Index Insurance,Probabilistic Climate Forecasts,and Production

Index insurance and probabilistic seasonal forecasts are becoming available in developing countries to help farmers manage climate risks in production. Although these tools are intimately related, work has not been done to formalize the connections between them. We investigate the relationship between the tools through a model of input choice under uncertainty, forecasts, and insurance. While it is possible for forecasts to undermine insurance, we find that when contracts are appropriately designed, there are important synergies between forecasts, insurance, and effective input use. Used together, these tools overcome barriers preventing the use of imperfect information in production decision making.     

Stock price reactivity to earnings announcements: the role of the Cammer/Krogman factors

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - The stock characteristics often used in securities litigation to assess market efficiency are dispositive indicators of reactivity to earnings...     

Minsky’s financial fragility: an empirical analysis of electricity distribution firms in Brazil (2007–2015)

This article applies Hyman P. Minsky’s insights on financial fragility to analyze the behavior of electricity distribution firms in Brazil from 2007 to 2015. More specifically, it builds an analytical framework to classify these firms into Minskyan risk categories and assess how financial fragility evolved over time, in each firm and in the sector as a whole. This work adapts Minsky’s financial fragility indicators and taxonomy to the conditions of the electricity distribution sector and applies them to regulatory accounting data for more than 60 firms. This empirical application of Minsky’s theory for analyzing firms engaged in the provision of public goods and services is a novelty. The results show an increase in the financial fragility of those firms as well as of the sector throughout the period, especially between 2008 and 2013.     

Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry

Many food traits desired by consumers are costly to provide and difficult to verify. A complicating factor is that delivered quality can only be affected stochastically by producers and imperfectly observed by consumers. Markets for these goods will emerge only if supplying firms can be trusted. We develop a repeated purchases model to explore how quality discoverability, market structure, nature of reputations, market premiums, and discount factors drive firm choice about the stringency of quality assurance systems designed to gain consumer trust. Reputation protection is key incentive for firms to invest in high-quality goods and quality assurance systems.