Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.      

Gifted kids or pushy parents? Foreign direct investment and plant productivity in Indonesia

This paper analyzes the causal relationship between foreign ownership and various aspects of plant performance using micro data from the Indonesian Census of Manufacturing. It examines the implications of foreign ownership in two different contexts: foreign acquisitions and foreign privatizations. To control for the possible endogeneity of FDI decision propensity score matching is combined with a difference-in-differences approach. The results indicate that foreign ownership leads to significant productivity improvements in the acquired plants. The improvements become visible in the acquisition year and continue in subsequent periods. After three years, the acquired plants exhibit a 13.5% higher productivity than the control group. The rise in productivity is a result of restructuring, as acquired plants increase investment outlays, employment and wages. Foreign ownership also appears to enhance the integration of plants into the global economy through increased exports and imports. Finally, productivity improvements and evidence of restructuring are also found in the context of foreign privatizations.     

SHOULD YOU ALLOW YOUR EMPLOYEE TO BECOME YOUR COMPETITOR? ON NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS*

We discuss a principal–agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal, as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict noncompete agreement.     

Who stays,who goes,who returns?

We study the determinants of East–West migration within Germany during the period 1990–2006, using administrative data, the German Microcensus and the German Socio‐Economic Panel. We find that in addition to income prospects and employment status, two well‐known determinants of migration, psychological and social factors play an important role in determining the migration decision. Men and women move from East to West in proportionate numbers, but among individuals who lived in the East in 1989 women are more likely to migrate. The migrant body in the second wave of migration, starting in the late 1990s, is increasingly composed of young, educated people. By focusing on differences between temporary and permanent migrants, we find that older and single individuals are more likely to return East than stay permanently in the West, compared with younger and married individuals. Finally, the life satisfaction of permanent migrants increases significantly after a move, while that of temporary migrants remains essentially flat.     

Lessons Learned: 50 Years of Information Technology in the Banking Industry – The Example of Deutsche Bank AG

Based on the lessons learned from the last 50 years, statements are derived of which the authors claim that these will continue to be valid in future: Information technology in the banking industry supports business processes – selecting and designing processes will continue to decide about economic success in future. The necessity of handling a growing business volume will still be the major driver for using new information technology in the banking industry. It will be even more important than the aim of reducing costs by automation. Industrialization of IT will also change the use of technology in the banking industry. Hence, banks do not necessarily have to run their systems alone but may outsource services if required. The definition of the major business fields will significantly influence the banks’ IT strategy and, among other factors, will decide on the market success of a bank. Technological development will have an increasing effect on the banking business, will change it, and enable new business models. Successfully dealing with technology-induced changes predominantly depends on a company’s employees.

The effect of working time and labor force participation on unemployment: A new argument in an old debate

This paper introduces a new argument into the theoretical literature on labor market effects of changes in working hours and labor force participation. We advance a general equilibrium model in which increased labor supply reduces unskilled unemployment via consumer demand: longer work hours and higher labor force participation imply higher incomes and less (leisure) time. In consequence, home production is reduced in favor of outsourcing domestic tasks to the market, shifting consumer demand toward unskill-intensive goods. Relative demand for unskilled labor rises and unemployment falls.     

Do international labor standards contribute to the persistence of the child-labor problem?

In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child-labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child-labor in developing countries and thereby improve children’s welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child-labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child-labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child-labor.     

Brexit und die Zukunft Europas – eine spieltheoretische Einordnung

After the Brexit referendum’s leave outcome last summer, the new relationship between the UK and the EU has to be shaped institutionally. For the two bargaining parties the question now is which negotiation strategy to take. In order to choose the optimal strategy, the players have to factor in their time preferences. A game theoretical approach yields that the EU — no matter what is economically feasible in the short run — has to play a tough negotiation strategy if they care about the long run. This result is not a question of punishment but of pure economic rationale.