Notes and Comments Industry-University collaboration: A general study

The recent history of developments in Industry-University collaboration in the U.K. is briefly reviewed and the present means utilized by Universities to collaborate with Industry and Commerce outlined.
The Appendix clarifies the means developed by over thirty Universities with University Companies, Industrial Units or Liaison Bureaux.     

The Effects of Gender and Career Stage on Ethical Judgment

This article reports the findings of a survey examining if there are gender and career stage differences between male and female practitioners regarding ethical judgment. The results show that, on average, females adopted a more strict ethical stance than their male counterparts on 7 out of 19 vignettes. Males on the other hand, demonstrated a more ethical stance than their female counterparts on 2 out of 19 vignettes. The results furthermore indicate there is a significant difference in ethical judgment across career stages. Overall, it appears that practitioners in later career stages display higher ethical judgment than practitoners in lower career stages. Implications are provided for both practitioners and academicians.     

Measuring marginal intra-industry trade

Measuring Marginal Intra-Industry Trade. — Trade liberalisation and adjustment: how important is intra-industry trade? This paper focuses on the appropriate measurement of intra-industry trade as indicator of structural adjustment costs. It is argued that existing dynamic versions of the Grubel-Lloyd index reflect horizontal trade only and classify vertical intra-industry trade with inter-industry trade. The paper proposes a method to distinguish between horizontal and vertical trade and applies these techniques to emerging trade between the EU and the economies of central and eastern Europe.     

A Cross-Validity Comparison of Conjoint Analysis and Choice Models at Different Levels of Aggregation

Several (ratings-based) conjoint analysis and experimental choice (choice-based conjoint) models are compared on their ability to predict both aggregate choice shares among the sample and individual choices in an availability validation task. While there was a weak relationship between validations at the individual and aggregate levels, several models stand out. In general, models capturing individual differences validated well at both the individual and aggregate level. The hierarchical Bayes choice and conjoint models validated particularly well.Among choice models, the hierarchical Bayes choice model had the highest aggregate and individual level-validations. It was followed by the hybrid and seven segment latent segment choice models. Overall, the highest validating ratings-based conjoint model was the hierarchical Bayes model. However, the seven segment latent segment conjoint model produced better aggregate choice share validations than any other conjoint model. These results indicate that validations can be improved either by using benefit segment models and/or merging different types of data to estimate more individualized models.In most cases, rescaling improved the ratings-based, but not the choice-based choice share validations. This suggests that one might adjust for differences between ratings and choice tasks before making choice share predictions.     

Bid-Ask Spread Estimation For A Correlated Value Innovation Process

Previous studies of bid-ask spread estimators based on serial covariance in returns document high proportions of positive serial covariances and therefore negative spread estimates. These findings may be due to the effects of time-variation in expected returns. Although purging the effects of time-varying expected returns yields more reasonable results, the bid-ask spread estimates from daily and weekly returns are still materially different. We present a method that avoids the need for removing the effects of time-varying expected returns by using a spread estimator developed directly for a correlated value innovation process. The new spread estimator not only yields more reasonable estimates of the bid-ask spread than the Roll (1984) model, but the spread estimates from daily and weekly returns are almost equal.     

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES

This article reinforces the message of the one immediately preceding by showing that small to medium‐sized firms have even stronger (non‐tax) motives for hedging risks than their large corporate counterparts. Although middle market companies have traditionally been viewed as less sophisticated than their larger corporate counterparts in the risk management arena, the authors suggest that such companies have become increasingly receptive to new hedging strategies using derivative products. When used appropriately, such products allow companies to stabilize their periodic operating cash flow by eliminating specific sources of volatility such as fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Smaller companies recognize that a single swing in a budgeted cost can have a catastrophic effect on an entire budget, whereas a larger company can more easily absorb such a cost. Moreover, because the principal owners of mid‐sized firms often have a substantial part of their net worth tied up in the business, they are likely to have a far stronger interest than typical outside shareholders in using risk management to reduce the volatility of corporate profits and firm value. Perhaps most important to owners whose firms rely on debt financing, the greater cash flow stability resulting from active risk management significantly reduces the possibility of financial distress or bankruptcy. In this article, three representatives of Bank of America's risk management practice discuss three different exposures faced by middle market companies—those arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices—and show how these risks can be managed with derivatives. Besides shielding companies from financial trouble, risk management is also likely to improve their access to the money and capital markets. By protecting the firm's access to capital, risk management increases the odds that the firm will not be forced to pass up good investment opportunities because of capital constraints or fear of getting into financial difficulty.     

The Downside of Being Responsible: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tail Risk

This paper assesses the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and downside equity tail risk, a field of research that is underdeveloped at this moment. Using global equities data over the period of January 2003 to December 2011, inclusive, the downside tail risk of each company is estimated using techniques of extreme value theory and CSR is approached using stakeholder theory. Our findings show a significant relationship between certain aspects of CSR and downside tail risk. The nature of the relationship differs across region, stakeholder and time. Furthermore, the relationships we found are sequential, which makes a causal link between CSR and tail risk plausible.     

Why good accountants do bad audits

On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. Accountants might seem immune to such distortions because they work with seemingly hard numbers and clear-cut standards. But the corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status, thereby misleading investors, regulators, and even management. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.