Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

This note uses the Theorem of the Alternative to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite.     

Wer wird Professor für Kommunikationswissenschaft und Journalistik?

Der vorliegende Beitrag fragt nach der demographischen Struktur der zentralen akademischen Akteure der Kommunikationswissenschaft in Deutschland und nach m?glichen Ver?nderungen dieser Struktur in den letzten 50 Jahren. Die Analyse zeigt zum einen, dass von einem einheitlichen Zugang zum Hochschullehrerberuf nach wie vor keine Rede sein kann, und zum anderen, dass das Fach vor einer demographischen Herausforderung steht. Die Kommunikationswissenschaft hat sich durch Akademisierung und ?Versozialwissenschaftlichung? von ihren Wurzeln gel?st. War Berufserfahrung im Medienbereich bis in die 1960er Jahre Voraussetzung für eine Berufung, verfügt heute nur noch eine Minderheit über solche Erfahrungen. Da die Existenz des Faches im Rahmen der Universit?t auch von der Nachfrage der Studierenden abh?ngt, kann man über die Folgen des anstehenden Generationswechsels nur spekulieren. In jedem Fall fehlt es an formal für die Hochschullehrerlaufbahn qualifiziertem Nachwuchs. Deshalb sind erhebliche Anstrengungen erforderlich, wenn der Boom im letzten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts sich nicht als Seifenblase erweisen soll.