Small and medium size firm’s marketing competitive advantage and environmental initiatives in the Middle East

The paper explores Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) in Saudi Arabia within the context of environmental sustainability. The objective of the study is to examine whether SME’s sustainable marketing competitive advantage through environmental initiatives can positively associate to a firm’s environmental (green) best practices and stakeholder influences; similarly, it also identifies if best practices mediate environmental costs and competitive advantage. A sample of 181 responses are obtained and are analysed using factor analysis, multiple regression and their interaction effects. The findings show that the association between firms that have competitive advantage due to environmental initiatives were found to be significant for best practices and indirect stakeholder influences. Furthermore, the results identified that by using environmental best practices, SMEs can lower their environmental costs to gain marketing competitive advantage. These findings highlight the function of environmentalism and how it can influence practitioners.     

Do oligopolistic firms benefit from being forced to act non-strategically?

The present study seeks to answer the question of whether acting non-strategically can benefit firms. In a static Cournot framework, if a subset of firms are constrained to the equilibrium level of output, being non-strategic will have no impact on profits of neither constrained nor strategic firms and provided that sufficiently large number of firms are restricted, a marginal quantity contraction can be to their benefit. In contrast, using a dynamic Cournot framework, we find that the constraint set at the equilibrium level or moderately deviated from it, leads to increased profits for all firms irrespective of the number of non-strategic ones.     

Board gender diversity and acquisition choices

We investigate the influence of gender diversity on the acquisition choices of bidding firms and find that firms with greater gender diversity are more likely to acquire nonlisted targets, use cash as the method of payment, and purchase firms in similar industries. Results show that these preferences are significantly influenced by female directors' financial expertise, target industry experience, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) experience, academic and professional qualifications, and networks. The percentage of female directors on boards is positively correlated with the market response to the announcement of acquisition choices preferred by female directors. Furthermore, bidders improve efficiency and accumulate long-term value gains through the contributions made by their female directors to these acquisition choices.     

Tariffs,R&D,and two merger policies

We compare welfare-increasing and consumer-surplus-increasing merger policies in an oligopoly when merging firms face endogenous trade policies, and engage in cost-reducing R&D activity. As R&D becomes less efficient, the equilibrium market structures (EMS) become less concentrated under both merger policies. When R&D is very efficient, monopoly becomes the EMS under the welfare-increasing merger policy. This occurs as the absence of tariff and efficient R&D under monopoly limit the price increase and the gain in profits outweighs the loss in consumer surplus and tariff revenue. The results suggest that trade policies should take into account merger policies and industries' R&D efficiency. The results also show that global welfare maximization requires global merger policy coordination.     

The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks

We introduce (strict) favoring upper ranks, which is an extension of favoring higher ranks for random assignments. We demonstrate that ex post favoring ranks implies (strict) favoring upper ranks, and envy-freeness implies favoring upper ranks. Moreover, for at least four agents, no mechanism satisfies strict favoring upper ranks and either equal division lower bound or equal treatment of equals and lower invariance. Finally, we proved that the (modified) eating algorithm provides a random assignment that is (strict) favoring upper ranks.