SPLIT RATINGS,BOND YIELDS,AND UNDERWRITER SPREADS

A split bond rating occurs when Moody's and Standard & Poor give different ratings to the same issue. We examine 1,277 public industrial bond issues, where 221 have split ratings, issued from 1980 through mid-1993. For split-rated industrial bonds, neither rating agency consistently gives higher ratings. Earlier studies find yields for split-rated bonds to be priced as either the higher or the lower of the ratings. We find the yields on split-rated bonds to be an average of the yields on the two ratings. Split ratings for industrial bonds appear to reflect random differences on the part of rating agencies. Our results differ from previous studies because we use a substantially larger sample and include high-yield bonds. As long as a bond has an investment-grade rating, the underwriter fees are found to be essentially the same for all rating categories. Below investment grade, the rating substantially affects the underwriter fee. Thus, split ratings for high-yield bonds have an important effect on the underwriter spread.     

Research and development (R&D) beyond manufacturing: the strange case of services R&D

The share of business research and development (R&D) expenditure stemming from the services sector of the economy has been growing rapidly in many (though not all) OECD countries, according to official statistics. The same data sources also indicate, however, that services contribute less to R&D than would be expected given their large shares of employment and output in national economies. In part, incomplete sampling of services in R&D surveys may lead to some underestimation of their R&D activity, but this is unlikely to account for their apparently poor performance. This paper draws on an analysis of existing statistical sources, and on interviews and workshops with service firms' managers. It finds difficulties associated with the ways in which R&D has been operationalised in survey questions. Examination of survey questionnaires suggests that the formulation of these questions, focusing on technological R&D and ruling out much social scientific R&D, disproportionately reduces the reporting of R&D by service firms. But beyond this, the R&D concept itself has some problematic features where it comes to documenting innovation in service firms. This was investigated through a programme of interviews and workshops with service firms, where a lack of familiarity with the R&D concept and R&D management practices was found to be commonplace. R&D performance and innovation activities vary across services of different sorts, even though most service subsectors appear to be low R&D investors. It is thus important to examine services' innovation patterns and processes, to establish what types of R&D‐like activity are underway in these subsectors. While some modification in R&D measurement would be desirable to capture services' activities, effort to understand the non‐R&D elements of services innovation is also important – for management and for policy (given that governments are seeking to create R&D incentives and targets for services and other sectors). There are grounds for expecting (a) services' share of business R&D to continue to grow; (b) this share to continue to be well below what would be expected from the prevalence of services in economic activity, and (c) for many services' innovation to continue to rely heavily on sources that are not directly associated with R&D.     

Social forecasting: From impressions to investigation

Acknowledgement of the insights that have already been gained from survey research and other methods common in social science has been a major omission of social forecasters. The author suggests that experts involved in futures research should broaden their horizons and regard social changes not necessarily as the result of technological ones, but quite often as the cause. Examples of recent survey research are chosen to illustrate some ways in which socio-psychological data can be utilised in forecasting studies.     

THE COST OF MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION FEES

Many individuals purchase shares in mutual funds as investments. With a lack of evidence supporting performance persistence in fund returns, investors should consider expenses as a fund-selection tool since fund expenses have a negative effect on fund returns. One of the largest expenses incurred by fund investors is distribution expenses, which include both load charges and annual fees. Close to two-thirds of all equity funds charge investors for fund distribution. The true cost of these distribution fees to investors is hard to measure because a myriad of distribution arrangements have evolved that vary both the timing and magnitude of distribution charges. We derive a simple methodology that expresses the present value of distribution costs as a percentage of the original investment in fund shares for any expected holding period. This methodology allows direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements.     

Inflation targeting and monetary policy in Canada: What is the impact on inflation uncertainty?

Inflation uncertainty has been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically to lower real output. This paper examines the impact of inflation targeting in Canada on inflation uncertainty, as well as persistence. Our results indicate that inflation targeting lowered inflation persistence, but actually increased uncertainty. Such an effect may be due to the failure of the previous formal target, the M1 money supply, to successfully combat inflation.     

Product resource–capability complementarity,integration mechanisms,and first product advantage

The current study extends work on resource-based theory (RBT) by exploring resource—capability complementarity in a new context—that of new technology ventures' (NTVs) first product (FP) commercialization in India. This study examines the influence of marketing and technology resource–capability complementarity on FP positional advantages (differentiation and cost-efficiency) and their influence on first product performance (FPP). Furthermore, this study incorporates the influence of supplier integration (SI) mechanisms (in terms of knowledge sharing and co-commercialization) in the process of FP commercialization. The findings suggest that asset complementarities have a positive relation with FP positional advantages, in that both differentiation and cost-efficiency enhance an NTV's FPP, and that SI moderates the relationships between both marketing and technology R–C complementarity and FP positional advantages.     

Multi-firm voluntary disclosures for correlated operations

We study the no-arbitrage theory of voluntary disclosure (Dye, J Account Res 23:123–145, 1985, and Ostaszewski and Gietzmann, Rev Quant Financ Account 31: 1–27, 2008), generalized to the setting of $n$ firms, simultaneously and voluntarily, releasing at the interim-report date ‘partial’ information concerning their ‘common operating conditions’. Each of the firms has, as in the Dye model, some (known) probability of observing a signal of their end of period performance, but here this signal includes noise determined by a firm-specific precision parameter. The co-dependency of the firms results entirely from their common operating conditions. Each firm has a disclosure cutoff, which is a best response to the cutoffs employed by the remaining firms. To characterize these equilibrium cutoffs explicitly, we introduce $n$ new hypothetical firms, related to the corresponding actual firms, which are operationally independent, but are assigned refined precision parameters and amended means. This impounds all existing correlations arising from conditioning on the other potentially available sources of information. In the model the actual firms’ equilibrium cutoffs are geometric weighted averages of these hypothetical firms. We uncover two countervailing effects. Firstly, there is a bandwagon effect, whereby the presence of other firms raises each individual cutoff relative to what it would have been in the absence of other firms. Secondly, there is an estimator-quality effect, whereby individual cutoffs are lowered, unless the individual precision is above average.