The Canada/Quebec pension plan disability program and the labor force participation of older men

The effects of the Canadian disability insurance program on the labor force participation of older men are studied using pooled cross-sectional time series data from ten Canadian provinces.     

On Exporting by Import State Traders and Peculiar Effects of Negotiated Minimum Access Commitments

It has been alleged that exportation by import state trading enterprises (ISTEs) must involve unfair trade practices. We show that such exporting may result from a rational use of market power by a sufficiently protected price discriminating ISTE. We argue that the flawed design and implementation of the tarffication process initiated in the last GATT agreement is providing ISTEs with incentives to export. The tariffication of import quotas and other related import restrictions was dirty in the sense that it permitted the setting of prohibitively high tariffs on many commodities. More importantly, it failed to eliminate quantitative trade barriers as the previous import quotas were replaced by minimum access commitments (MACs). In this paper, we use a simple partial equilibrium framework to explore the trade and welfare consequences of trade liberalization through tariff reductions and MAC enlargements under the small country assumption when domestic production and imports are controlled by an ISTE. We show that tariff reductions and MAC enlargements have very different effects on the behavior of the ISTE. MAC enlargements induce inefficient trade by encouraging the profit maximizing ISTE to increase its exports. In terms of welfare, MAC enlargements are immiser-izing. We conclude that tariff reductions are to be preferred to MAC increases as a means to liberalize trade .     

Deep Trade Agreements and Global Value Chains

Review of Industrial Organization - A prominent argument as to why countries sign “deep” preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is to foster global value chains (GVCs) operations. By...     

A bargaining model in general equilibrium

The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at the same competitive prices.     

Estimation of the regression slope by means of Gini’s cograduation index

The simple linear model \(Y_i = \alpha + \beta \, x_i + \epsilon _i\) \((i=1,2, \ldots ,N \ge 2)\) is considered, where the \(x_i\)’s are given constants and \(\epsilon _1, \epsilon _2 , \ldots , \epsilon _N\) are independent identically distributed (iid) with continuous distribution function F. An estimator \(\tilde{\beta }\) of the slope parameter is proposed, based on a stochastic process which makes use of Gini’s cograduation index. The properties of \(\tilde{\beta }\) and of the related confidence interval are studied. Some comparisons are given, in terms of asymptotic relative efficiency, with other estimators of \(\beta \) including that obtained with the method of least squares.     

Matching and Inverse Propensity Weighting Estimates of the Union Wage Premium: Evidence from Canada, 1997–2014

I estimate the union wage premium for private‐sector workers using Canadian data from Statistics Canada's Labour Force Survey from 1997 to 2014, examining the trend and gender differences in the premium. I obtain my estimates using matching and inverse propensity weighting estimators, which form counterfactuals for union workers. These estimators create better covariate balance and can also be used to address the bias that arises from the log transformation of wages.