Effects of cognitive age,dispositional time perceptions,and time view manipulations on product attribute evaluations

Researchers manipulate time perceptions in experiments, but the efficacy of such manipulations demands further scrutiny. Two studies test the effects of dispositional time views and time view manipulations on product attribute evaluations, as well as the interaction between cognitive age and manipulated time perceptions and that between dispositional and manipulated time perceptions. The results suggest that time manipulation drives and predicts consumer product evaluations. In addition, cognitive age interacts with time manipulation as a meaningful moderator/predictor, and dispositional time view interacts with time manipulation to influence consumer evaluations. An incongruency effect (i.e., a time manipulation condition that differs from consumers' time perceptions) occurs for hedonic attribute evaluations but not for utilitarian attribute evaluations. The research offers several managerial implications of these findings.     

Adopting bioenergy crops: Does farmers’ attitude toward loss matter?

We apply prospect theory to examining farmers’ economic incentives to divert a share of their land to bioenergy crops (miscanthus and switchgrass in this study). Numerical simulation is conducted for 1,919 rain‐fed U.S. counties to identify the impact of loss aversion on bioenergy crop adoption, and how this impact is influenced by biomass price, discount rate, credit constraint status, and policy instruments. Results show that ignoring farmer's loss aversion causes overestimation of miscanthus production but underestimation of switchgrass production, particularly when farmers are credit constrained and have a high discount rate. We find that establishment cost subsidy induces more miscanthus production whereas subsidized energy crop insurance induces more switchgrass production. The efficacy of these two policy instruments, measured by biomass production increased by per dollar of government outlay, depends on the magnitude of farmers’ loss aversion and discount rate.     

Boards: Does one size fit all?

This paper reexamines the relation between firm value and board structure. We find that complex firms, which have greater advising requirements than simple firms, have larger boards with more outside directors. The relation between Tobin's Q and board size is U-shaped, which, at face value, suggests that either very small or very large boards are optimal. This relation, however, arises from differences between complex and simple firms. Tobin's Q increases (decreases) in board size for complex (simple) firms, and this relation is driven by the number of outside directors. We find some evidence that R&D-intensive firms, for which the firm-specific knowledge of insiders is relatively important, have a higher fraction of insiders on the board and that, for these firms, Q increases with the fraction of insiders on the board. Our findings challenge the notion that restrictions on board size and management representation on the board necessarily enhance firm value.     

Opportunistic monetary policy: An alternative rationalization

This paper offers an alternative rationalization for opportunistic behaviour, i.e., a gradual disinflation strategy where policymakers react asymmetrically to supply shocks, opting to disinflate only in recessionary period. Specifically, we show that adaptive expectations combined with asymmetry in the Phillips curve of a specific sort together provide an optimizing justification for opportunism. However, the empirical basis for these conditions to be satisfied in the current low-inflation context of most OECD countries remains however to be established.     

Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups

Emerging markets like India have poorly functioning institutions, leading to severe agency and information problems. Business groups in these markets have the potential both to offer benefits to member firms, and to destroy value. We analyze the performance of affiliates of diversified Indian business groups relative to unaffiliated firms. We find that accounting and stock market measures of firm performance initially decline with group diversification and subsequently increase once group diversification exceeds a certain level. Unlike U.S. conglomerates' lines of business, and similar to the affiliates of U.S. LBO associations, affiliates of the most diversified business groups outperform unaffiliated firms.     

Managerial incentives and risk-taking

We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta.     

Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?

We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significant impact on CEO compensation. One view is that benchmarking is inefficient because it can lead to increases in executive pay not tied to firm performance. A contrasting view is that benchmarking is a practical and efficient mechanism used to gauge the market wage necessary to retain valuable human capital. Our empirical results generally support the latter view. Our findings also suggest that the documented asymmetry in the relationship between CEO pay and luck is explained by the firm's desire to adjust pay for retention purposes and is not the result of rent-seeking behavior on the part of the CEO.     

Conservation capital and sustainable economic growth

An endogenous growth model, which links pollution to ineffectiveinput-use, is developed to examine the potential for achievingbalanced growth while preserving the environment through investmentin conservation capital. We derive conditions under which individualpreferences for environmental quality and private incentivesfor investment in conservation capital can lead to non-decreasingenvironmental quality with balanced growth even in the absenceof environmental regulations. Additionally, conditions underwhich investment in conservation capital can enable an environmentallyregulated economy to achieve a higher rate of sustainable balancedgrowth than otherwise are analysed.     

Oligopolies with (Somewhat) Environmentally Conscious Consumers: Market Equilibrium and Regulatory Intervention

We consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly where consumers care about the product's “greenness.” Firms can be asymmetric: they may differ in the product's intrinsic value and may also differ in their chosen level of greenness. We examine the choice of greenness and the implications of various policy interventions. We show that (i) the choices of product greenness are strategic substitutes, (ii) the high‐intrinsic quality firm produces the greener product, (iii) the low‐quality firm's greenness may increase with the cost of its provision or decrease with consumer willingness to pay for it, (iv) a minimum quality standard (MQS) leads the greener firm to lower its environmental quality and can even reduce average quality, (v) greenness is underprovided even if consumers fully internalize the externality, and (v) an MQS can reduce welfare if the greenness of the high‐quality firm exceeds the MQS, even when environmental quality is underprovided. The effects of policy interventions on profits differ qualitatively across polices and firms: A firm that lobbies for one type of intervention may lobby against another similar one, and a firm may lobby for an intervention while its competitor may lobby against it. A subsidy for the development costs of a green product can financially hurt both firms.