Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts’ targets through tax expense decreases

Returns are positive when firms meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts, but negative when firms miss. Prior research finds little substantial discount for managing earnings to beat the forecasts via accruals generally. We consider whether the market reward for beating the forecast is smaller when firms use tax expense decreases, which are visible and transparent at the earnings announcement date, unlike accruals. When firms beat analysts’ forecasts by decreasing their tax expense relative to the third-quarter rate, the market discounts the reward by an economically significant amount: approximately 86%. We document lower persistence of current-year tax changes for those firms that decrease tax expense to beat the target. The observed discount for beating the forecast only because of a third to fourth quarter tax decrease may reflect market perceptions of the lack of persistence of the decrease.     

Does FIN 48 Improve Firms' Estimates of Tax Reserves?

This paper examines whether the increased accounting guidance and reporting requirements of FIN 48 impact the adequacy and accuracy of tax reserves and the effect of auditor‐provided tax services on tax reserves. While we do not find FIN 48 affected the adequacy or accuracy of tax reserves on average, FIN 48 eliminated the differences in the tax reserve adequacy of firms with and without auditor‐provided tax services that existed prior to its adoption. We also find evidence of less premature releasing of tax reserves post‐FIN 48. Our evidence is consistent with an increase in the comparability of reserves for firms that do and do not purchase auditor‐provided tax services, consistent with one of the FASB's objectives for FIN 48.     

Opportunistic shirking behaviour during unpaid overtime

We identify the presence of shirking by Major League Baseball umpires during indefinite unpaid overtime, as defined by extra innings. In the presence of new information about expected game length, umpires exert biases in ball and strike calls consistent with opportunistically reducing the likelihood of working additional time. General implications with respect to the effectiveness of salaried workers during unpaid overtime hours are discussed.     

Buyer‐Induced Exclusive Dealing

Large retailers may exercise buyer power in their interactions with manufacturers. This article explores the use of exclusive dealing arrangements by a monopoly retailer when purchasing a differentiated product from competing manufacturers. Interactions among the firms are modeled as a bargaining game. When consumers' brand preferences are weak and/or when one brand is preferred by a significant majority of consumers, it is more profitable for the retailer to negotiate an exclusive dealing arrangement with one of the manufacturers than to distribute both products. Also, it is more profitable for the retailer to induce exclusive dealing if the manufacturer of the excluded brand has a lot of bargaining power when negotiating with the retailer. If buyer‐induced exclusive dealing reduces the retail price of the exclusive brand in order to encourage “brand switching” by consumers who favor the excluded brand, the practice may increase consumer welfare and even total welfare.     

Countervailing Power and Chain Stores

The countervailing power of large buyers subdues the market power of sellers, but price concessions won by large buyers in upstream markets may or may not translate into lower prices downstream as Galbraith (American capitalism: The concept of countervailing power. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1952, Am Econ Rev 44:1–6, 1954) once contended. This paper presents a model that formalizes certain previously neglected elements of Galbraith’s argument, and shows that upstream price concessions may lead to lower downstream prices. In this model, a large retail chain store with countervailing power plays one large supplier off against another to win lower prices. An indirect effect of these interactions is that small retailers also pay lower prices, although not as low as the chain. Finally, competition among the retailers drives retail prices lower. The retail-price-restraining effect of the chain is stronger than the effect that is produced by the entry of an additional supplier.     

The behaviour of expected short-term real interest rates in the UK

The existence of persistent technical inefficiency offers the opportunity for a ‘free lunch’ not typically implied by the neoclassical theory of the firm. When external effects are related to the use of particular inputs, reduction of persistent technically inefficient levels of input use represents a means of reducing external impacts. An important example is found in agriculture where substantial environmental impacts are generated by particular inputs. Within this context, this paper considers the usefulness of data envelopment analysis (DEA) for estimation of potential input reductions and assessment of potential reductions of environmental impacts of agricultural inputs. An application for French cereal production provides estimates that indicate that substantial potential exists for reduction of input use and environmental impacts.     

Social Pressure at the Plate: Inequality Aversion,Status, and Mere Exposure

This paper uses professional baseball data to evaluate the impact of social pressures on subjective decisions made by officials. Umpires show tendencies consistent with both centrality bias and favoritism toward players with higher status in the league. Results also indicate that the odds of a strike are lower for batters in close proximity to the official throughout the game. Implications extend beyond sport to issues regarding closeness of contact in employee–manager relationships and pay and promotions decisions in the workplace. Given the persistent monitoring of officials in professional baseball, this phenomenon could be more prevalent in less scrutinized positions in other industries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sticky Price Models,Durable Goods,and Real Wage Rigidities

The standard two‐sector New Keynesian model with durable goods is at odds with conventional wisdom and vector autoregression (VAR) evidence: Following a monetary shock, the model generates (i) either negative or no comovement across sectoral outputs and (ii) aggregate neutrality of money when durable goods' prices are flexible. We reconcile theory with evidence by incorporating real wage rigidities into the standard model: As long as durable goods' prices are more flexible than nondurable goods' prices, we obtain positive sectoral comovement and, thus, aggregate nonneutrality of money.     

Managerial practices that enhance innovation

In high-innovation organizations, special funds earmarked for research and development are used to support experimental activities. A special committee accepts or rejects an innovators proposal and undertakes a feasibility study. The feasibility-study team uses a marketing orientation to determine if a real customer need exists and how it may best be met. By the time a proposal reaches the adoption stage, the advocate's original idea has been modified by input from study-group members. The project is given an adequate funding level and is monitored and audited on a regular basis. Finally, implementation takes place first on a small scale so that, in the event of failure, a minimum amount of resources will be lost.Essentially, successful innovation depends on a company's willingness to commit the necessary time, money, and leadership to research and development. In the simplest terms, the difference between high- and low-innovation organizations is that the latter are willing to follow up and follow through on behalf of new ideas.