Business cycle measurement with some theory

A method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the DGP and the exact specification of the aggregate decision rules is proposed. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use some to identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub-models. The approach has good properties, even in small samples, and when the class of models is misspecified. The method is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction (the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers) in a standard class of models.     

Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze

In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.     

The probability of a “gross” violation of an efficient markets variance inequality

This note considers the small sample bias of the empirical variances of observed and ex-post-rational prices of financial assets, and shows that this can be much more severe than has previously been thought.     

Union recognition in Britain's offshore oil and gas industry: implications of the Employment Relations Act 1999

The Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA) has provided trade unions in the UK with new opportunities for achieving recognition. After a long history of anti‐unionism in the offshore oil and gas industry, employers have voluntarily ceded recognition to Trades Union Congress (TUC)‐affiliated trade unions. The legitimacy of this recognition process has been contested by the non‐TUC Offshore Industry Liaison Committee (OILC), an offshore workers’ union, seeking to act as a recognised bargaining agent. The ERA may be promoting ‘business friendly’ agreements at the expense of claims to recognition of other bargaining agents and of democratic employee choice.     

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