Stock market seasonality: International Evidence

This study examines empirically stock market seasonality in major industrialized countries. Evidence is provided that there are strong seasonalities in the stock market return distributions in most of the capital markets around the world. The seasonality, when it exists, appears to be caused by the disproportionately large January returns in most countries and April returns in the U.K. With the exception of australia, these months also coincide with the turn of the tax year.     

Subsidiary initiatives and subsidiary autonomy: Evidence from New Zealand and Brazil

The paper uses evidence from a developed and a developing economy (New Zealand and Brazil) to study the consequence of multinational subsidiary initiative taking for subsidiary autonomy. Initiative taking and autonomy are known to increase the likelihood of a subsidiary continuing to grow and develop. Uncertainty remains as to whether subsidiaries acquire or lose autonomy as they engage in initiatives partly as the willingness to pursue initiatives can be viewed positively or negatively by the parent company. By using cross-country data and distinguishing three types of initiative according to the scope of their potential impact (internal, local and global) the study provides a basis for examining this topic that improves on evidence from a single country or single initiative study. Data from 200 multinational subsidiaries in New Zealand and 172 in Brazil are gathered for analysis. As well as examining the overall relationship between initiative taking and autonomy the study presents the first evidence on this topic for subsidiaries in New Zealand and Brazil. The overall conclusion is that subsidiary initiative taking is likely to increase subsidiary autonomy but the affect over autonomy is dependent upon the type of initiative that the subsidiary undertakes: subsidiary autonomy is more likely to increase as a result of a local market initiative than a global or internal market initiative.     

Regime Dependent Effects of Inflation Uncertainty on Real Growth: A Markov Switching Approach

We empirically investigate the effects of inflation uncertainty on output growth for the United States between 1960 and 2012. Modeling output dynamics within a Markov regime switching framework, we provide evidence that inflation uncertainty exerts a negative and regime‐dependent impact on output growth. A battery of sensitivity checks confirm our findings.     

A Measure of the Shadow Economy in a Small Economy: Evidence from Household‐Level Expenditure Patterns

In this paper we measure the size of the shadow economy in North Cyprus by using micro‐econometric approaches and then calculate its implications on national accounts and fiscal balances. There is a relatively new strand of literature that focuses on comparing income–expenditure patterns of households to calculate the degree of underreporting of income levels by self‐employed and privately employed individuals, as compared with public servants. We use the 2008 Household Budget Survey of North Cyprus and analyze the differences in food consumption patterns among three kinds of employees: self‐employed, privately employed, and public. We found that self‐employed and privately employed individuals underreport their income levels by 20 percent and 13 percent, respectively, compared with publicly employed individuals. This has important implications for the aggregate economy in North Cyprus, where we estimate that the shadow economy created by underreporting is as much as 8.6 percent of GNP and 11.1 percent of total tax revenue.     

Inflation, price dispersion, and market structure

In this paper, we use a novel data set containing prices from bazaars, convenience stores, and supermarkets in Istanbul to re-examine the relationship between price dispersion and inflation. Although existing evidence is mixed, we find positive and significant relationships between dispersion, on the one hand, and lagged dispersion and unexpected product-specific inflation on the other. We also find evidence that dispersion is initially decreasing in anticipated aggregate inflation but is eventually increasing. Finally, average price duration and dispersion are lowest in the bazaar. This is intuitive, since menu and search costs should be minimal in that market structure.     

Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems

We identify a new channel through which schools can potentially manipulate the well-known student and school-optimal stable mechanisms. We introduce two fictitious students creation manipulation notions where one of them is stronger. While the student and school-optimal stable mechanisms turn out to be weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclic (Ergin in Econometrica 88:485–494, 2002) and essentially homogeneous (Kojima in Games Econ Behav 82:1–14, 2013) priority structures, respectively, they still lack strong fictitious student-proofness. We then compare the mechanisms in terms of their vulnerability to manipulations in the sense of Pathak and Sönmez (Am Econ Rev 103(1):80–106, 2013) and find out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is more manipulable than the school-optimal one. Lastly, in the large market setting of Kojima and Pathak (Am Econ Rev 99(3):608–627, 2009), the student-optimal stable mechanism becomes weakly fictitious student-proof as the market is getting large.     

Strategy-proof size improvement: is it possible?*

The number of assigned agents (i.e., size) is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate the possibility of size increase. A mechanism $\psi$ size-wise dominates another mechanism $\varphi$ if the latter never assigns more agents than the former, and at some problem, $\psi$ assigns more agents than $\varphi$. We obtain arguably mild conditions for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, whenever there are at least as many objects as the total number of agents, we find conditions, different from those previously mentioned, for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and group strategy-proof mechanism. These results have implications for deferred-acceptance, top trading cycles, efficiency-adjusted deferred-acceptance, serial dictatorship, and Boston mechanisms.     

Assignment maximization

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto efficient and undominated—in terms of the number of assignments—in equilibrium. The second is fair for unassigned agents and assigns weakly more agents than any stable mechanism in equilibrium.     

Nexus between economic risk and political risk in the United Kingdom: Evidence from wavelet coherence and quantile-on-quantile approaches

This study examines the linkage between economic risk and political risk in the United Kingdom. This linkage has attracted the attention of policymakers; however, there is no consequence of the linkage in the existing literature. The study aims to close this gap for the UK case by applying wavelet coherence (WTC) and quantile-on-quantile regression (QQR) approaches and using quarterly data between 1984/Q1 and 2020/Q4. The results of the WTC reveal that there is time–frequency dependency between economic risk and political risk majorly in the medium and low frequencies. Moreover, the direction of the causality changes over time. Furthermore, the outcomes of the WTC show that economic risk leads political risk between 1995 and 2005, whereas political risk leads economic risk from 2006 to 2019. The outcomes of the QQR approach disclose that in the higher tail (0.7–0.95) of political risk and lower and medium tail (0.05–0.60) of economic risk, the effect of political risk on economic risk is positive and strong. On the flip side, at all quantiles (0.05–0.95) of economic risk and lower quantiles (0.10–0.30) of political risk, the effect of political risk on economic risk is positive and strong. The results are also validated by the outcomes of partial wavelet coherence, multiple wavelet coherence, and quantile regression. Hence, the results highlight the importance of political risk (economic risk) for economic risk (political risk) in the UK case.     

How Social Structures Influence the Labour Market Participation of Individuals with Mental Illness: A Bourdieusian Perspective

Adopting a Bourdieusian perspective, this paper examines the social structures that influence the labour market participation of individuals with mental illness. We draw on 257 qualitative surveys completed by individuals with diagnosed mental health conditions in Europe, North America, Oceania, Africa, and Asia. We employed thematic analysis to analyse the data. The findings reveal that the interplay of capital endowments, symbolic violence, habitus and illusio shape the labour market participation of individuals with mental illness. Capital endowments of individuals with mental illness are afforded less value in the labour market and these individuals internalize, legitimize and normalize their disadvantaged position, blaming themselves rather than questioning the social structures leading to the challenges they encounter. We highlight that social structures condition the opinion these individuals have of themselves and how this affects how they navigate the labour market. In sum, we show that Bourdieu's concepts provide a useful lens to study inequalities in the labour market, as they reveal the social structures that produce, sustain and reinforce the social order that disadvantages individuals with mental illness.