The assessment: contracts and competition

A significant recent development has been the extension of marketprocesses to activities which were previously provided by thepublic sector. A central feature of newly privatised marketsis the emergence of widespread forms of contracting. Explicitcontracting is used where in the past transactions had takenplace internally within a public enterprise of a governmentdepartment. The design of efficient forms of contracting hasbeen an essential component of the development of new marketsand quasi-markets such as those in defence and health. Thispaper examines evidence of the structure of contracts and theextent to which they contribute to or detract from the efficientoperation of markets, discusses the role of contracts in somenewly emerging markets, and evaluates contracts in utilitieswhere regulation rather than competition policy is widespread.     

Efficient rank tests for semiparametric competing risk models

We consider a semiparametric competing risk model given by k independent survival times. The paper offers an asymptotic treatment of tests for the semiparametric null hypothesis of equality of the underlying risks. It turns out that modified rank tests are asymptotically efficient for certain semiparametric submodels, where the baseline hazard is a nuisance parameter. In addition, the asymptotic relative efficiency of the present tests is derived. A comparison of asymptotic power functions can then be used to classify various tests proposed earlier in the literature. For instance a chi-square type test is efficient for proportional hazards. Data driven tests of likelihood ratio type are proposed for cones of alternatives. We will consider certain stochastically increasing alternatives as a special example. The paper shows how the concept of local asymptotic normality of Le Cam works for hazard oriented models.     

TARIFF FORMATION IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODEL*

The theory of endogenous trade policy formation argues that tariffs emerge from the political process. This occurs because of conflicting economic interests trying to redistribute income in their favor through the adoption of suitable trade policies. Mayer and Riezman (1987) questioned this view arguing that if individuals differ only in factor ownership they would always prefer some tax/subsidy policy to tariffs. Here we allow individuals to differ not only with respect to factor ownership, but also with respect to consumption preferences and income tax treatment. We show that tariffs might be the social decision even though nobody's individual preferences suggest tariffs as the best choice.     

The assessment: financial instability

This paper analyses the causes, consequences, and cures forfinancial instability based on nine articles on this subjectin the Oxford Review of Economic Policy. It argues that thearticles suggest a high degree of consensus about the policiesrequired to minimize risks of financial instability and thepolicies required to tackle it if it emerges.     

Euro-currency market as recycling medium

During the past year the Euro-currency market played a very large role in bridging over the oil-induced payments imbalances. In the interest of international monetary stability this market should now move somewhat away from the centre of the stage and leave the main responsibility for the recycling of oil funds to the official financing mechanisms.