Will export taxes replace VERs?

Some economists use an export tax, which alters the domestic relative price of exports, to model a voluntary export restraint, which is a restriction on the quantity of exports with restriction-induced rents accruing to the exporting country. Implicit in this approach is the presumption that the two policies are equivalent. In a very general model that allows for a finite number of goods and factors and intermediated goods and joint production, we demonstrate that, in general, this is, in fact, not the case. Specifically, from the exporting country’s perspective, the real income effects of the two policies are nonequivalent.     

Asymptotic inference for a one-dimensional simultaneous autoregressive model

A nonstationary simultaneous autoregressive model \({X^{(n)}_k=\alpha \Big(X^{(n)}_{k-1}+X^{(n)}_{k+1}\Big)+\varepsilon_k, k=1, 2, \ldots , n-1}\), is investigated, where \({X^{(n)}_0}\) and \({X^{(n)}_n}\) are given random variables. It is shown that in the unstable case α = 1/2 the least squares estimator of the autoregressive parameter converges to a functional of a standard Wiener process with a rate of convergence n ², while in the stable situation |α| < 1/2 the estimator is biased but asymptotically normal with a rate n ^1/2.     

Rush,delay or money burning: Informational biases in policy decisions

We examine the consequences when the public is unsure about the ability of governments to foresee the effects of decisions. Governments with much information should invest either immediately or never. Governments that are not well informed should wait for better information. But since governments want to signal their abilities to solve problems, we observe rash decisions and problems are portrayed as crises. We also show that excessive delay can occur. Delay or rush occur even if there is very little uncertainty about abilities of governments. We discuss three institutional rules to alleviate the rush and delay bias: Limiting expenditures before elections, experimental clauses or money burning.     

Betwixt and Between: The Dilemma of Employee References

Concerns have arisen over employers' collection and sharing of information about employees, especially employment references. As a result of the dramatic growth in the number of lawsuits brought by employees, many employers have seriously curtailed the information they release concerning current and former employees. However, even the refusal to release information carries a legal risk. Employers who do not obtain information concerning applicants can be liable for negligent hiring, and those who knowingly withhold negative information regarding their former employees may be liable for negligent referral. This paper explores these expanding liabilities and suggests strategies to allow employers to manage the risk of communicating employee references.     

On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects

We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness (i) increases (decreases) the parameter region with a unique duopoly equilibrium (multiple equilibria), (ii) reduces competition, (iii) reduces the conflict between consumer and social preferences for de facto standardization, and (iv) reduces the misalignment between consumer and social preferences for compatibility.     

Climate Policy,Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries

A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions requires international cooperation in emission abatement as well as individual countries’ investment in the adoption of abatement technology. The existing literature on climate policy pays insufficient attention to small countries, which account for a substantial proportion of global emission. In this study, we investigate how climate policy and learning about climate damage affect investment in abatement technology in small countries. We consider three alternative climate policy instruments: emission standards, harmonized taxes and auctioned permits. We say that learning is feasible if an international environmental agreement (IEA) is formed after the resolution of uncertainty about climate damage. We find that, either with learning and quadratic abatement costs or without learning, harmonized taxes outperform emission standards and auctioned permits in terms of investment efficiency. Without learning, a large cost of nonparticipation (that a country incurs) in the IEA can be beneficial to the country. Whether learning improves investment efficiency depends on the size of this nonparticipation cost.     

Timing of Mitigation and Technology Availability in Achieving a Low-Carbon World

This paper analyzes the economic and investment implications of a series of climate mitigation scenarios, characterized by different levels of ambition for long-term stabilization goals and transitional pathways. Results indicate that although milder climate objectives can be achieved at moderate costs, stringent stabilization paths, compatible with the 2°C target, might require significant economic resources. Innovation and technology are shown to be able to mitigate, but not structurally alter, this trade-off. Technologies that allow capturing CO₂ from the atmosphere are shown to be important for expanding the feasibility space of stringent climate policies, though only if deployed at a scale which would represent a tremendous challenge. In general, the analysis indicates that the timing of mitigation is an important factor of cost containment, with early action being desirable. It also elaborates on the set of mitigation strategies and policies that would be required to achieve climate protection at maximum efficiency.