Governance Systems in Family SMEs: The Substitution Effects between Family Councils and Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The main objective of this paper is to explore the role of family councils vis‐à‐vis corporate governance mechanisms. Particularly, the paper explores whether family councils perform only their distinctive family governance role or if they also substitute for the roles performed by corporate governance control mechanisms. Based on a sample of 243 Italian family SMEs, our research findings show that the family council partially substitutes the shareholders' meeting and the board of directors in playing their respective corporate governance roles of ownership and monitoring. These findings are interpreted in the light of both agency and relational perspectives.     

Benefit shifting: The case of sickness insurance for the unemployed

This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness insurance (SI), using a proportional hazard duration model and a large register-based dataset. The combination of limited UI duration and the fact that SI rights do not depend on remaining UI, creates an incentive to use SI to effectively extend UI. The separate effects of elapsed unemployment duration and of UI duration on hazard rates are identified through a reform of the UI system. The estimated hazard rate for transition from unemployment to SI increases sharply the last months before UI exhaustion. The spikes are larger for diagnosis for mental illness, and vary across individuals, but are present for all groups and all diagnoses.     

Private Firms and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Economic and Management Perspective

This article provides a definition of corporate␣governance and highlights the challenges in adapting understanding of governance to the privately-held firm. We emphasize the need to develop the scope of governance in privately-held firms beyond the traditional agency theory focus in the financial economics literature relating to large publicly-listed corporations. There is a need to draw on and integrate an array of theoretical perspectives from both economics and other social science disciplines as well. We present a schematic model of corporate governance which places the contributions presented in the special issue in context and which serves as a guide to highlighting gaps in the research base. We review the principal issues relating to corporate governance in privately-held firms which relate to: governance in different organizational contexts (institutional context; the industrial sector within which the firm finds itself, the ownership context of the firm, and the stage within the firm’s life-cycle); the scope of corporate governance; and other internal governance mechanisms to be considered We identify areas for further research on corporate governance in privately-held firms with respect to processes of governance, organizational contexts, assumptions about the owners, executive remuneration, financial reporting, the nature of the dependent variable relating to the expected outcome of different approaches to governance and various methodological issues. We suggest a need to develop governance codes for privately-held firms that are flexible enough to take account of the different types of governance needs of firms at different stages in their life-cycle.      

Environmental Satellite Models for a Macroeconomic Model

To support national environmental policy, it is desirable to forecast and analyse environmental indicators consistently with economic variables. However, environmental indicators are physical measures linked to physical activities that are not specified in economic models. One way to deal with this is to develop environmental satellite models linked to economic models. The system of models presented gives a frame of reference where emissions of greenhouse gases, acid gases, and leaching of nutrients to the aquatic environment are analysed in line with – and consistently with – macroeconomic variables. This paper gives an overview of the data and the satellite models. Finally, the results of applying the model system to calculate the impacts on emissions and the economy are reviewed in a few illustrative examples. The models have been developed for Denmark; however, most of the environmental data used are from the CORINAIR system implemented in numerous countries.     

LOST IN STATE SPACE: ARE PREFERENCES STABLE?*

We use field experiments to examine the temporal stability of risk preferences. Over a 17‐month period, we elicited risk preferences from subjects chosen to be representative of the adult Danish population. During this period we revisited many of these subjects and repeated a risk aversion elicitation task. We find some variation in risk attitudes over time, but we do not detect a general tendency for risk attitudes to increase or decrease over a 17‐month span. The results also suggest that risk preferences are state contingent with respect to personal finances.     

Determinants of farmers’ willingness to participate in subsidy schemes for pesticide-free buffer zones—A choice experiment study

Danish farmers have been far less interested in agri-environmental subsidy schemes (AES) than anticipated. In order to examine how to improve the appeal of such schemes, a choice experiment was conducted concerning 444 Danish farmers’ preferences for subsidy schemes for pesticide-free buffer zones. A random parameter logit framework was used to capture heterogeneity among farmers. Our results indicate that 1) the vast majority of farmers are willing to trade off the size of the subsidy for less restrictive scheme requirements and that 2) the amount of the subsidy they are willing to trade off varies with specific scheme requirements, suggesting which features are most important for successful policy design. Our results suggest that farmers value flexible contract terms higher than reduced administrative burdens. Finally, we suggest a practical approach to estimating a monetary value of farmers’ reluctance to participate in AES. While the trade off's that farmers are willing to make between subsidy size and individual scheme requirements are case specific, our results concerning increased use of farm advisors, farmers ability of valuing different types of flexibility, and our attempt to place a monetary value on farmers’ reluctance to engage in regulatory subsidy schemes have a potentially broader application platform.     

Countervailing Power and Price Transparency*

We investigate whether improved transparency about prices may increase the countervailing power exercised by buyers of an intermediate good. In a model with an informed manufacturer that sells to both informed and uninformed firms, we show that full transparency cannot be part of equilibrium due to the strategic effect of the resulting informational spillover. Transparency policies introduce a distortion for informed segments and are unsuccessful in completely removing the distortion from the uninformed segment. Welfare effects are hence ambiguous and depend on the weight assigned to uninformed markets. Our results thus cast further doubt on the value of transparency.     

Lobbying Bureaucrats*

We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying.