Forecast performance,disagreement, and heterogeneous signal-to-noise ratios

We propose an imperfect information model for the expectations of macroeconomic forecasters that explains differences in average disagreement levels across forecasters by means of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the variance of private noise signals. We show that the forecaster-specific signal-to-noise ratios determine both the average individual disagreement level and an individuals’ forecast performance: Forecasters with very noisy signals deviate strongly from the average forecasts and report forecasts with low accuracy. We take the model to the data by empirically testing for this implied correlation. Evidence based on data from the Surveys of Professional Forecasters for the USA and for the Euro Area supports the model for short- and medium-run forecasts but rejects it based on its implications for long-run forecasts.     

Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. At the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. At the second stage, the two managers compete in an oligopolistic tournament against each other. The findings substantially differ from the results for Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly: There exist asymmetric equilibria where one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative one, although the structure of the game is completely symmetric. If the influence of noise vanishes, the owner of the more aggressive firm will even induce sales maximization to his manager in order to preempt his competitor. Received: 22 April 2004, Accepted: 25 December 2005 JEL Classification: L1, M2 I would like to thank the editor Semih Koray, two anonymous referees, Ulf Schiller, Dirk Sliwka, Gunter Steiner, and the participants of the Microeconomics Seminar of the Humboldt University at Berlin for very helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant KR 2077/2-3 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"), is gratefully acknowledged.     

Methoden zur allokation von sicherheitskapital Darstellung und Beurteilung aus Sicht der Unternehmungsleitung

If the board of an insurance company wants to allocate capital to its business fields it is worth-while to base this decision on a conceptual distinction between profit and risk (safety first-principle). For calculating the amounts of capital allocated five methods can be used. These methods differ in the way risk is measured. To evaluate strengths and weaknesses of these methods four criteria are introduced: power, compatibility regarding the board’s preferences, costs and board involvement. Checking the criteria for each method gives the result that three methods are dominated. The board, therefore, has to choose only between the volatility based method (in its variance-proportional form) and the shortfall based method.     

Export Behavior and Firm Productivity in German Manufacturing: A Firm-Level Analysis

This paper examines the causal relationship between productivity and exporting in German manufacturing. We find a causal link from high productivity to presence in foreign markets, as postulated by a recent literature on international trade with heterogeneous firms. We apply a matching technique in order to analyze whether the presence in international markets enables firms to achieve further productivity improvements, without finding significant evidence for this. We conclude that high-productivity firms self-select themselves into export markets, while exporting itself does not play a significant role for the productivity of German firms. JEL no. F10, F13, F14, D21, L60     

Chancen und Risiken in den Finanzmärkten

Ohne Zusammenfassung