Misleading Inferences from Panel Unit Root Tests: a Reply*

Ford et al. (this issue) point out that the SURADF panel unit root test may be sensitive to panel composition. This reply shows that they overstate the case since they focus on a short time series of 44 observations. Type II errors are much more likely in this environment so that inconsistent conclusions may arise for individual panel members across differently composed panels. We demonstrate that this problem becomes much less likely when the number of time‐series observations increases.     

Does international research and development increase patent output? An analysis of Japanese pharmaceutical firms

Internationalizing research and development is often advocated as a strategy for fostering the development of technological capabilities. Although firms conduct international R&D to tap into knowledge bases that reside in foreign countries, we argue that in order to benefit from international R&D investments firms must already possess research capabilities in underlying or complementary technologies. We examine the international R&D expansion activities, research capabilities, and patent output of 65 Japanese pharmaceutical firms from 1980 to 1991. We find that firms benefit from international R&D only when they possess existing research capabilities in the underlying technologies. In addition to refining our understanding of when international R&D enhances firm innovation, our results integrate asset‐seeking and asset‐based theories of foreign direct investment. Internationalizing R&D to tap into foreign knowledge bases is consistent with asset‐seeking theories of foreign direct investment, while the contingent nature by which firms benefit from international R&D is consistent with asset‐based theories of foreign direct investment and the notion of absorptive capacity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs

We analyze the non‐cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher‐cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower‐cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.     

The Internationalization of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Policy Perspective

Small Business Economics - Small and medium sized firms play an important role in the process of creative destruction. The focus of the paper is on the international diffusion of small and medium...     

Getting there in a global industry: Impacts on performance of changing international presence

We investigate the effects of increasing and decreasing international presence on market share and survival in the American medical diagnostic imaging equipment industry. Imaging equipment manufacturers possessing international medical operations tend to achieve superior market share and longer survival, but we find that attempting to become an international medical player is risky. Both increasing and decreasing international presence have negative associations with survival, while decreased internationalization is associated with decreased American market share. Brief case studies suggest that the ingredients for success in internationalization may include preparedness, focused management, and learning from international experience.     

Firm non‐market capabilities and the effect of supranational institutional safeguards on the location choice of international investments

Research Summary : We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary : The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.