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1.
Manipulating uncertainty 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
A. S. Pinto Barbosa 《Constitutional Political Economy》1994,5(3):255-271
Uncertainty about the distributional incidence of policy reforms may, if it impinges selectively on particular subsets of
voters, alter the direction of the majority vote. This possibility should be a matter of special concern when subject to potential
manipulation by a purposeful agent such as a Leviathan-like bureaucracy. This paper discusses a constitutional defense against
such prospect.
This paper was prepared for a conference on “Constitutional Status Quo and Prospects for Change” held at George Mason University
in April, 1994. I am grateful to participants in that conference and to my colleagues at Nova, especially to Mário Páscoa,
for their comments and criticisms. I also benefited from comments of an anonymous referee. Responsibility for errors remains
with me. 相似文献
2.
Angel Martínez Sánchez 《Small Business Economics》1992,4(2):153-168
This paper highlights the difficulty of developing HT firms in a peripheral region of Spain. Although the endogenous development of HT firms in these regions is possible, their evolution depends on more central regions. The firm's geographical location and the type of HT production are the most important endogenous factors governing the firm's success. 相似文献
3.
Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling. 相似文献
4.
5.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):483-495
Summary. In this paper, I study the existence of Sunspot Equilibria in a general framework whose dynamics allow for the presence of
predetermined variables in the system. The main motivation for this research comes from the fact that previous studies did
not allow for such predetermined variables which, nevertheless, appear quite naturally in economic models. I show, for a non-negligible
subset of dynamics with predetermined variables verifying usual assumptions, the existence of Stationary Sunspot Equilibria
fluctuating between an arbitrary finite number of states arbitrarily close to a steady state.
Received: March 1, 1995; revised version September 18, 1996 相似文献
6.
Borges del Rosal Africa San Luis Concepción Sánchez-Bruno Alfonso 《Quality and Quantity》2003,37(3):303-316
Quality &; Quantity - Cliff (1993) has proposed the use of a measure of effect size alternative to traditionalmean differences: δ {? = Pr(xi1 &;gt; xj2) - Pr(xi1 &;lt; xj2)}which,... 相似文献
7.
Rolando F. Peláez 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2005,29(1):127-137
This paper presents a logit model for dating business-cycle turning points. The regressors are monthly series from the Business
Cycle Indicators database of the Conference Board. Dividing the sample period into a subset for model initialization (1959∶9–1970∶12)
and a subset for testing (1971∶1–2003∶12) yields a chronology that is nearly identical to that established by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). However, the recognition lag is less than four months, in contrast to an average of more
than eleven months for the official chronology. (JEL E320)
The author is grateful for comments by an anonymous referee. 相似文献
8.
Diánez-González Juan Pablo Camelo-Ordaz Carmen Fernández-Alles Mariluz 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2021,17(2):1007-1035
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This paper has been designed with a dual goal. On the one hand, the paper aims to examine the role of management teams, industry agents, and... 相似文献
9.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
10.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献