Targeting Child Labor in Debt Bondage: Evidence, Theory, and Policy Implications

Despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child laborin debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor, severalimportant questions have yet to be addressed: How pervasiveis the phenomenon? Are there systematic correlations betweenthe incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic,legislative, and financial development indicators of the economy?How does an understanding of these correlates affect the waynational and international policy measures aimed at targetingthis form of child labor are perceived? This article addresseseach of these questions. The empirical findings suggest strongcorrelation between the likelihood of the incidence of childlabor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy,the stage of financial development, and enforcement of corelabor rights. Building on this evidence, the article presentsa theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and meritsof a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child laborin debt bondage.     

Can Consumers Forgo the Need to Touch Products? An Investigation of Nonhaptic Situational Factors in an Online Context

Touch is an important source of information for consumers, and there is much to learn about its role in an online purchase decision context where the ability to touch products is not (at least currently) possible. The present investigation examines three nonhaptic situation‐specific factors that moderate the relationship between haptic motivation and consumer responses. The results indicate that positive mood, price promotions, and level of situation‐specific product expertise are influential, yielding greater purchase intentions and product judgment confidence when touch is not available. Additionally, the findings of the investigation suggest that imagining a Web site is comparable to actually viewing a Web site. Several implications for consumer behavior research and online marketers are discussed.     

Imaginable surprise in global change science

Decisionmakers at all scales (individuals, firms, and local, national, and international governmental organizations) are concerned about reducing their vulnerability to (or the likelihood of) unexpected events, 'surprises.' After briefly and selectively reviewing the literature on uncertainty and surprise, we adopt a definition of 'surprise' that does not include the strict requirement that it apply to a wholly unexpected outcome, but rather recognizes that many events are often anticipated by some, even if not most observers. Thus, we define 'imaginable surprise' as events or processes that depart from the expectations of some definable community. Therefore, what gets labelled as 'surprise' depends on the extent to which what happens departs from community expectations and on the salience of the problem. We offer a typology of surprise that distinguishes imaginable surprises from risk and uncertainty, and develops several kinds of impediments to overcoming ignorances. These range from the need for more 'normal science' to phenomenological impediments (e.g., inherentunpredictability in some chaotic systems) to epistemological ignorance (e.g., ideological blocks to reducing ignorance). Based on the input of some two dozen scholars at an Aspen Global Change Institute Summer Workshop in 1994 *, we construct two tables in which participants offer many possible 'imaginable surprises' in the global change context, as well as their potential salience for creating unexpectedly high or low carbon dioxide emissions. Improving the anticipation of surprises is an interdisciplinary enterprise that should offer a sceptical welcoming of outlier ideas and methods.     

Tax contracts and elections

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks when in office. A government raises taxes for both purposes. We show that tax contracts yield moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coalitions in order to win government. Moreover, in polarized societies they unambiguously improve the welfare of the median voter.     

The Market Perception of Convertible Debt Versus Straight Debt: some Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firms and Non-U.S. Firms Listed in the U.S.

Accounting for convertible debt has long been a source of controversy in the accounting profession in the U.S. Current U.S. accounting rules require classifying convertible debt at date of issuance as "entirely debt" until conversion, despite numerous studies that assert that convertible debt is not "entirely debt", but is a blend of debt and equity. Convertible debt has taken on international interest because of the issuance of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 32, Financial Instruments; Disclosure and Presentation, which prescribes reporting separate debt and equity components for convertible debt. This study examines convertible debt issued by U.S. firms and non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. using a levels approach. Specifically, convertible debt is compared to straight debt and contrary to ex ante expectation, convertible debt was not found to be perceived as being significantly different than straight debt for U.S. firms for any years and is statistically different in only two of the six years tested for non-U.S. firms. The validity of this study's findings is underscored by its research design, which compares convertible debt and straight debt issued by the same firms. The findings suggest that investors regard reported amounts of convertible debt similar to straight debt in their assessment of firm value.     

Getting Shut Out of the International Capital Markets: It Doesn't Take Much*

We use a simple model of international lending to show that an emerging market borrower who might default can be shut out of international capital markets without warning. A modest haircut on obligations, for example, can shut down lending.