In the context of green bonds playing an increasingly vital role in the green financial market, this study selects 61 green bonds issued in China from 2016 to 2021 as samples to examine the factors influencing green bond credit, including financial information and ratings of issuers, green certification, and government subsidies. First and foremost, based on AHP and entropy method, the financial composite index is constructed to evaluate the issuers’ finance. Additionally, the differences in the cost of green bonds issued by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and semi-enterprises are explored by adding the property rights variable. Empirical results indicate that the issuer’s rating could significantly affect the credit spread. In addition, the green bond credit spreads of SOEs are more competitive than those of semi-enterprises. When the issuer is a SOE, green bond credit spread has a remarkable negative correlation with finance information. Furthermore, green certification and government grants are not the main factors. Finally, the green bond market, crucial to controlling the green financial system, is presented with specific recommendations for its growth in this study.
Planning as part of public sector decision-making situations is an activity of critical importance, with direct relevance for urban planners. The ramifications of such decisions generally have significant effect on peoples’ lives. The current paper deals with the comparison between territorial maps in the context of districting problems with a strong socio-economic component. The theoretical problem involves the comparison of two partitions in a connected, undirected, and planar graph. In considering this problem, we introduce three new indices to compare territory partitions: compatibility, inclusion, and distance, all of which have importance for real-world planning situations. Numerical experiments of these indices were carried out for the communes network in (Iˆle de France), France. 相似文献
The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is a federal block grant program to help low-income households pay their heating and cooling bills. If the regular fiscal year LIHEAP appropriation is less than or equal to $1.975 billion, then a 1981 formula is applied to distribute funding across states, while if appropriations rise above the $1.975 billion threshold, a 1984 formula is applied in conjunction with two hold-harmless provisions. In 18 of the past 20 years, the 1981 formula has served as the default mechanism to distribute LIHEAP funding. The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the inadequacy of the 1981 formula and to explain why the objectives of LIHEAP are not met when this formula is used. We explain why the distribution of LIHEAP funds is not proportionate to the need for assistance and offer some suggestions for improvement. The 1981 formula is shown to be the outcome of a convoluted political process heavily biased in favor of cold-climate states, with cold-climate states receiving on-the-order of at least $150 million a year in allotment dollars beyond their “fair share” of heating requirements. The 1981 and 1984 distribution formulas are derived and a critical examination of each formula is presented. The 1984 formula is shown to be an ideal mechanism to distribute LIHEAP funds, based on a scientific and rational understanding of low-income energy needs, but legislative constraints prevent its application. 相似文献
