Old flames never die – the role of binding social ties for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms

This paper investigates the role of social ties and family embeddedness for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms. Family firms are mostly characterized by close and often inseparable ties between the dominant family coalition and the firm and offer specific resources within a context of both rational as well as non-rational factors that influence entrepreneurial strategies. We empirically test (n =?181) the relationship between binding social ties and innovation, strategic renewal, and corporate venturing. Our findings indicate a strong significance for networks and close and stable relationships both to inside the firm and the outside in decision making for corporate venturing and innovation. In contrast, the results for strategic renewal show no relevance of strong social ties. We link up with the debate on the role of owners as an important stakeholder group.

     

Systematic review of sourcing and 3D printing: make-or-buy decisions in industrial buyer–supplier relationships

Management Review Quarterly - Additive manufacturing (AM) is regarded as a technology that has transformative and disruptive potential in nearly all industries. However, AM is not only about new...     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001     

Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation. Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000     

How to control a chaotic economy?

An economic system which exhibits chaotic behaviour has been stabilized on various periodic orbits by use of the Ott-Grebogi-Yorke method. This procedure has been recently applied to controlling chaotic phenomena in physical, chemical and biological systems. We adopt this method successfully for Feichtinger's generic model of two competing firms with asymmetrical investment strategies. We show that the application of this control method to the particular economic process considered brings a substantial advantage: one can easily switch from a chaotic trajectory to a regular periodic orbit and simultaneously improve the system's economic properties. Numerical simulations are presented in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the whole procedure.The work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and by the Polish National Council (KBN) Grant No 2 P302 038 04.     

Representation and Educational Background of European Economists in Top Journals of Economics

We assess the contribution of European authors to 10 topjournals of economics from 1980 to 1998. Despite efforts on the European Union and national levels topromote academic excellence, European authors still play a minor role in top journals. Examining the development overtime we find little evidence for an increasing share of European contributions. Particular attention has been paidto the educational background of European authors. There is still a segmentation of academic education alonglanguage barriers in continental Europe. However, a considerable proportion of European authors has received a PhD from the US.