Real option pricing with mean-reverting investment and project value

In this work, we are concerned with valuing the option to invest in a project when the project value and the investment cost are both mean-reverting. Previous works on stochastic project and investment cost concentrate on geometric Brownian motions (GBMs) for driving the factors. However, when the project involved is linked to commodities, mean-reverting assumptions are more meaningful. Here, we introduce a model and prove that the optimal exercise strategy is not a function of the ratio of the project value to the investment V/I – contrary to the GBM case. We also demonstrate that the limiting trigger curve as maturity approaches traces out a nonlinear curve in (V, I) space and derive its explicit form. Finally, we numerically investigate the finite-horizon problem, using the Fourier space time-stepping algorithm of Jaimungal and Surkov [2009. Lev´y based cross-commodity models and derivative valuation. SIAM Journal of Financial Mathematics, to appear. http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=972837]. Numerically, the optimal exercise policies are found to be approximately linear in V/I; however, contrary to the GBM case they are not described by a curve of the form V*/I*=c(t). The option price behavior as well as the trigger curve behavior nicely generalize earlier one-factor model results.     

A Typology of Reverse Innovation

Reverse innovation commonly refers to an innovation initially launched in a developing country and later introduced to an advanced country. Adopting a linear innovation model with the four sequential phases of concept ideation, product development, primary target market introduction, and subsequent secondary market introduction, this study expands the espoused definition of reverse innovation beyond its market‐introduction focus with reversals in the flow of innovation in the ideation and product development phases. Recognizing that each phase can take place in different geographical locations, the paper then introduces a typology of global innovation with 16 different types of innovation flows between advanced and emerging countries, 10 of which are reverse innovation flows. The latter are further differentiated into weak and strong reverse innovation, depending on the number of innovation phases taking place in an emerging country. This analytical framework allows recasting of current research at the intersection between innovation and international business. Of the 10 reverse innovation flows, six are new and have not been covered in the literature to date. The study addresses questions of ethnocentrism and the continuity of the flow of innovation, and discusses possible extensions of the model with respect to the number of geographical categories and phases of innovation. Four research propositions highlight areas for future investigation, especially in the context of optimizing a firm's portfolio of global innovation competence and capability. The implications for management are concerned with internal and external resistance to reverse innovation. Most significantly, while greater recognition and power of innovation in formerly subordinate organizational units is inconvenient to some, the ability to leverage the potential of reverse innovation makes a firm more likely to succeed in global innovation overall.     

Socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing of family firms

Socioemotional wealth (SEW), i.e., the noneconomic utility a family derives from its ownership position in a firm, is the primary reference point for family firms. Family firms are willing to sacrifice economic gains in order to preserve their noneconomic utility. Thus, we argue that family firms sacrifice IPO proceeds by choosing higher IPO underpricing than nonfamily firms if underpricing helps them protect their SEW. Our empirical results, based on a sample of 153 German IPOs, support our hypothesis. On average, family firms have 10 percentage points more IPO underpricing than nonfamily firms. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Socially Useless Jobs

Recent research suggests that many workers in modern economies think that their job is socially useless, i.e., that it makes no or a negative contribution to society. However, the evidence so far is mainly anecdotal. We use a representative dataset comprising 100,000 workers from forty‐seven countries at four points in time. We find that approximately 8 percent of workers perceive their job as socially useless, while another 17 percent are doubtful about the usefulness of their job. There are sizeable differences among countries, sectors, occupations, and age groups, but no trend over time. A vast majority of workers cares about holding a socially useful job and we find that they suffer when they consider their job useless. We also explore possible causes of socially useless jobs, including bad management, strict job protection legislation, harmful economic activities, labor hoarding, and division of labor.     

Analysts’ annual earnings forecasts and changes to the I/B/E/S database

Review of Accounting Studies - I/B/E/S is a common source of analyst earnings forecast data, and the reliability of these data is important for practice and academic research. Examining a common...     

The importance of firms in wage determination

Firms are central to many theories of the labor market. However, the actual degree to which firms shape the structure of wages is still not well understood. This paper investigates (i) the importance of firms in explaining wage differences across individuals and industries, and (ii) how the nature of interfirm mobility – job-to-job vs. job-unemployment-job – affects the relative importance of firms and workers in wage determination. Results indicate that (i) firms are much more important in explaining the variance of average wages across industries rather than across individuals, and (ii) using job-to-job transitions to identify the firm's contribution to the wage rate reduces the importance of firm wage policies in explaining wage differences by as much as 50%.     

The Biofuel Controversy

Summary  About a decade ago, the main OECD countries decided to promote the use of biofuels so as to reduce greenhouse gases, to contribute to energy self-sufficiency and to create additional demand for agricultural commodities. The introduction of mandatory blending requirements and lavish subsidies spurred fast adoption of this technology. In the course of 2008, the already existing controversy about the effectiveness of this strategy culminated as the resulting upward shift in demand contributed to staggering rises in food prices on world markets. It is uncertain as yet whether this will tone done current ambitions among policy makers to expand biofuel production. The paper shows that high ratios of energy prices to food prices are needed to make biofuel production profitable without the mandatory blending and subsidies. Yet, even if food-based biofuels disappeared, the issue remains that rising high energy prices will promote intensified use worldwide of land for energy crops, requiring huge amounts of mineral fertilizers and putting nature under additional pressure. In policy terms, this defines three major tasks. The first is replacing the current excise taxes on energy carriers by a uniform carbon tax, so as to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in an efficient manner, the second to prevent price fluctuations on the oil markets from destabilizing food markets, as happened in recent years. Introduction of upper limits on the use of food for biofuel could prove effective here. The third, much wider, task is to make the transition to a partly biomass based energy production possible and sustainable, that is establishing fair distribution of property and user rights over the lands, while safeguarding biodiversity and soil fertility and maintaining adequate labour standards and living conditions, also during periods that these become non-profitable following a drop in energy prices. The authors thank Lia van Wesenbeeck for her comments.     

Monetary effects on nominal oil prices

The paper presents a theory of nominal asset prices for competitively owned oil. Focusing on monetary effects, with flexible oil prices the US dollar oil price should follow the aggregate US price level. But with rigid nominal oil prices, the nominal oil price jumps proportionally to nominal interest rate increases. We find evidence for structural breaks in the nominal oil price that are used to illustrate the theory of oil price jumps. The evidence also indicates strong Granger causality of the oil price by US inflation as is consistent with the theory.