Social security trust fund flows and the welfare costs of rent seeking

The current study provides estimates from a Parks regression (using panel data) that suggest that the welfare costs due to rent seeking efforts by interest groups to obtain Social Security trust fund flows ranged from approximately $132 million (per twoyear federal election cycle from 1985–1994) to a theoretical expectation of $66 billion, all in real terms. These welfare costs are in addition to any other social costs that may be present, including the reduced levels of national saving that Social Security may induce.     

An analysis of the automatic stabilizers associated with taxes and transfer payments

This paper examines the question of the stability of automatic stabilizers in the United States. Based on a statistical test suggested by Brown, Durbin and Evans, the analysis concludes that the magnitude of automatic stabilization of economic activity afforded by personal tax receipts has remained virtually invariant over the period 1939–86. The automatic stabilization effectiveness of transfer payments, however, had increased, since 1964. This is attributed to the implementation of various Great Society programmes beginning in 1964.     

Union Influence and Right-to-Work Law Passage

A bstract . Urban and labor economists have examined macro and micro effects of the passage of right-to-work laws in various states. These laws prohibit unions from negotiating bargains that require new and previous hires to join the union. The results have been suggestive, pointing out that cost-of-living indices are dramatically influenced by the presence of unionized workers.
This analysis describes the economic and political evolution necessary for the legal passage of right to-work laws. Although individual studies have pointed out that a low degree of unionization is necessary for the passage of such laws, no study has attempted to describe the timing of the decline in unionization rates as it relates to the passage of these laws. To test this thesis, a discrete-time or hazard model is employed. Evidence suggests that a low threshold of union activity must be reached before an individual state will adopt such labor laws. Also important in the analysis is the degree of construction and manufacturing within each state, as well as public choice determinants of legislative activity such as the role of the Democratic Party. The discrete-time model suggests that a declining union membership is important in determining the "timing" of the adoption of right-to-work laws by states, as well as the actual adoption of these laws by states.     

Analysing Misleading Discrete Responses: A Logit Model Based on Misclassified Data*

This study presents an alternative to direct questioning and randomized response approaches to obtain survey information about sensitive issues. The approach used here is based on a logit model that can be used when survey data on the dependent variable are misclassified. The method is applied to a direct survey of undergraduate cheating behaviour. Student responses may not always be truthful. In particular, a student claiming to be a non‐cheater may actually be a cheater. The results indicate that the incidence of cheating in our sample is approximately 70% rather than the self‐reported value of 51%.     

Modeling household fertility decisions: estimation and testing of censored regression models for count data

"This paper adds to the recent body of research on fertility by estimating and testing censored Poisson regression models and censored negative binomial regression models of household fertility decisions. A novel feature of this study is that in each case the censoring threshold varies from individual to individual. Also, a Lagrange multiplier or score test is used to investigate overdispersion. In these regression models the dependent variable is the number of children. In this situation, censored Poisson regression models and censored negative binomial regression models have statistical advantages over OLS, uncensored Poisson regression models, and uncensored negative binomial regression models. The censored models employed in this study are estimated using panel data collected from the Consumer Expenditure Survey compiled by the [U.S.] Bureau of Labor Statistics."     

Advertising as special service provision under non-price vertical restraints: exclusive territories in beer distribution

This article presents statistical evidence which supports Lester Telser's 1960 hypothesis, that when vertical restraints are made illegal, intrabrand competition results which diminishes the provision of point-of-sale, special services. This results because of the public goods problem exhibited by the special services. Increased special service provision by the national manufacturer must then substitute for the special service provision left unfilled by the wholesaler. Evidence relating to the efficacy of such substitution is also presented.     

The Economics Olympics: Ranking U.S. Economics Departments Based on Prizes,Medals, and Other Awards

This study ranks the top 25 U.S. economics departments on the basis of four prestigious awards won/held by these departments' current faculty: the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, the John Bates Clark Medal, the American Economic Association's (AEA's) Distinguished Fellow Award, and the American Economic Association's Richard T. Ely Lecturer. Based on our methodology, the top economics department is affiliated with the University of Chicago. This distinction stems from its affiliation with six Nobel Prize winners, four Clark Medal winners, and two participants each in the AEA Distinguished Fellow and Richard T. Ely Lecturer categories.     

Academic scholarship,organization prestige,and the earnings of U.S. business school deans

This study models the market for business school deans as an outcome of a differential game between a university's central administration and the job candidates in the market for business school deans. In our model, the ability of a business school dean to advance the organization is enhanced by his or her own scholarly reputation, such that a job candidate chooses an optimal level of scholarship that relates to his or her marketability. In this way, the supply of scholarship (by job candidates) can be seen as the supply of job candidates in the market for business school deans, whereas the demand for scholarship can be seen as the demand for business school deans. The main features of our game‐theoretic model are tested using data from both national and regional business schools and colleges in the U.S. Econometric results indicate that each additional scholarly contribution by a business school dean generates a wage premium ranging from $1,000 to $1,200, whereas in the case of national institutions, each additional student enrolled at the doctoral (master's) level raises the wage by $671 ($56). Lastly, the production of between nine and 10 scholarly contributions is found to be necessary in order to face a 50% probability of holding a business school deanship at a national institution, whereas production of about 37 scholarly contributions leads to a 50% probability of holding a deanship with a named business school at a national institution.     

Anti-Abortion Activities and the Market for Abortion Services: Protest as a Disincentive

Cross-section data for the US are used to estimate the effects of anti-abortion activity on the demand and supply of abortion services in 1992. Empirical results show that anti-abortion activity had a signi~cant negative impact on both the demand and supply of abortion services. Using estimates from a two-stage least-squares estimation of demand and supply, anti-abortion activities (measured as picketing with physical contact or blocking of patients) have decreased the market equilibrium abortion rate by an estimated 19 percent and raised the price of an abortion by approximately 4.3 percent. Taken together, the empirical results show that anti-abortion activities have been successful in making abortion services scarcer.     

On the Incidence of Excise Taxes on a Monopolist's Price: A Pedagogical Note

Intermediate microeconomic theory texts mislead by their treatment of the effect of an excise tax on a monopolist's price and output. This note offers a simple demonstration of the correct approach.