论普通商事仲裁管辖对法院管辖的排除

有效的仲裁协议是仲裁机构受理商事纠纷的前提，也是排除法院管辖权的依据。当事人有关仲裁协议有效性的争议将会动摇仲裁管辖的基础。本文从分析仲裁管辖的依据入手，探讨了仲裁管辖与法院管辖之间的界限，结合国际上仲裁管辖制度的最新发展，提出我国应进一步放宽对仲裁管辖权的限制，以促进仲裁事业的发展。     

浅谈大数据时代下管理会计的发展与变革

大数据对于管理会计的发展与变革具有前所未有的促进作用.一方面,大数据为管理会计的内部报告功能增强数据支持力度;另一方面,也进一步增加了管理会计的内涵与活力.管理会计基于大数据背景,实现了拓展服务范围和全链条的动态化管理.在实践过程中,企事业单位的管理会计活动时常出现各种问题,如理论脱离实际、信息壁垒与信息安全漏洞并存,已经成为管理会计正常发展的掣肘.因此,大数据时代下企事业单位应用管理会计不仅需要转变思想观念,积极探索个性化改革方案,也需要建立健全信息化管理体制,突破信息壁垒局限,还需要重视安全管理,提高安保水平.     

The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement

Passage of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) overhaul bill in 1998 reflects the depth of American taxpayer frustration with the agency. We bring a constitutional, or rules of the game, perspective to tax enforcement. We examine political costs and benefits and agency discretion as reasons why tax enforcement by the government might deviate from the preferences of a representative citizen. We also examine prospects for reform. Lasting reform must alter the rules for deciding tax enforcement policy or the political pressures which yield excessive enforcement today will reemerge in the future.     

Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility

The notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium suffers from three inherent difficulties. First, given the equilibrium strategies of other players, there are many best replies. Second, the equilibrium is unstable. Third, comparative statics results are counterintuitive. We demonstrate that these difficulties all have their origin in von Neumann and Morgenstern′s expected utility. In contrast, players with "quadratic utility" have unique best replies and the Nash equilibrium appears to yield intuitive comparative statics results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

A Note on Regulating Oligopolistic Industries: A Hierarchical Model

In a 1994 paper, extending the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme of Sappington and Sibley, Schwermer presented a non-Bayesian incentive scheme for regulating a Cournot oligopoly industry. This note designs an oligopolistic incentive scheme for a hierarchical Stackelberg model in which firms choose outputs sequentially.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

福利彩票发行效率研究——基于制度框架的实证分析

以销售额为单一评价指标的彩票发行效率研究缺乏科学性和全面性。本文重建了彩票发行效率研究的评价体系,根据我国现实情况将研究建立在福利彩票发行、销售框架搭建基础上,通过制度分析得出判断性结论,提出这一制度实施效率的假设,并进一步使用综合指标体系在实证分析中加以检验。     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.     

CPA职业道德博弈分析

本文运用博弈分析方法对CPA职业道德进行了分析,发现CPA职业道德状况是CPA审计市场诸因素的复合函数,分别运用不完全信息动态博弈和静态博弈方法,对CPA审计机制和CPA行业内部的诸因素对CPA职业道德的影响进行了分析,并提出了相应的治理对策。