IMF新决议的突破：双边汇率监督范围之厘定

明确地划定双边汇率监督覆盖的范围是IMF新决议的重大突破。新决议以外部稳定作为统领原则和核心，借助临近原则将对外部稳定具有直接和重要影响的会员国政策纳入汇率监督的范围。新决议还对国内政策、国内稳定与外部稳定的关系做了廓清，认为国内政策通过促进国内稳定来促进外部稳定，同时对经济增长与外部稳定的关系进行了明确。新决议对我国具有重要影响，我国应重视但不应不适当地放大新决议的影响，最重要的是利用新决议的特点和有利规定为人民币汇率主动、可控和渐进性改革保驾护航。     

A 'Basic Needs' Strategy for Development of Technology in Low Income Countries.

Abstract . The ‘basic needs’ strategy in development planning calls for giving priority to meeting minimum human needs and providing certain essential public services. This investigations studies its relevancy for developing technology and change in low income countries. It advances the case for an operationally-oriented basic needs concept for technology in such countries. It outlines a simplified planning model incorporating such a strategy. Eight equations are developed to yield an illustrative preliminary function showing the basic needs technology interacting with a structure of production, consumption and accumulation.     

Nonresponse Bias and Stimulus Effects in the Dutch National Election Study

Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

我国反腐败工作的现状与进展

反腐败问题是现代社会所面临的一个共同课题。我国反腐败现状可以从监督、领导干部廉洁自律、查办违法违纪案件、纠正损害群众利益的不正之风和源头治理等五个方面来进行深入了解和总体把握。在此基础上,针对我国反腐败理论研究的薄弱环节,从“腐败”的概念和类型划分、反腐败的领域范围、预防腐败以及制定反腐败的专门法律等方面探讨和研究反腐败的基本问题,以便促进我们对反腐败工作的认识,并推动相关的工作。     

Temporary Liaisons: The Commitment of ‘Temps’ Towards Their Agencies*

abstract The majority of research on organizational commitment has focused on commitment in traditional, ongoing and open‐ended relationships. The commitment of employees in non‐standard work arrangements such as temporary employment has been subject to much less theoretical and empirical investigation. In this study, we examine the affective and continuance commitment of temporary workers towards their agency and its determinants. We distinguish two groups of determinants: the process by which the temporary worker chose a particular agency and the support provided by the agency. The findings can be summarized as follows: (1) affective commitment among temps is generally higher than their continuance commitment; (2) having more alternative agencies to choose from (i.e., volition) does not enhance the commitment of temporary workers; (3) a public choice for a particular agency raises both types of commitment, whereas the perceived agency dependence created by the choice increases continuance, but not affective commitment; and (4) both types of commitment are positively influenced by agency supportiveness, reflected in the way the agency deals with problems, the career support it provides, and the way it keeps in close contact with its temporary workers. Finally, the results suggest that factors raising affective commitment may ‘spill over’ to increase continuance commitment.     

A different perspective on operating leverage: Comments

A recent article in this journal by Dran (1991) suggests that the usual treatment of degree of operating leverage (DOL) is misleading because it improperly attributes the DOL to the ratio of fixed to total costs rather than the closeness of the firm’s output to breakeven. Managerial economics texts are clear in identification of DOL as an elasticity concept which varies with the nearness to break-even. Examples associating DOL with the relative level of fixed cost arise from association of higher fixed costs with higher breakeven points, and this appears to be the normal economic relationship.