When consumers switch brands

A proposed integrative approach measured consumer response to various incentives to switch brands. The response measure consisted of both actual behavior (i.e., switching behavior) and an evaluative measure, which underlies the behavior. Self-perception theory was utilized to assess consumer switching behavior in response to intrinsic versus extrinsic motives. The integrative approach was tested in the context of a multistage longitudinal field study concerning five product classes. Findings show that there is a difference depending upon whether switching behavior was induced by extrinsic (e.g., price, coupon) or intrinsic (e.g., a desire to try a new brand) incentives. Unlike intrinsically induced switching, extrinsic incentives motivated consumers to switch despite a high level of satisfaction with the last purchased brand. However, this switching behavior resulted in weaker intentions to repurchase the new brand.     

The Effect of Governance Mechanisms on Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprise Cash Holdings: Evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper investigates the impact of governance mechanisms on small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) cash holdings from 2000 to 2009, employing static and dynamic panel data analyses. We find no evidence that firm governance index and insider ownership affect cash holdings. This might indicate that governance mechanisms in SMEs are relatively weak. We also report that chief executive officer compensation has a positive effect on cash holdings. Firm‐specific factors such as firm size, leverage, and liquidity negatively affect cash holdings, whereas the research and development ratio and operating risk are positively associated with them. Finally, SMEs have target cash holdings and adjust to these.     

论城管行政执法体系的构建

我国各地的城管部门虽然有着同一称谓,但是其职责范围却不尽相同。在城管执法人员的编制上,有的是机关编制,有的是事业编制,有的是合同工,在执法的主体资格上也存在很大差异。目前我国还没有统一的相关城管执法立法,城管在执法过程中常常面临职责不清的情况。在执法过程中,执行难的问题时常发生。所以有必要对于城管执法问题进行研究,构建符合我国国情的城管执法体系,厘清城管执法与其他行政部门之间的责任范围,解决好城管执法过程中存在的相关法律问题。     

A new look at the forward premium “puzzle”

We decompose the spot and forward rates into (permanent) nonlinear trend components and (transitory) stationary components. We examine the unbiasedness of the permanent (transitory) component of the forward rate in predicting the permanent (transitory) component of its corresponding future spot rate. The transitory component of the future spot rate under reacts to the transitory component of the forward rate. However, the permanent component of the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the permanent component of the future spot rate. A robust nonlinear cotrending relation is also found between the forward and future spot rates and the hypothesis of the forward‐rate unbiasedness is sustained in the long run. These results suggest that the forward rate better explains the long‐term behavior of the future spot rate. Simulation analysis shows that if the transitory component of the forward rate fully predicts the transitory component of the future spot rate, the forward premium puzzle disappears. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 31:599–628, 2011     

Measuring and explaining the efficiencies of the United Arab Emirates banking system

Using newly collected data from a survey distributed to all banks in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), this article measures economic efficiency in the banking industry, namely allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency. Employing a nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, the study estimates the efficiency for a cross section of the UAE banks in 2004. The results indicate that the dominant source of inefficiency in the UAE banking is stemming from allocative inefficiency rather than technical inefficiency. Furthermore, the main source of the relatively small size, technical inefficiency in the UAE banking industry is not the scale inefficiency but rather pure technical inefficiency. The results further indicate that the UAE banks are able to use their input resources more efficiently when they have more branches, and that newer banks are performing better than older banks on average. Moreover, the results also show that short experiences of employees affect efficiencies negatively and government ownership tends to reduce efficiency (as the government shares increase in the bank, the efficiency scores get lower). Finally, the most interesting results have to do with finding higher average efficiencies in banks that employ more women, more managers and less national citizens of the UAE.     

Team Incentives and Organizational Form

Conventional wisdom regarding nonprofit firms is that the absence of a profit motive renders them inefficient. However, the costs and product quality realized by profit-taking firms is determined by how well those firms deal with a variety of internal incentive and information problems, and this should be equally true for nonprofits. This article analyzes the team incentive problem in nonprofit organizations. Holmstrom (1982) showed that the introduction of a budget-breaker into a team permitted the creation of incentives to provide efficient effort when it is otherwise impossible. A similar result obtains for a nonprofit team, but the role of principal differs from that found in profit-taking teams. It is shown that any of: donors, government regulators, or Trustees can fulfill this role in a nonprofit team. One implication of this is shown to be that nonprofit firms may indeed pay employees less than otherwise identical employees earn in identical jobs in profit-taking firms.     

How Inequality Affects Trust in Institutions: Evidence from Indonesia

Trust is an important ingredient to improve economic performance and people's welfare by alleviating market failures caused by imperfect information, costly enforcement, or coordination failures. Using the World Values Survey 2018, we estimate the impact of village and district levels inequality on trust in institutions in Indonesia. We find that higher village level inequality has a negative effect only on trust in strangers, while higher district level inequality reduces trust in television, the press, the central government, the courts, and the police. The implication points to the importance of keeping inequality at the aggregate level in check to maintain people's trust in social, political and state institutions.     

The Optimal Choice for Lenders Facing Defaults: Short Sale,Foreclose, or REO

When mortgage borrowers default and have no desire or ability to keep their property, then loss mitigation involves a sale of the property via one of the following options: (1) the lender allows pre-foreclosure “short sale” by the borrower, (2) the lender institutes the foreclosure process under a notice of default and the property is sold during the process by the borrower, and (3) the lender forecloses on the property, takes title, and sells the property in the market as real estate owned (REO). Sale of the property in the above three options is conducted by a motivated seller, either the owner or the lender, who desires to sell the property as quickly as possible. Thus, relative to a no-default sale, the house is most likely to be sold at a discounted price. It is generally expected that the discount would be lower in the case of a “short sale.” This option, however, may result in a longer marketing time, thus a higher total loss, than the other two options. We developed a model that allows simultaneous estimation of price and time-on-market effects of “short sales,” foreclosures, and REO options. We find that the short-sale option has the lowest-price discount, but significantly higher costs associated with marketing time. The pattern of price discount and marketing time reverses as we move to a sale while in the process of foreclosure and to a sale with an REO status.