A Comment on Excess Asset Reversions and Shareholder Wealth

This study re-examines the earlier finding of Alderson and Chen (1986a) that financial markets do not consider excess pension assets in determining share prices and that significant increases in shareholder wealth occur when an overfunded pension plan is terminated. The results document that specific event-time contamination (corporate restructuring announcements) provides the driving force for all the earlier findings.     

The Investment Opportunity Set and Acquired Goodwill*

This paper examines how managers in New Zealand allocate the cost of firms' investments in subsidiaries between net tangible assets and acquired goodwill. We find a negative relation between acquired goodwill and leverage. This could be interpreted as the result of managers of highly leveraged acquiring firms opportunistically allocating a lower portion of the acquisition price to acquired goodwill. However, this analysis, like much of the research on accounting choice, suffers from an omitted variables problem. We present evidence that the observed negative relation between acquired goodwill and leverage may stem from each variable's relation to the investment opportunity set. Further, we find no evidence that acquired goodwill is related to the existence of debt covenants. Together, these results suggest an endogenous relation between the firm's asset structure, its financing policy, and the allocation of acquisition price to acquired goodwill.     

Did Regulation Fair Disclosure,SOX, and Other Analyst Regulations Reduce Security Mispricing?

Between 2000 and 2003 a series of disclosure and analyst regulations curbing abusive financial reporting and analyst behavior were enacted to strengthen the information environment of U.S. capital markets. We investigate whether these regulations reduced security mispricing and increased stock market efficiency. After the regulations, we find a significant reduction in short‐term stock price continuation following analyst forecast revisions and earnings announcements. The effect was more pronounced among higher information uncertainty firms, where we expect security valuation to be most sensitive to regulation. Analyst forecast accuracy also improved in these firms, consistent with reduced mispricing being due to an improved corporate information environment following the regulations. Our findings are robust to controls for time trends, trading activity, the financial crisis, analyst coverage, delistings, and changes in information uncertainty proxies. We find no concurrent effect among European firms and a regression discontinuity design supports our identification of a regulatory effect.     

ECONOMICS OF THE "CRITICAL USE" OF METHYL BROMIDE UNDER THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL

We analyze the economics of granting temporary exceptions to the phaseout of methyl bromide (MeBr) under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The protocol allows such exceptions based on technical or economic "feasibility" through a critical use exemption (CUE) process. Data compiled under the protocol make it possible to set forth criteria for the exceptions based on estimation of the benefits of compliance in terms of "willingness to pay" to abate the externality, as well as costs to the users creating the externality. We estimate a political willingness to pay and show that market and supply effects would reduce losses to MeBr users below estimates of such losses provided in CUE nominations. This suggests that the phaseout of MeBr can proceed with considerably fewer CUEs than requested by the parties. (JEL Q1 , Q2 , Q3 , H8 )     

The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium

Formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution. This paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence. Valence can be interpreted as the non-policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders. The theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence. The condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance. When the condition fails, the low-valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre. The inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the Israel election in 1996.     

POSTING MULTIPLE PRICES TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER PRICE SEARCH*

In a model of competition with imperfect consumer price information and incomplete price search, some consumers may end up comparing prices originating from the same supplier: either because one firm sets multiple prices or because a group of firms colludes. This leads to added monopoly power for these firms, and average prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium become higher. There is a shift in welfare from consumers to producers, both with exogenous and endogenous consumer search behaviour. However consumers might search more or less with multiple prices. The implications for the price‐setting equilibrium, competition policy and recent judgements are considered.