Do investors learn about analyst accuracy? A study of the oil futures market

We study the impact of analyst forecasts on prices to determine whether investors learn about analyst accuracy. The straight‐forward relationship between supply and price, the economic importance of the market, the predictable timing of forecast error realizations, and the high frequency of the data make the crude oil market an interesting and advantageous setting. We find that prices rise (fall) when analysts forecast a decrease (increase) in supplies. During the 15 minutes following supply announcements, prices rise (fall) when forecasts have been too high (low). Importantly, both relationships are stronger for more accurate analysts, implying that investors learn about analyst accuracy. © 2009 Wiley Peridocals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:414–429, 2009     

Internal rationality, imperfect market knowledge and asset prices

We present a decision theoretic framework in which agents are learning about market behavior and that provides microfoundations for models of adaptive learning. Agents are ‘internally rational’, i.e., maximize discounted expected utility under uncertainty given dynamically consistent subjective beliefs about the future, but agents may not be ‘externally rational’, i.e., may not know the true stochastic process for payoff relevant variables beyond their control. This includes future market outcomes and fundamentals. We apply this approach to a simple asset pricing model and show that the equilibrium stock price is then determined by investors? expectations of the price and dividend in the next period, rather than by expectations of the discounted sum of dividends. As a result, learning about price behavior affects market outcomes, while learning about the discounted sum of dividends is irrelevant for equilibrium prices. Stock prices equal the discounted sum of dividends only after making very strong assumptions about agents? market knowledge.     

Optimal information transmission in organizations: search and congestion

We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whose internal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problems arrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to their respective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone. The organization handles multiple problems simultaneously. For this reason, the process may be subject to congestion. We provide a characterization of the threshold of collapse of the network and of the stock of floating problems (or average delay) that prevails below that threshold. We build upon this characterization to address a design problem: the determination of what kind of network architecture optimizes performance for any given problem arrival rate. We conclude that, for low arrival rates, the optimal network is very polarized (i.e. star-like or centralized), whereas it is largely homogenous (or decentralized) for high arrival rates. These observations are in line with a common transformation experienced by information-intensive organizations as their work flow has risen in recent years.     

A great wall of patents: What is behind China's recent patent explosion?

China's patent surge, documented in this paper, is seemingly paradoxical given the country's weak record of protecting intellectual property rights. Using a firm-level data set that spans the population of China's large and medium-size industrial enterprises, this paper explores the factors that account for China's rising patent activity. While the intensification of research and development in the Chinese economy tracks with patenting activity, it explains only a fraction of the patent explosion. The growth of foreign direct investment in China is prompting Chinese firms to file for more patent applications. Amendments to the patent law that favor patent holders and ownership reform that has clarified the assignment of property rights also emerge as significant sources of China's patent boom. These results are robust to alternative estimation strategies that account for over-dispersion in the patent counts data and firm heterogeneity.     

Corporate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union*

We assess the economic impact of introducing consolidation with formula apportionment in the European Union and consider alternative enhanced cooperation agreements. We find that the consolidation is likely to yield a small aggregate welfare gain in Europe. However, not all countries benefit. A coalition of winning countries reduces the welfare gain and may induce a process of adverse selection which destroys the possibility of cooperation. We find that a coalition of similar countries (in terms of the size of their multinational sector) is more feasible in achieving agreement and is actually preferred by those countries over a Europe‐wide reform.