Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Banks, Steve Ching, Vincent Feltkamp, Bezalel Peleg, Sang-Young Sonn, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Transboundary Environmental Problems with Mobile but Heterogeneous Populations

Most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant, ignoringpopulation mobility. We showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions, and populations are homogeneous, asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa Nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting, even without any internationalenvironmental agreement. In the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population, and showthat when people differ, a non-cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient. We alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments, there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient. Finally, we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility, butinefficient when there is population mobility.     

Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

Evaluation of national foresight activities: Assessing rationale, process and impact

The paper addresses the question of what constitutes an appropriate evaluation strategy for national foresight activities in different situations. The variety of rationales for foresight is explored, ranging from a desire to set priorities through to participation-oriented goals and building new networks around common visions and strategies. A generational model of foresight is used to show the evolution of key evaluation issues. The generic motivations for evaluation of accountability, justification and learning are discussed in the context of foresight. Evaluation grounded in the concept of behavioural additionality and the systems failure rationale is shown to be more suited as a rationale for foresight as public policy.Assessing the effects of foresight requires an understanding that it is only one of several influences on public policy. To be effective it needs to be tuned into the strategic behaviour and cycles of policy and economic actors. Cases are presented of evaluation of foresight programmes in the United Kingdom, Germany and Hungary. It is concluded that there is no “one-size-fits-all” evaluation approach and that the method selected is conditioned by motivation, timing and the level of aggregation. Foresight cannot be fully evaluated independently from its context. Foresight is being strengthened by the emergence of rigorous and systematic knowledge to assist learning and improvement.     

Timing of Public Information and Cost Reduction

Received July 31, 2000; revised version received July 18, 2001     

Stability and agreement criteria for the termination of Delphi studies

This paper addresses the question of the methodology of testing for stability between successive Delphi rounds and the necessity of doing so prior to the analysis of the level or type of consensus. Following a discussion of a hierarchical set of a criteria for determining the termination of such studies, the paper reviews some of the more common treatments of the subject in the literature. It is finally proposed that a χ² test be used to test the stability of responses between rounds. The method is demonstrated by a numerical example.     

Henry George and Europe

A bstract . In the eyes of European scholars, publicists and politicians who studied Henry George's work, he, as a social philosopher , had adopted the position of the natural law philosophers of the 18th century. The latter inspired the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, as well as the poiitical philosophy of Jeffersonian democracy , the ethos of the 18th and 19th century pioneer settlers. George rejected Social Darwinism. He saw natural law as the only true and reliable basis for a just social order. Like Karl Marx he mastered Ricardian economics ; unlike Marx, George made two factors the basis of his system, labor and land. George saw that each person had a natural right —and a natural imperative for survival —to apply his or her productive capacity to the earth –as living space and as storehouse of nutrients and raw materials. The person-land relationship , he discovered, lay at the basis of human culture. And so the land's rent , now monopolized by the few, had to be appropriated to meet the needs of society, most efficiently and justly by a land value tax.