have different concave utility functions. At the first stage, both players simultaneously choose risk. At the second stage, both observe overall risk and simultaneously decide on effort or investment. The results show that those two effects which mainly determine risk taking – an effort effect and a likelihood effect – are strictly interrelated. This finding sharply contrasts with existing results on risk taking in tournament games with symmetric equilibrium efforts where such linkage can never arise. Conditions are derived under which this linkage leads to a reversed likelihood effect so that the favorite (underdog) can increase his winning probability by increasing (decreasing) risk which is impossible in a completely symmetric setting.     

Efficiency and productivity change in Ukrainian health care

The study analyses technical efficiency and efficiency change of 193 community hospitals and polyclinics across Ukraine, for the years 1997–2001. These facilities are a subset of the medical institutions in rural Ukraine; they are identical w.r.t. their function in the health system and share the same departmental structure. The data comprise the number of beds in the hospitals, the number of staff employed in the hospitals as well as the polyclinics connected to the hospitals, the number of inpatient and outpatient admissions as well as the number of surgical procedures, lab tests, X-rays performed and the number of deaths and deaths after surgery. Because of the known sensitivity of traditional nonparametric frontier estimators to outlier observations, we employ an order-m estimator, a robust technique, to assess the efficiency of these health care providers as well as changes of their productivity time. The efficiency scores are calculated with an output-oriented model; they are close to unity for hospitals whereas polyclinics seem somewhat less efficient. The Malmquist-indices averaged over all observations are close to unity indicating that productivity does not change over during our observation period. But, depending on the period and the region, substantial deviations from unity can be observed.

Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments

We derive several implications of incentive compatibility in general (i.e., not necessarily quasilinear) environments. Building on Kos and Messner (2013), we provide a (partial) characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.     

Deploying strategic resources: comparing members of farmer cooperatives to non-members in sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract

Primary producers in global value chains, like any other firm, aim for entrepreneurial success through deploying strategic resources, collective action, strategic intent, and a supportive institutional environment. In the current article, we analyze the extent to which members of farmer cooperatives in Ethiopia succeed in deploying strategic resources. We find that non-members utilize resources more efficiently and that the potential for collective action is not realized. The potential for collective action remains unrealized due to the institutional environment. We suggest pathways for further research.     

Enhancing the EU’s Energy Supply Security—An Evaluation of the Nabucco Project and an Introduction to Its Open Season Capacity Allocation Process

The Russian dominance of the European Union (EU)’s natural gas supplies has put the independence of the EU at risk. This paper presents an evaluation of the Nabucco gas pipeline project—considered by some to be the most economical link to new natural gas sources—to determine whether it would help the EU to diversify its gas supplies in a cost-effective way, thus improving its energy supply security in future years. Furthermore, an introduction to the Nabucco Open Season Capacity Allocation Process is given. Applying empirical methods and competitive pipeline benchmarking analysis, three hypotheses related to the Nabucco natural experiment are evaluated: while hypothesis (1) focuses on the strength of demand for the Nabucco pipeline transportation capacities, hypotheses (2) and (3) examine fair usage rights and overall cost effectiveness of this project. Empirical results show that, due to the EU’s increasing long-term gas demand and decreasing indigenous production, there is a strong demand for the Nabucco gas pipeline by gas shippers. Furthermore, the empirical survey reveals that Nabucco provides a fair capacity allocation of fifty percent to third party shippers. Finally, competitive benchmarking shows Nabucco is indeed a cost-effective new pipeline and a link to fresh natural gas sources for Europe. Based on these results, it is anticipated that “Nabucco” will not only remain the name of a famous opera, but will also become the term associated with one of the most successful energy projects in Europe.