Publishing performance in economics: Spanish rankings (1990–1999)

Abstract. This paper contributes to the growing literature that analyses the Spanish publishing performance in Economics throughout the 1990s. Several bibliometric indicators are used in order to provide Spanish rankings (of both institutions and individual authors) based on Econlit journals. Further, lists of the ten most influential authors and articles over that period, in terms of citations, are reported. We are grateful to many colleagues who made very useful remarks to preliminary versions of this paper, as well as to two anonymous referees. We are particularly indebted to Xavier Sala-i-Martín, without whose invaluable help this work would not have been possible. All errors or omissions are of our exclusive responsibility.     

Distributional assumptions and a test of the dual labor market hypothesis

Recent application of the switching regression model to allocate workers into the primary and secondary labor markets is considered to be the best solution to the classification problem of the empirical testing of the dual labor market theory. In such models, normality of the error terms is assumed. This paper adopts the switching regression model to test the dual labor market theory by assuming different distributions of the error terms. The test results strongly support the dual labor market theory regardless of the assumption one makes about the error terms. However, the results indicate that different distribution can lead to different percentage distributions of workers in the two segments. In particular, the normal distribution generates more workers in the primary segment than the non-normal distributions. Therefore, care must be taken not to generalize the type of industries or occupations that fall under the primary and secondary segments. First version received: October 2000/Final version received: March 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  I would like to thank Kevin Lang, Robert Marshall, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am grateful for comments received from the session participants of the Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco, CA, June 28–July 2, 1996, and the Midwest Economic Association Conference, Kansas City, 1997. I thank George Bonney, the Chief Statistician of Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia for his comments. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Penn State Research and Development Grant, 1995.     

Applied Welfare Economics with Bounded Rationality: Public Policies Toward Remote Sensing

Earlier experimental evidence indicates that some decision makers under-invest in information when it is costly. This insight is applied to the cost–benefit analysis of the provision of data obtained by satellites. In fields like agriculture, remotely sensed information of great precision can be provided to additional farmers at minimal extra costs if a service for farmers with similar information needs is set up. Here, the tendency to under-invest in information asks for creative solutions by the private sector: bankers may work together with rational producers in setting up the information service and promoting it. However, if producers financial resources are insufficient, public intervention, in the form of a free information service may be necessary.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Sean Flynn, Daniel Heller, and Carlos Lenz and participants of the Lisbon Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, particularly Asatoshi Maeshiro, for helpful comments.     

The effect of fertility on labour force participation: The Spanish evidence

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of fertility on the decision of labour force participation of married females in Spain, allowing for the existence of unobserved characteristics that affect both fertility and participation. We use a pooling of five waves of the European Household Panel for Spain (1994–1998). Results indicate that not taking into account the unobserved characteristics that affect both variables imposes on average a strong downward bias on the true effect of fertility on participation. This bias is especially strong for highly educated females. We are grateful to Raquel Carrasco and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Financial support from Gobierno Vasco (PI-1999-160)), Ministry of Education and Science (BE2000-1394), Instituto de la Mujer and Universidad del País Vasco (UPV 00035.321-13511/2001) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Is capital a collusion device?

Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies, when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001     

The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002     

The proper panel econometric specification of the gravity equation: A three-way model with bilateral interaction effects

We argue that the proper specification of a panel gravity model should include main (exporter, importer, and time) as well as time invariant exporter-by-importer (bilateral) interaction effects. In a panel of 11 APEC countries, the latter are highly significant and account for the largest part of variation. First version received: February 2001/Final version received: June 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  We are grateful to two anonymous referees and Robert Kunst for their helpful comments.     

Class length and student performance: An extended study

Many accounting educators believe that the student learning of accounting is better facilitated over a longer period of time, rather than a shorter period of time. This study examined the results of student performance in two introductory accounting courses, comparing student performance results of four-week summer classes with the results of traditional 16-week courses. In this research, the same professor taught the spring and summer ACC 201 courses, and two other professors taught both the spring and summer ACC 211 courses. Also held constant were the lecture material, course assignment, and test content. The results of the study indicate that in general, students taking introductory accounting over four weeks fare about as well as students who take introductory accounting over a traditional 16-week period. These results have potential importance beyond accounting education and provide support to universities offering more block courses to better serve individual student needs.     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997